Vol. 3. · The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning providence, and a translation of extracts from his treatise on the subsistence of evil; as preserved in the Bibliotheca Gr. of Fabricus

P. 13. _Devised wanderings, sections, battles, lacerations, rapes and adulteries of the Gods._ See the fables in which these things are asserted of the Gods admirably unfolded by Proclus in the Introduction to the 2nd. and 3rd. books of the Republic of Plato, in Vol. 1. of my Plato.

P. 90. _And thus much concerning divine names._ In addition to what is here said, Proclus admirably remarks on this subject as follows, in his MS. Scholia On the Cratylus of Plato.

Since, however, the present discourse is about divine names, it is necessary to speak a little concerning them. And in the first place, let us speak concerning the names which are occultly established in the Gods themselves; since some of the ancients said that these originated from the more excellent genera,[395] but that the Gods are established beyond a signification of this kind; but others admitted that names are in the Gods themselves, and in those Gods that are allotted the highest order.

The Gods, therefore, possess an hyparxis uniform and ineffable, a power generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of conceptions; and they give subsistence to all things according to this triad. Hence it is necessary that the participations of those divinities who are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged nearer to _the good_, should proceed triadically through all things to which they give subsistence. It is also necessary that among these, those participations should be more ineffable, which are defined according to the _hyparxes_ of the first Gods; but that those should be more apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to the _intellect_ of exempt causes; and that those participations which are between these, should be such as are the effluxions of _prolific powers_. For the fathers of wholes giving subsistence to all things, have disseminated in all things vestiges, and impressions of their own triadic hypostasis; since nature also inserts in bodies an exciting principle (εναυσμα) derived from her proper idiom through which she moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has established in the universe an image of his own monadic transcendency, through which he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato says, like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that these rudders and this helm of the universe, in which the demiurgus being seated orderly disposes the world, are nothing else than a symbol of the whole fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehension, but to the Gods themselves known and manifest. And why is it requisite to speak concerning these things, since of the ineffable cause of all, who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impression in every being, and even as far as to the last of things, through which all things are suspended from him, some more remotely, and others more near, according to the clearness and obscurity of the impression which they contain. This it is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with things inanimate: and has not an intellectual power; since it lies in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things, have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective peculiarities, and through these convert all things to themselves, in like manner all the Gods impart to their progeny, symbols of their cause, and through these establish all things in themselves, The impressions, therefore, of the hyparxis of the higher order of Gods, which are disseminated in secondary natures are ineffable and unknown, and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And of this kind are the characters of light, through which the Gods unfold themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in the Gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divisibly, and accompanied with form. Hence the Gods[396] exhort “To understand the fore-running form of light.” For subsisting on high without form, it becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through motion, from the Gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the essence by which it is received.

Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in a certain respect media between things ineffable and effable, and pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the primary gifts of the Gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent genera (i.e. angels, dæmons and heroes) previously participating the illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting appropriately in each of their participants, and co-ordinately in all things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind are the symbols of the Gods, which are indeed uniform in the more elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations (αδιαρθρωτων εκφωνησεων).

The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from intellectual essences to all peculiarities, and proceed as far as to us, are divine names, through which the Gods are invoked, and by which they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the Gods themselves, and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of the Gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify something to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the Gods. Different nations however, participate differently of these, as for instance the Egyptians according to their native tongue, receiving names of this kind from the Gods; but the Chaldeans and Indians in a different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a similar manner the Greeks according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the Chaldeans, we must nevertheless admit that each of these names is the progeny of the Gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful; since of things which are known to us, such as are dæmoniacal and angelic are more efficacious; and in short of things denominated the names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those that are more remote.

Not every genus of the Gods however, can be denominated. For Parmenides evinces that the God who is beyond all things is ineffable. “For, says he, he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of.” And of the intelligible Gods the first genera, which are conjoined with _the one itself_, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that the progression of intelligibles, should be terminated in this order; in which there is the first effable,[397] and that which is called by proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence.[398] Hence the whole of the telestic art energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other Gods: for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual orders. But he thus speaks,

μητιν σπερμα φεροντα θεων, κλυτον οντε φανητα, πρωτογονον μακαρες καλεον κατα μακρον Ολυμπον.

i.e., “Metis bearing the seed of the Gods, whom the Gods about lofty Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus.” In the Gods however nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are present with them through the participation of the light which the mighty Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are divided from each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another: and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but there is also a union of the intellective and onomastic energy. The transportive name (διαπορθμιον ονομα) of _Iynxes_[399] (ιγγυων) which is said to sustain all the fountains, appears to me to signify a thing of this kind. Such also is the appellation _teletarchic_ (το τελεταρχικον) which some one of the Gods[400] says, “leaps into the worlds, through the rapid reproof of the father.” κοσμοις ενθρωσκειν κραιπνην δια πατρος ενιπην. For all these things are occultly with the Gods, but are unfolded according to second and third progressions, and to men that are allied to the Gods.

There is therefore a certain abiding name in the Gods, through which the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter in Plato gives names to the unapparent periods of souls.[401] For fathers define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their producing causes through the intellectual impressions which they bear. Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the Gods and which through the middle genera end in the rational essence.

There are however other names of a second and third rank; and these are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing enthusiastically about the Gods, and at another time energizing according to science; either conjoining their own intelligence with divine light, and thence deriving perfection; or committing the fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as geometricians, physicians and rhetoricians give names to the things the peculiarities of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by Phœbus (των ποιητων οι φοιβοληπτοι) ascribe many names to the Gods, and to human names give a division opposite to these; receiving the former from enthusiastic energy and the latter from sense and opinion; concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some names to the Gods and others to men.

P. 138. _So that language when conversant with that which is ineffable, being subverted about itself, has no cessation and opposes itself._ Damascius likewise, in a wonderfully sublime manner speaks of the immense principle of the universe, conformably to what is now said by Proclus, in his excellent MS treatise περι αρχων, or “concerning principles;” and the following is an epitome of what he says on this subject.

“Our soul prophesies that the principle which is beyond all things that can in any respect be conceived, is unco-ordinated with all things. Neither therefore, must it be called principle, nor cause, nor that which is first, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor in short, is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For whatever we conceive or consider, is either something belonging to all things, or is all things, though analyzing we should ascend to that which is most simple, and which is the most comprehensive of all things, being as it were, the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings. For of beings, that which has an united subsistence, and is perfectly without separation, is the extremity, since every being is mingled from elements which are either bound and infinity, or the progeny of these. But _the one_ is simply the last boundary of _the many_. For we cannot conceive any thing more simple than that which is perfectly one; which if we denominate the principle and cause, the first, and the most simple, these and all other things are there only according to _the one_. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of _the one_ the distributed multitude which is in ourselves; unless we despise these appellations also, because _the many_ cannot be adapted to _the one_. Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it could, it would in this respect be _many_. Or, these things also will be contained in it, according to _the one_. For the nature of _the one_ is all-receptive, or rather all-producing, and there is not any thing whatever which _the one_ is not. Hence all things are as it were evolved from it. It is therefore, properly cause, and the first, the end and the last, the defensive enclosure of all things, and the one nature of all things; not that nature which is in things, and which proceeds from _the one_, but that which is prior to them, which is the most impartible summit of all things whatever, and the greatest comprehension of all things which in any respect are said to have a being.

