Even admitting a certain responsibility on the part of the Appellant in regard to the actions of members of the Salvation Army, it remains yet to be proved of what nature the acts are to which this responsibility applies. It is evident that they can only be acts which have been ordered to be performed by the Appellant. Even if the most complete and official resemblance were to be admitted between the Salvation Army and that which is commonly called an Army, and even supposing the Appellant were the General-in-Chief of that Army, it is clear that it would be impossible to lay to her charge the private acts of the soldiers under her. No general of an army has ever been held personally responsible for individual crimes or offences perpetrated by his soldiers. It is not therefore sufficient in order to prove the responsibility of the Appellant toward the Genevese Government that it should be proved that members of the Society in which she occupies a high position, should have rendered themselves guilty of a contravention of a Governmental regulation. It must be established that that contravention was perpetrated on her own order. Now the Council of State never asserts that this has been the case.