Moreover, the Council of State does not define any one of the acts of which it makes the Appellant responsible. It neither indicates the persons whom it holds guilty nor the circumstances in which they have committed any offence. It is left to be understood only that there has been a contravention of the order by which the Council of State, on the 2nd February, _temporarily suspended the exercises of the Salvation Army_. No other act whatsoever is attributed to the persons for whose conduct the Appellant is held responsible. It is essential to note this point. Now, in coming to the question of these contraventions of the decree of the 2nd February, it is very difficult to give any exact definition of their nature. First of all, it is necessary to know what it is which the Council of State wished to suspend temporarily. Secondly, whether it had the right to order this suspension. When the Council of State was questioned by the members of the Salvation Army and other persons on the former point, it never gave any definite or categorical explanation which could serve as a rule of conduct; and with regard to the second point it is evident that the decree could not claim to extend to meetings held in a private house in which certain members of the Salvation Army may have taken part. Now it is a matter of public notoriety in Geneva that since the issue of the decree of the Council of State the public “exercises” of the Army have completely ceased throughout the Canton. The Appellant defies the Council of State to establish the contrary. It is very possible that certain members of the Salvation Army may since then have participated as individuals in religious meetings to which they have been invited by private persons at their own private houses; but there is no contravention of the decree of the Council of State in such an act; and, further, these are private actions for which the Appellant is in no way whatever responsible.