But if _the one_ is the cause of all things, and is comprehensive of all things, what ascent will there be for us beyond this also? For we do not strive in vain, extending ourselves to that which is nothing. For that which is not even _one_, _is_ not according to the most just mode of speaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is something beyond _the one_? For _the many_ require nothing else than _the one_. And hence _the one_ alone is the cause of the _many_. Hence also _the one_ is entirely cause, because it is necessary that the cause of _the many_ should alone be _the one_. For it cannot be nothing; since nothing is the cause of nothing. Nor can it be _the many_: for so far as many they are unco-ordinated; and _the many_ will not be one cause. But if there are many causes, they will not be the causes of each other, through being unco-ordinated, and through a progression in a circle, the same things being causes and the things caused. Each therefore, will be the cause of itself, and thus there will be no cause of the many. Hence it is necessary that _the one_ should be the cause of _the many_, and which is also the cause of their co-ordination for there is a certain conspiring co-ordination, and a union with each other.

If, therefore, some one thus doubting should say that _the one_ is a sufficient principle, and should add as the summit that we have not any conception or suspicion more simple than that of _the one_, and should therefore ask how we can suspect any thing beyond the last suspicion and conception we are able to frame;--if some one should thus speak, we must pardon the doubt. For a speculation of this kind is it seems inaccessible and immense: at the same time however, from things more known to us we must extend the ineffable parturitions of our soul, to the ineffable co-sensation of this sublime truth. For as that which subsists without is in every respect more honourable than that which subsists with habitude, and the unco-ordinated than the co-ordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn for instance than Jupiter, being than forms, and _the one_ than _the many_ of which _the one_ is the principle; so in short, that which transcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than all causes and principles, and is not to be considered as subsisting in any co-arrangement and habitude; since _the one_ is naturally prior to _the many_, that which is most simple to things more composite, and that which is most comprehensive to the things which it comprehends. So that if you are willing thus to speak, _the first_ is beyond all such opposition, not only that which is in things co-ordinate, but even that which takes place from its subsistence as the first. _The one_ therefore, and the united are posterior to the first: for these causally contain multitude as numerous[402] as that which is unfolded from them. _The one_ however, is no less one, if indeed it is not more so, because separate multitude is posterior to and not in it; and the united is no less united because it contracted in one things separated prior to separation. Each of these therefore, is all things, whether according to co-ordination, or according to their own nature. But all things cannot be things first, nor the principle. Nor yet one of them alone, because this one will be at the same time all things, according to _the one_: but we shall not yet have discovered that which is beyond all things. To which we may also add, that _the one_ is the summit of _the many_, as the cause of the things proceeding from it. We may likewise say that we form a conception of _the one_ according to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But that which is most venerable, must necessarily be incomprehensible by all conceptions and suspicions; since also in other things, that which always soars beyond our conceptions is more honourable than that which is more obvious: so that what flies from all our suspicions will be most honourable. But if this be the case it is _nothing_. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than _the one_, the other posterior to sensibles. If also, we strive in vain in asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold; the one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect whatever has any subsistence. For _this_ also is ineffable, as Plato says, but according to the worse, but _that_ according to the better. If too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is the most necessary advantage of all others, that all things thence proceed as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as _the one_ produces _the many_, nor as _the united_ things _separated_, but as the ineffable similarly produces all things, ineffably. But if in asserting these things concerning it, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and which standing in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but signify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and disappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through indications to such as are able to understand these investigations. We also see that our parturitions suffer these things about _the one_, and that in a similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For _the one_, says Plato, if it _is_, is not _the one_. But if it is not, no assertion can be adapted to it: so that neither can there be a negation of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name simple. Nor is there any opinion nor science of it; for neither are these simple. So that _the one_ is in every respect unknown and ineffable.

What then? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable? Or, perhaps indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through _the one_ as a medium, to the ineffable beyond _the one_, which is now the subject of discussion; and this by an ablation of _the one_, in the same manner as he leads us to _the one_ by an ablation of other things. For, that he gives to _the one_ a certain position is evident from his Sophista, where he demonstrates that it subsists prior to being, itself by itself. But if, having ascended as far as to _the one_, he is silent, this also is becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner of the ancients concerning things in every respect unspeakable; for the discourse was indeed most dangerous, in consequence of falling on idiotical ears. Indeed, when discoursing concerning that which in no respect has any subsistence, he subverts his assertions, and is fearful of falling into the sea of dissimilitude, or, rather of unsubsisting void. But if demonstrations do not accord with _the one_, it is by no means wonderful; for they are human and divisible, and more composite than is fit. Indeed, they are not even adapted to being, since they are formal, or rather, they are neither adapted to forms nor essences. Or, is it not Plato himself, who in his Epistles[403] evinces that we have nothing which is significant of form, no type nor name, nor discourse, nor opinion, nor science? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend ideas by its projecting energies, which we cannot possess while busily engaged in discourse. If there fore we even energize intellectually, since in this case our intellection is characterized by form, we shall not accord with _the united_ and with being. And if at any time we are able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and discordant with _the one_. If, also, we energize according to the most profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive _the one itself_, yet even this is expanded only as far as to _the one_, if there is a knowledge of _the one_; for this we have not yet determined. At the same time however, let us now apply ourselves to the discussion of things of such great importance, through indications and suspicions, being purified with respect to unusual conceptions, and led through analogies and negations, despising what we possess with respect to these, and advancing from things more ignoble with us to things more honorable.

Shall we therefore say, that the nature which we now investigate as the first, is so perfectly ineffable, that it must not even be admitted concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that _the one_ is ineffable, as flying from all composition of words and names, and all distinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be apprehended in a manner the most simple and comprehensive, and that it is not one alone as the characteristic of one, but as _one all things_, and _one prior to all things_, and not one which is something belonging to all things? These indeed, are the parturitions of the soul, and are thus purified with respect to _the simply one_, and that which is truly the one cause of all things. But, in short, we thus form a conception of _the one_ which we contain as the summit or flower of our essence, as being more proximate and allied to us, and more prompt to such a suspicion of that which nearly leaves all things behind it. But from some particular thing which is made the subject of hypothesis, the transition is easy to that which is simply supposed, though we should in no respect accede to it, but being carried in that which is most simple in us, should form a suspicion concerning that which is prior to all things. _The one_ therefore, is thus effable, and thus ineffable, but that which is beyond it is to be honoured in the most perfect silence, and prior to this, by the most perfect ignorance[404] which despises all knowledge.

Let us therefore, now consider, in the second place, how it is said to be perfectly unknown. For if this be true, how do we assert all these things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much discussion about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality unco-ordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, and is nothing of all things, nor even _the one itself_, these very things are the nature of it. Besides, with respect to its being unknown, we either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. But if the latter, how do we say that it is perfectly unknown? And if we know this, in this respect therefore it is known. Or shall we say that it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore deny one thing of another, not knowing that which is the subject of the negation; nor can we say that it is not this or that, when we can in no respect reach it. How therefore can we deny of that of which we are perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is just as if some one who was blind from his birth should assert that heat is not in colour. Or perhaps indeed, he also will justly say, that colour is not hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of colour, except that it is not tangible; for he knows that he does not know it. Such a knowledge indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of his own ignorance. And we also when we say that the first is unknown, do not announce any thing of it, but we confess the manner in which we are affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is not in the colour, nor yet his blindness, but in him. The ignorance therefore of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge of that which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing known. But if knowledge is in that which is known being as it were the splendour of it, so some one should say ignorance is in that which is unknown, being as it were the darkness of it, or obscurity, according to which it is unknown by, and is unapparent to all things,--he who says this is ignorant, that as blindness is a privation, so likewise all ignorance, and that as is the invisible, so that of which we are ignorant, and which is unknown. In other things therefore, the privation of this or that leaves something else. For that which is incorporeal, though invisible, yet is intelligible; and that which is not intelligible by a certain intelligence, leaves at the same time something else. But if we take away every conception and suspicion, this also we must say is perfectly unknown by us, about which we close every eye. Nor must we assert any thing of it, as we do of the intelligible, that it is not adapted to be seen by the eyes, or as we do of _the one_, that it is not naturally adapted to be understood by an essential and abundant intellection: for it imparts nothing by which it can be apprehended, nothing which can lead to a suspicion of its nature. For neither do we only say that it is unknown, that being something else it may naturally possess the unknown, but we do not think fit to predicate of it either _being_, or _the one_, or _all things_, or _the principle of all things_, or in short, _any thing_. Neither therefore, are these things the nature of it, viz. _the nothing, the being beyond all things, supercausal subsistence, and the unco-ordinated with all things_; but these are only ablations of things posterior to it. How, therefore, do we speak concerning it? Shall we say, that knowing these posterior things, we despise them with respect to the position, if I may so speak, of that which is in every respect ineffable? For as that which is beyond some particular knowledge is better than that which is apprehended by such knowledge, so that which is beyond all suspicion must necessarily be most venerable; not that it is known to be so, but possessing the most venerable as in us, and as the consequence of the manner in which we are affected about it. We also call this a prodigy, from its being entirely incomprehensible by our conceptions: for it is through analogy, if that which in a certain respect is unknown, according to a more excellent subsistence, is superior to that which is in every respect known. Hence that which is in every respect unknown according to a more excellent subsistence, must necessarily be acknowledged to be supreme, though it indeed has neither the supreme, nor the most excellent, nor the most venerable: for these things are our confessions about that, which entirely flies from all our conceptions and suspicions. For by this very assertion, that we can form no suspicion of it, we acknowledge that it is most wonderful; since if we should suspect any thing concerning it, we must also investigate something else prior to this suspicion, and either proceed to infinity in our search, or stop at that which is perfectly ineffable. Can we therefore, demonstrate any thing concerning it? And is that demonstrable which we do not think fit to consider as a thing whose subsistence we can even suspect? Or, when we assert these things, do we not indeed demonstrate _concerning_ it, but not _it_? For neither does it contain the demonstrable, nor any thing else. What then? Do we not opine concerning it these things which we now assert? But if there is an opinion of it, it is also the object of opinion. Or shall we say we opine that it is not these things? For Aristotle also says that there is true opinion. If therefore, the opinion is true, the thing likewise is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in consequence of the thing subsisting, the opinion also is true. Though indeed, how will that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or shall we say this is true, that it is not these things, and that it is not known? Is it therefore truly false, that it is these things, and that it is known? Or shall we say that these things are to be referred to privations, and to that which in a certain respect is not, in which there may be a falling from the hypostasis of form? Just as we call the absence of light darkness. For, light not existing, neither is there any darkness. But to that which is never and in no respect being, nothing among beings can, as Plato says, accede. Neither, therefore, is it non-being, nor, in short, privation; and even the expression _never in no respect_ (το μηδαμη μηδαμως) is incapable of signifying its nature. For this expression is being, and _signification_ is something belonging to beings. Likewise, though we should opine that it is not in any respect, yet at the same time, since it thus becomes the object of opinion, it belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly calls that which never and in no respect is, ineffable and incapable of being opined, and this according to the worse than the effable and opinion, in the same manner as we say the supreme is according to that which is better than these. What then, do we not think, and are we not persuaded that the supreme thus subsists? Or, as we have often said, do not these things express the manner in which we are affected about it? But we possess in ourselves this opinion, which is therefore empty, as is the opinion of a vacuum, and the infinite. As therefore, we form a phantastic and fictitious opinion of these though they are not, as if they were, just as we opine the sun to be no larger than a sphere whose diameter is but a foot, though this is far from being the case;--so if we opine any thing concerning that which never and in no respect is, or concerning that of which we write these things, the opinion is our own, and the vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think that we apprehend the supreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to us, so much does it transcend our conceptions. How therefore, do we demonstrate that there is such an ignorance in us concerning it? And how do we say that it is unknown? We reply in one word, because we always find that what is above knowledge is more honourable; so that what is above all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found to be most honourable. But it is sufficient to the demonstration that it cannot be found. We also say that it is above all things; because if it were any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there would be something common to it with all things, viz. the being known. But there is one co-ordination of things in which there is something common; so that in consequence of this, it will subsist together with all things. Hence it is necessary that it should be unknown.

In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the known, though they are relatively inherent at the same time. As, therefore, we say that the same thing is relatively large and small, so likewise we say, that a thing is known and unknown with reference to different things. And as the same thing, by participating of the two forms, the great and the small, is at the same time both great and small, so that which at the same time participates of the known and the unknown is both these. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to sense, but is known to intellect. For the more excellent will not be privation, the inferior at the same time being form; since every absence, and a privation of this kind, is either in matter, or in soul; but all things are present in intellect, and still more in a certain respect in the intelligible. Unless indeed, we denominate privation according to a more excellent subsistence, as we say that is not form which is above form; and that is not being which is superessential; and that is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a transcendency which surpasses all things. If, therefore, _the one_ is the last known of things which are in any respect whatever known or suspected, that which is beyond _the one_ is primarily and perfectly unknown; which also is so unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor can we accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us whether it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about it, nor can we know it, neither as known nor unknown. Hence, we are on all sides subverted, in consequence of not being able to reach it in any respect, because it is not even one thing, or rather, it is not that which is not even one thing. Hence it is that which in no respect whatever has any subsistence; or it is even beyond this, since this is a negation of being, and that which is not even one thing is a negation of _the one_. But that which is not one thing, or in other words, that which is nothing, is a void, and a falling from all things. We do not however thus conceive concerning the ineffable. Or shall we say that _nothing_ is twofold, the one being beyond, and the other below, all things? For _the one_ also is twofold, _this_ being the extreme, as _the one_ of matter, and _that_ the first, as that which is more ancient than being. So that with respect to _nothing_ also, _this_ will be as that which is not even the last one, but _that_ as neither being the first one. In this way therefore, that which is unknown and ineffable is twofold, _this_, as not even possessing the last suspicion of subsistence, and _that_, as not even being the first of things. Must we therefore, consider it as that which is unknown to us? Or this indeed is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown even to much-honoured intellect, if it be lawful so to speak. For every intellect looks to the intelligible; and the intelligible is either _form_ or _being_. But may not divine knowledge know it; and may it not be known to this superessentially? This knowledge, however, applies itself to _the one_, but that which we are now investigating is beyond _the one_. In short, if it also is known, in conjunction with others, it will also be something belonging to all things; for it will be common to it with others to be known, and thus far it will be co-ordinated with others. Further still, if it is known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It will therefore define it. Every boundary however, ascends ultimately as far as to _the one_; but _that_ is beyond _the one_. It is therefore perfectly incomprehensible and invisible, and consequently is not to be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that knowledge is of things which may be known as beings, or as having a subsistence, or as participating of _the one_. But this is beyond all these. Further still, _the one_ also appears to be unknown, if it is necessary that what is known should be one thing, and that which knows another, though both should be in the same thing. So that _the truly one_ will not know itself: for it does not possess a certain duplicity. There will not therefore be in it that which knows, and that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, considered according to _the one itself_ alone, and as being conjoined with _the one_, be united with that which is simple, according to duplicity. For how can the double be conjoined with the simple? But if he knows _the one_ by _the one_, that which knows, and also that which is known will be _one_, and in each the nature of _the one_ will be shown, subsisting alone, and being _one_. So that he will not be conjoined as different with that which is different, or as that which is gnostic with that which is known, since this very thing is one alone; so that neither will he be conjoined according to knowledge. Much more therefore, is that which is not even _the one_ unknown. But if _the one_ is the last thing known, we know nothing of that which is beyond _the one_; so that the present rhapsody is vain. Or shall we say we know that these things are unworthy to be asserted, if it be lawful so to speak, of the first hypothesis [in the Parmenides of Plato,] since, not yet knowing even intelligible forms, we despise the images which subsist in us of their eternal and impartible nature; since these images are partible, and multifariously mutable. Again, being ignorant of the contracted subsistence of intelligible species and genera, but possessing an image of this, which is a contraction of the genera and species in us, we suspect that being itself resembles this contraction, but is at the same time something more excellent; and this must be especially the case with that which has an united subsistence. But now we are ignorant of _the one_, not contracting, but expanding all things to it; and in us simplicity itself consists, with relation to the all which we contain, but is very far from coming into contact with the all-perfect nature of _the one_. For _the one and the simple_ in our nature, are in the smallest degree that which they are said to be, except that they are a sign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus also assuming in intellect every thing which can be in any respect known or suspected, we think fit to ascribe it as far as to _the one_; if it be requisite to speak of things unspeakable, and to conceive things which are inconceivable. At the same time also, we think fit to make that the subject of hypothesis, which cannot be compared, and is unco-ordinated with all things, and which is so exempt that neither in reality does it possess the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from something, and is not in every respect exempt, as possessing habitude to that from which it is exempt, and in short, preceding in a certain co-ordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly exempt the subject of hypothesis, we must not even suppose it to be exempt. For, accurately speaking, its proper name will not be verified when ascribed to _the exempt_; since in this case it would at the same time be co-ordinated; so that it is necessary even to deny this of it. Likewise, negation is a certain sentence, and that which is denied is a certain thing: but that of which we are now endeavouring to speak is not any thing. Neither therefore, can it be denied, nor spoken of, nor be in any way known: so that neither is it possible to deny the negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonstration of what we say, is a perfect subversion of language and conception. What end therefore, will there be of the discourse, except the most profound silence, and an acknowledgement that we know nothing of that which it is not lawful, since impossible, to lead into knowledge?”

In another part, near the beginning of the same admirable work, he remarks that _the one_ in every thing is the more true thing itself. “Thus for instance, _the one_ of man [or the summit and flower of his nature,] is the more true man, that of soul is the more true soul, and that of body the more true body. Thus also _the one_ of the sun, and _the one_ of the moon, are the more true sun and moon.” After which he observes as follows: “Neither _the one_, nor _all things_ accords with the nature of _the one_. For these are opposed to each other, and distribute our conceptions. For, if we look to the simple and _the one_, we destroy its immensely great perfection; and if we conceive all things subsisting together, we abolish _the one_ and _the simple_. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. At the same time however, aspiring after the knowledge of it, we connect all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend this mighty nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, or contracting the peculiar nature of _the one_, and rejoycing in that which is simple and the first in speaking of the most ancient principle, we thus introduce _the one itself_ as a symbol of simplicity; since we likewise introduce _all things_ as a symbol of the comprehension of all things. But that which is above or prior to both we can neither conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful that we should suffer these things about it, since the distinct knowledge of it is unical, which we cannot perceive? Other things too of this kind we suffer about _being_. For endeavouring to perceive _being_, we dismiss it, but run round the elements of it, bound and infinity. But if we form a more true conception of it, that it is an united plenitude of all things, in this case the conception of _all things_ draws us down to multitude, and the conception of _the united_ abolishes that of all things. Neither however is this yet wonderful. For with respect to forms also, when we wish to survey any one of these, we run round the elements of it, and, striving to perceive its unity, we obliterate its elements. At the same time however, every form is one and many; not indeed partly one, and partly many, but the whole of it is through the whole a thing of this kind. Not being able, therefore, to apprehend this collectively, we rejoice in acceding to it with a distribution of our conceptions. But always adhering in our ascent, like those who climb clinging with their hands and feet, to things which extend us to a more impartible nature, we obtain in a certain respect a co-sensation in the distribution of that which is uniform. We despise therefore this, with respect to the collected apprehension of it, which we cannot obtain, unless a certain vestige of collected intelligence in our nature is agitated. And this is the light of truth, which is suddenly enkindled, as if from the collision of fire stones. For our greatest conceptions, when exercised with each other, verge to a uniform and simple summit as their end, like the extremities of lines in a circle hastening to the centre. And though even thus they subsist indeed with distribution, yet a certain vestige of the knowledge of form which we contain is pre-excited; just as the equal tendency of all the lines in a circle to terminate in the middle affords a certain obscure representation of the centre. After the same manner also we ascend to being, in the first place, by understanding every form which falls upon us as distributed, not only as impartible, but also as united, and this by confounding, if it be proper so to speak, the multitude in each. In the next place, we must collect every thing separated together, and take away the circumscriptions, just as if making many streams of water to be one collection of water, except that we must not understand that which is united from all things, as one collection of water, but we must conceive that which is prior to all things, as the form of water prior to divided streams of water. Thus therefore, we must expand ourselves to _the one_, first collecting and afterwards dismissing what we have collected, for the super-expanded transcendency of _the one_. Ascending therefore, shall we meet with it as that which is known? Or, wishing to meet with it as such shall we arrive at the unknown? Or may we not say that each of these is true? For we meet with it afar off as that which is known, and when we are united to it from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of _the one_, then are we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown instead of being gnostic. This contact therefore, as of one with one, is above knowledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which is known. As however, the crooked is known by the straight, so we form a conjecture of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge. _The one_ therefore, is so far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things however, the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but on the contrary, less known; knowledge being dissolved by _the one_ into ignorance, since as we have before observed, where there is knowledge, there also is separation. But separation approaching to _the one_ is inclosed in union; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. Thus too, the analogy of Plato requires. For first we endeavour to see the sun, and we do indeed see it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach to it, by so much the less do we see it; and at length we neither see other things, nor it, the eye becoming spontaneously dazzled by its light. Is therefore _the one_ in its proper nature unknown, though there is something else unknown besides _the one_? _The one_ indeed wills to be by itself, but with no other; but the unknown beyond _the one_ is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge we neither know, nor are ignorant of, but which has about itself super-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this _the one itself_ is darkened: for being very near to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. On this account, Plato in speaking of it finds all his assertions subverted: for it is near to the subversion of every thing, which takes place about the first. It differs from it however in this, that it is _one_ simply, and that according to _the one_ it is also at the same time all things. But the first is above _the one_ and _all things_, being more simple than either of these.”

P. 113. _Origen who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinus._ This Origen was not the Christian father of that name, but was somewhat junior to him.

P. 190. _And Plotinus, exhibiting in a most divinely inspired manner, the peculiarity of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, defines it to be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own being._ The 7th book of the 3rd Ennead of Plotinus is concerning Eternity, and the following beautiful extract from it contains the definition of eternity alluded to by Proclus.

“Perhaps we ought to conceive of eternity, as a certain one collected from many; viz. either as one intelligence or one nature, whether consequent to things in the intelligible world, or existing together with it, or beheld as situated in the depths of its essence. All these, I say, reduced into eternity as one, which is also many, and is endued with a various capacity. Indeed, he who beholds a various capacity, when he considers it as a subject denominates its essence; but so far as he perceives life, he denominates its motion; and afterwards permanency, considered as abiding in a manner entirely the same. He will likewise behold difference and sameness, so far us they are many, bound in one. So that he who contracts the difference, subsisting in things which are many, into one life alone, and contemplates an unceasing sameness of energy, never passing its intelligence or life, from one thing into another, but ever abiding in the same manner in itself far remote from all interval; he I say, who beholds all these, contemplates eternity, viewing life ever possessing a present whole, where all things abide together in sameness, without the order of first and last, and are comprehended in an indivisible bound. Where all things are collected into one, as into a point, not yet proceeding into a linear flux, but abiding in sameness, that is, in itself, in an ever present _now_; because nothing of its nature is past, nothing in it is future; but what it is, it always is. Hence eternity is not a subject, but that which beams as it were from its subject, according to the possession of an ever present identity; promising itself that its ever abiding nature, will never be changed. For what should happen to this in future which it is not at present? Since it is a perfect and present plenitude of all things. Nor can the term was, the appellation of time past, belong to eternity. For what can that be, which _was_ present with its nature, and is _past_? It is in like manner independent of all connection with futurity. And hence eternity is that which neither _was_ nor _will be_, but alone _is_, which it possesses in a stable manner; because it is neither changed into a future, nor altered from a past duration. So that the eternity which we are now investigating, is life total and full, abiding in its essence about being itself; and is every where without interval and one.

Hence, eternity is something especially venerable, and a God, as inherent intelligence affirms. But intelligence likewise dictates, that eternity is the same with that God whom we denominate being and life. And it may with the greatest propriety be said, that eternity is a deity shining and unfolding himself in intelligible light, such as he is in his essence; in an essence, I say, perfectly unchangeable and the same, and thus firmly abiding in an unceasing energy of life. Nor ought any one to wonder that we speak of eternity, as consisting of many things. For every thing which abides in the intelligible world, is called many, on account of its infinite power; since infinite there receives its denomination, because it never falls off from the consummate intellectual plenitude of its nature. And indeed, it is particularly called after this manner, because it loses nothing of its own. And if any one should describe eternity, as life already infinite because universal, and because it never deserts the integrity of its nature; (since it cannot be diminished by the past, nor increased by the future, because it is a perfect whole)----if any one should thus describe eternity, he will approach very near to its true definition. For what is afterwards added, that it is a perfect whole, and loses nothing of its integrity, is only a certain exposition of the definition which affirms it to be infinite life. But because a nature of this kind, thus all-beautiful and eternal, abides about _the one itself_, emanating and in no respect departing from it, but ever abiding about and in it, and living with it in indissoluble union; hence it is said by Plato, not rashly, but in a manner truly beautiful and profound, that _eternity abides in one_. So that he not only reduces that which eternity contains into one; but the life of being in like manner reduces itself, about _the one itself_. This then is what we investigate, and that is eternity, which thus abides. For that which is the energy of life abiding from itself, and residing in the depths of unity, without any deception, either in essence or life, is without all controversy eternity. Since _truly to be_, is _never not to be_, and to possess no diversity of being. But when in discoursing on eternity, we use the term _ever_; and also when we say it is not sometimes being, and sometimes non-being, we must consider these appellations as adopted only for the purpose of explanation. For the term ever is not perhaps principally assumed, but is employed, in order to show an incorruptible and never-failing nature.”

P. 215. _Let us in the next place speak in common about all the intelligible triads, &c._ For the further information of the reader on this most profound subject the intelligible triad, the following observations are added, being an extract from the Introduction to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

As the first cause then is _the one_, and this is the same with _the good_, the universality of things must form a whole, the best and the most profoundly united in all its parts which can possibly be conceived: for _the first good_ must be the cause of the greatest good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodness is union, the best production must be that which is most united. But as there is a difference in things, and some are more excellent than others, and this in proportion to their proximity to the first cause, a profound union can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of a superior order coalescing through intimate alliance with the summit of the proximately inferior. Hence the first of bodies, though they are essentially corporeal, yet κατα σχεσιν, through _habitude_ or _alliance_, are most vital, or lives. The highest of souls are after this manner intellects, and the first of beings are gods. For as _being_ is the highest of things after _the first cause_, its first subsistence must be according to a superessential characteristic.

Now that which is superessential, considered as participated by the highest or _true being_, constitutes that which is called _intelligible_. So that every true being depending on the gods is a _divine intelligible_. It is _divine_ indeed, as that which is deified; but it is _intelligible_, as the object of desire to intellect, as perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of _being_ itself. But in the first being life and intellect subsist according to _cause_: for every thing subsists either according to _cause_, or according to _hyparxis_, or according to _participation_. That is, every thing may be considered either as subsisting occultly in its cause, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is,) or as participated by something else. The first of these is analogous to light when viewed subsisting in its fountain the sun; the second to the light immediately proceeding from the sun; and the third to the splendour communicated to other natures by this light.

The first procession therefore from the first cause, will be the intelligible triad, consisting of _being_, _life_, and _intellect_, which are the three highest things after the first god, and of which _being_ is prior to _life_, and _life_ to _intellect_. For whatever partakes of life partakes also of being: but the contrary is not true, and therefore being is above life; since it is the characteristic of higher natures to extend their communications beyond such as are subordinate. But _life_ is prior to _intellect_, because all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of its superessential characteristic, all things may be considered as subsisting according to cause: and consequently number here has not a proper subsistence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and absorbed in superessential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we must not suppose that any _essential distinction_ takes place, but must consider this appellation as expressive of its ineffable perfection. For as it is the nearest of all things to _the one_, its union must be transcendently profound and ineffably occult.

All the gods indeed considered according to their unities are all in all, and are at the same time united with the first god like rays to light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all established in the first cause (as Proclus beautifully observes) like the roots of trees in the earth; so that they are all as much as possible superessential, just as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the same time being earth itself: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, or subsisting according to the eternal, is different from the partial natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its being wholly of a superessential idiom, must possess an inconceivable profundity of union, both with itself and its cause, so as to subsist wholly according to _the united_, το ηνωμενον; and hence it appears to the eye of pure intellect, as one simple indivisible splendour beaming from an unknown and inaccessible fire.

He then who is able, by opening the greatest eye of the soul, to see that perfectly which subsists without distinction, will behold the simplicity of the intelligible triad subsisting in a manner so transcendent as to be apprehended only by a superintellectual energy, and a deific union of the perceiver with this most arcane object of perception. But since in our present state it is impossible to behold an object so astonishingly lucid with a perfect and steady vision, we must be content, as Damascius well observes,[405] with a far distant, scarcely attainable, and most obscure glimpse; or with difficulty apprehending a trace of this light, like a sudden coruscation bursting on our sight. Such then is the pre-eminence of the intelligible order, to which on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we assign a triple division, beholding in our phantasy as in a mirror a luminous triad, beaming from a uniform light; just, says Damascius, as the uniform colour of the sun appears in a cloud which possesses three catoptric intervals, through the various coloured nature of the rainbow.

But when we view this order in a distributed way, or as possessing distinction in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of subsistence to our imperfect conceptions, it is necessary to give the triad itself a triple division. For we have said that it consists of _being_, _life_, and _intellect_. But in _being_ we may view life and intellect, according to cause; in _life_ being according to participation, and intellect according to cause; and in _intellect_ both being and life according to participation; while at the same time in reality the whole is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to cause. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is said in the Chaldaic theology to consist of _father_, _power_, and _intellect_; _father_ being the same with _hyparxis_, _unity_, _summit_, or _that which is superessential_; _power_ being a certain pouring forth, or infinity of _the one_[406] (or the summit); and on this account, says Damascius, it is present with _father_, as a diffused with an abiding one, and as pouring itself forth into a true chaos: but _intellect_, that is _paternal intellect_, subsisting according to a conversion to the paternal one; a conversion transcending all other conversions, as being neither gnostic, nor vital, nor essential, but an indistinct surpassing energy, which is union rather than conversion.

Such then is the intelligible triad, considered according to an all-perfect distribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our mental eye. But if we are desirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal vision, and the fascinating but delusive forms of the phantasy, which, Calypso-like, detain us in exile from our fathers’ land: after having through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal port, and purified ourselves from the baneful rout of the passions, those domestic foes of the soul; if after all this we are desirous of gaining a glimpse of the surpassing simplicity and ineffable union of this occult and astonishing light, we must crowd all our conceptions together into the most profound indivisibility, and, opening the greatest eye of the soul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, silently walking on the extremities of her shining feet, he will suddenly from his awful sanctuary rise to our view.

But after such a vision, what can language announce concerning this transcendent object? That it is perfectly indistinct and void of number. “And,” as Damascius[407] beautifully observes, “since this is the case, we should consider whether it is proper to call _this_ which belongs to it _simplicity_, απλοτης; _something else, multiplicity_ πολλοτης; and _something besides this, universality_ παντοτης. For that which is intelligible is _one_, _many_, _all_, that we may triply explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be _one_ and _many_? Because _many_ is the infinite power of _the one_. But how can it be _one_ and _all_? Because _all_ is the every way extended energy of _the one_. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it was an extension of power to that which is external; nor power, as an extension of hyparxis abiding within; but again, it is necessary to call them three instead of one: for one appellation, as we have often testified, is by no means sufficient for an explanation of this order. And are all things then here indistinct? But how can this be easy to understand? For we have said that there are three principles consequent to each other; viz. _father_, _power_, and _paternal intellect_. _But these in reality are neither one, nor three, nor one and at the same time three._[408] But it is necessary that we should explain these by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is adapted to their nature, or rather through our desire of expressing something proper on the occasion. For as we denominate this triad _one_, and _many_, and _all_, and _father_, _power_, and _paternal intellect_, and again _bound_, _infinite_, and _mixed_--so likewise we call it a _monad_, and _the indefinite duad_, and _a triad_, and a paternal nature composed from both these. And as in consequence of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations, as incapable of harmonizing with the things themselves, we should likewise reject the latter on the same account.”

But in order to convince the reader that this doctrine of the intelligible triad is not a fiction devised by the latter Platonists, I shall present him with the following translation from Damascius (περι αρχων) _Concerning Principles_,[409] in which the agreement of all the ancient theologists concerning this triad is most admirably evinced.

“The theology contained in the Orphic rhapsodies concerning the intelligible Gods is as follows _Time_ is symbolically placed for the one principle of the universe; but _æther_ and _chaos_, for the two posterior to this one: and _being_, simply considered, is represented under the symbol of an egg. And this is the first triad of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the second triad, they establish either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or a white garment, or a cloud: because from these Phanes leaps forth into light. For indeed they philosophize variously concerning the middle triad. But Phanes here represents intellect. But conceiving him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as _intellect_,[410] Ericapæus as _power_, and Phanes as _father_. But sometimes[411] the middle triad is considered according to the three-shaped God, while conceived in the egg: for the middle always represents each of the extremes; as in this instance, where the egg and the three-shaped God subsist together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which is united; but that the three-shaped and really multiform God is the separating and discriminating cause of that which is intelligible. Likewise the middle triad subsists according to the egg, as yet united; but the third[412] according to the God who separates and distributes the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is as follows. According to them _water_ and _matter_ were the first productions, from which earth was secretly drawn forth: so that water and earth are established as the two first principles; the latter of these having a _dispersed_ subsistence; but the former conglutinating and connecting the latter. But they are silent concerning the principle prior to these two, as being ineffable: for as there are no illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence sufficiently evinced. But the third principle posterior to these two, _water_ and _earth_, and which is generated from them, is _a dragon_, naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle having the countenance of the God himself. They add likewise that he has wings on his shoulders, and that he is called _undecaying Time_, and _Hercules_; that _Necessity_ resides with him, which is the same as _Nature_, and incorporeal _Adrastia_, which is extended throughout the universe, whose limits she binds in amicable conjunction. But as it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as established according to essence; and assert, besides this, that it subsists as male and female, for the purpose of exhibiting the generative causes of all things.

“But I likewise find in the Orphic rhapsodies, that neglecting the two first principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in silence, the third principle, posterior to the two, is established by the theology as the original; because this first of all possesses something effable and commensurate to human discourse. For in the former hypothesis, the highly reverenced and undecaying _Time_, the father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this _Time_ is neglected, and the principle becomes _a dragon_. It likewise calls triple æther, moist; and Chaos, infinite; and Erebus, cloudy and dark; delivering this second triad analogous to the first: this being potential, as that was paternal. Hence the third procession of this triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and summit æther, not according to a simple but intellectual subsistence: but its middle infinite chaos, considered as a progeny or procession, and among these parturient, because from these the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then is the third intelligible triad? I answer, the egg; the duad of the natures of male and female which it contains, and the multitude of all-various seeds, residing in the middle of this triad: And the third among these is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his shoulders; but in his inward parts naturally possessing the heads of bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, invested with the all-various forms of wild-beasts. This last then must be considered as the _intellect_ of the triad; but the middle progeny, which are _many_ as well as _two_, correspond to _power_, and the egg itself is _the paternal principle_ of the third triad: but the third God of this third triad, this theology celebrates as _Protogonus_, and calls him _Jupiter_, the disposer of all things and of the whole world; and on this account denominates him _Pan_. And such is the information which this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible principles of things.

But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the Theology of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is passed over in silence, as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal enunciation. Eudemus therefore commences his genealogy from _Night_, from which also Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from making the Homeric genealogy consistent and connected, for he asserts that Homer begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent, that _Night_ is according to Homer the greatest divinity, since she is reverenced even by Jupiter himself. For the poet says of Jupiter--“that he feared lest he should act in a manner displeasing to swift _Night_.” So that Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods from _Night_. But it appears to me that Hesiod, when he asserts that Chaos was first generated, signifies by Chaos the incomprehensible and perfectly united nature of that which is intelligible: but that he produces earth[413] the first from thence, as a certain principle of the whole procession of the Gods. Unless perhaps Chaos is the second of the two principles: but Earth,[414] Tartarus, and Love, form the triple intelligible. So that _Love_ is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible order, considered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus denominated by Orpheus in his rhapsodies. But _Earth_ for the first, as being first established in a certain firm and essential station. But _Tartarus_ for the middle, as in a certain respect exciting and moving forms into distribution. But Acusilaus appears to me to establish _Chaos_ for the first principle, as entirely unknown; and after this, two principles, _Erebus_ as male, and _Night_ as female; placing the latter for _infinity_, but the former for _bound_. But from the mixture of these, he says that _Æther_, _Love_, and _Counsel_ are generated, forming three intelligible hypostases. And he places _Æther_ as the summit; but _Love_ in the middle, according to its naturally middle subsistence; but _Metis_ or _Counsel_ as the third, and the same as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the history of Eudemus, from these he produces a great number of other Gods. But Epimenides establishes _Air_ and _Night_ as the two first principles; manifestly reverencing in silence the one principle prior to these two. But from air and night _Tartarus_ is generated, forming as it appears to me the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature from the two. And this mixture is called by some an intelligible medium, because it extends itself to both the summit and the end. But from the mixture of the extremes with each other, an egg is generated, which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another progeny proceeds. But according to Pherecydes Syrius, the three first principles are a _Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature_, _Time_,[415] and _an Earthly Nature_: one of these subsisting, as I conceive, prior to the other two. But he asserts that _Time_ generates from the progeny of itself, _Fire_, _Spirit_, and _Water_: which signify, as it appears to me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from these, distributed into five profound recesses, a numerous progeny of Gods is constituted, which he calls _five-times animated_ (πεντεμψυχος): and which is perhaps the same as if he had said πεντεκοσμος, or a _five-fold world_. But we may probably discourse on this subject at some other opportunity. And thus much may suffice at present concerning the hypotheses derived from the Grecian fables, which are both many and various.

But with respect to the theology of the Barbarians, the Babylonians seem to pass over in silence the one principle of the universe. But they establish two principles, Tauthe and Apasoon. And they consider Apasoon as the husband of Tauthe, whom they denominate the mother of the Gods; from whom an only-begotten son _Mooumis_ was produced: which, as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced from two principles.[416] But from these another procession is derived, _Dache_ and _Dachus_. And likewise a third from these, _Kissare_ and _Assoorus_. And from these again three deities are produced, _Anus_, _Illinus_, and _Aus_. But from _Aus_ and _Dache_ a son called Belus is produced, who they say is the demiurgus of the world. But with respect to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, some of them call all the intelligible and united world _Place_, and some of them _Time_: from which _a good divinity_ and _an evil dæmon_ are distributed; _Light_ and _Darkness_ subsisting prior to these, according to the assertions of others. However, both the one and the other, after an undistributed nature, consider that nature as having a subsistence which distributes the two-fold co-ordination of better natures: one of which co-ordinations _Orosmades_ presides over, and the other _Arimanius_. But the Sidonians, according to the same historian, place before all things, _Time_, _Desire_, and _cloudy Darkness_. And they assert that from the mingling of _Desire_ and _Darkness_ as two principles, _Air_ and _a gentle Wind_ were produced: _Air_ evincing the summit of the intelligible triad; but _the gentle Wind_ raised and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the intelligible. And again that from both these the bird _Otus_, similar to a night raven, was produced; representing, as it appears to me, intelligible intellect. But as we find (without the assistance of Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Mochus, places _Æther_ and _Air_ as the two first principles, from which the intelligible god _Oulomus_ was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the summit of the intelligible order. But from this god (yet proceeding together with him) they assert that _Chousorus_ was produced, being the first unfolding procession. And after this _an egg_ succeeds; which I think must be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding _Chousorus_ is intelligible power, because this is the first nature which distributes an undistributed subsistence: unless perhaps after the two principles _Æther_ and _Air_, the summit is _One Wind_: but the middle _Two Winds_, the _south-west_ and the _south_; for in a certain respect they place these prior to _Oulomus_. But _Oulomus_ himself is intelligible intellect: and unfolding _Chousorus_[417] the first order after the intelligible series. But the _egg itself_ is heaven: from the bursting of which into two parts, the sections are said to have become heaven and earth. But with respect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is related of them by Eudemus: we have, however, by means of some Egyptian philosophers resident among us, been instructed in the occult truth of their theological doctrine. According to these philosophers then, the Egyptians in certain discourses celebrate _an unknown Darkness_ as the one principle of the universe, and this _thrice pronounced as such_: but for the two principles after the first they place _Water_ and _Sand_, according to Heraiscus; but according to the more ancient writer Asclepiades, _Sand_ and _Water_; from which and after which the first _Kamephis_ is generated. But after this _a second_, and from this again _a third_; by all which, the whole intelligible distribution is accomplished. For thus Asclepiades determines. But the more modern Heraiscus says that the Egyptians, denominating the third Kamephis from his father and grandfather, assert that he is _the Sun_; which doubtless signifies in this case intelligible intellect. But a more accurate knowledge of these affairs must be received from the above-mentioned authors themselves. It must however be observed, that with the Egyptians there are many distributions of things according to union; because they unfold an intelligible nature into characteristics, or peculiarities of many gods, as may be learned from such as are desirous of consulting their writings on this subject.”

Thus far Damascius; from which curious and interesting relation the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the ancient theologists with each other in celebrating the intelligible triad, and venerating in silence the ineffable principle of things, but may likewise see that the Christian trinity is essentially different from this triad, because according to Plato and the ancient theologists, the first cause is not a part of any triad, or order of things. Consonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the Chaldeans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes Picus, in his _Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldean Theologists_.[418] “The intelligible co-ordination (says he) is not in the intellectual co-ordination, as Amasis the Egyptian asserts, but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed in the abyss of the first unity, and under the obscurity of the first darkness.” Co-ordinatio intelligibilis non est in intellectuali co-ordinatione, ut dixit Amasis Ægyptius, sed est super omnem intellectualem hierarchium, in abysso primæ unitatis, et sub caligine primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abscondita.

But from this triad it may be demonstrated, that all the processions of the Gods may be comprehended in six orders, viz. the _intelligible order_, the _intelligible and at the same time intellectual_, the _intellectual_, the _supermundane_, the _liberated_, and the _mundane_.[419] For the _intelligible_, as we have already observed, must hold the first rank, and must consist of _being_, _life_, and _intellect_; _i.e._ must _abide_, _proceed_, and _return_; at the same time that it is characterised, or subsists principally according to _permanent being_. But in the next place that which is both _intelligible_ and _intellectual_ succeeds, which must likewise be triple, but must principally subsist according to _life_, or _intelligence_. And in the third place the _intellectual_ order must succeed, which is _triply convertive_. But as in consequence of the existence of the sensible world, it is necessary that there should be some demiurgic cause of its existence, this cause can only be found in _intellect_, and in the last hypostasis of the _intellectual triad_. For all forms in this hypostasis subsist according to all-various and perfect divisions; and forms can only fabricate when they have a perfect intellectual separation from each other. But since _fabrication_ is nothing more than _procession_, the demiurgus will be to the posterior orders of Gods what _the one_ is to the orders prior to the _demiurgus_: and consequently he will be that secondarily which the first cause of all is primarily. Hence his first production will be an order of Gods analogous to the _intelligible_ order, and which is denominated _supermundane_. After this he must produce an order of Gods similar to the _intelligible_ and _intellectual_ order, and which are denominated _liberated_ Gods. And in the last place, a procession correspondent to the _intellectual_ order, and which can be no other than the mundane Gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterised according to diversity, and is allotted the boundary of all universal hypostases.

All these orders, as is shown by Proclus in this work, are unfolded by Plato in the conclusions of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides; and this in a manner perfectly conformable to the Chaldaic theology. In proof of this I refer the reader to my collection of Chaldean oracles, in the Old Monthly Magazine.

P. 348. _It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men._

The following admirable developement by Proclus of the difficulty of discovering the maker of the universe, is extracted from p. 91, &c. of his Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato.

“Father and fabricator differ from each other, so far as the former is the cause of matter,[420] but the latter of the world and order, and in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed, as the former is the supplier of being and union, but the latter of powers and a multiform essence; and so far as the one stably contains all things in himself, but the other is the cause of progression and generation: and so far as the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the latter an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but fabricator he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo indeed, is said to be the _father_ of Plato, but the builder of a house is the _maker_ or fabricator of it, as not himself generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there was no occasion to call the demiurgus father, because according to Timæus, he does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, rather the fabricator as producing form? For we call all those makers who produce any thing from a non-existent state into existence. But so far as the demiurgus produces that which he produces, in conjunction with life, he is father. For fathers are the causes of animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with life. And thus much concerning this particular.

But ‘_this universe_’ signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane causes[421] and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of the mundane Gods proceeds; likewise, the one divinity, the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined with the world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. All these therefore must be assumed for the _universe_; since it signifies all these. Perhaps likewise the addition of the pronoun _this_, is significant of the universe being in a certain respect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not _this_, because it is comprehensive of _all intellectual forms_. But the term _this_ is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as Plato says, to discover the demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to discovery, one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are first,[422] but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, according to reminiscence; the discovery from such things as are first may be said to be difficult, because the invention of the intermediate powers, pertains to the highest theory. But the discovery from such things as are secondary, is nearly more difficult than the former. For if we intend from these to survey the essence of the demiurgus, and his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the world, and the unapparent natural powers which it contains, according to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,[423] and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and dæmoniacal, and the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational and the irrational, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls, the different numbers of Gods according to the different parts of the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without having seen these is impelled to the survey of the demiurgus, is more imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined with that which is all-perfect.

Moreover, it is necessary,[424] that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole intelligible world, should introduce herself to the maker of the universe; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the door of the father, it is necessary, that we should be united to him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For then she is present with her father, banquets together with him on the truth of real being, and in pure splendour is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence of the intellectual demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life; or as the true labour of souls. For after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of _the one_ than this. For this is the paternal port,[425] and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

But to _say that when found it is impossible to speak of him to all men_,[426] perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who had arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them to all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude are not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this may be said which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to certain persons such as he has seen him. For the discovery was not made by the soul speaking, but closing her eyes, and being converted[427] to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the way [to union]. For since the essence of other things is not naturally adapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition, or through science, but is seen through intellection alone, as Plato says in his Epistles, in what other way can it be possible to discover the essence of the demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how when having thus found it, is it possible to tell what is seen, and explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolution which is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple nature. What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about the demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of _the one itself_? To this we reply, we speak indeed _about_ them, but we do not speak _of each of them itself_. And we are able indeed to speak _scientifically_ of them, but not _intellectually_. For this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient to lead that which is discovered into light?”

The following extracts from the _Manuscript Scholia of_ PROCLUS On the _Cratylus of Plato_, are added on account of their great importance; and that the reader may be furnished with all the information on the recondite theology of Greece, that it was in my power to obtain.

This manuscript is so rare that, if I am not mistaken, no copy of it is to be found in any of the colleges either of Oxford or Cambridge. My copy of it is a transcript of that which is now in the possession of Mr. HEBER of Oxford.

The reader, however, must be careful to remember that the design of Plato in the Cratylus was to unfold those peculiarities only of the Gods that are apparent in their names.

That Jupiter is not _said to be_, but _is_ the father of those who genuinely preserve the proper form of life, such as Hercules and the Dioscuri; but of those who are never at any time able to convert themselves to a divine nature, he never _is_, nor _is said to be_ the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a certain energy above human nature, have again fallen into _the sea of dissimilitude_,[428] and for honour among men have embraced error towards the Gods,--of these Jupiter is _said to be_ the father.

That the paternal cause originates supernally from the intelligible and occult gods; for there the first fathers of wholes subsist; but it proceeds through all the intellectual Gods into the demiurgic order. For Timæus celebrates this order as at the same time _fabricative_ and _paternal_; since he calls Jupiter the _demiurgus_ and _father_. The fathers however who are superior to the one fabrication are called Gods of Gods, but the demiurgus is the father of Gods and men. Farther still, Jupiter is said to be _peculiarly_ the father of some, as of Hercules, who immutably preserve a Jovian and ruling life during their converse with the realms of generation. Jupiter therefore, is triply father, of Gods, partial souls, and of souls that embrace an intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual order of the Gods therefore, is supernally bounded by the king[429] of the total divine genera, and who has a paternal transcendency with respect to all the intellectual Gods. This king according to Orpheus is called by the blessed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympus Phanes Protogonus. But this order proceeds through the three Nights, and the celestial orders, into the Titanic or Saturnian series, where it first separates itself from the fathers and changes the kingdom of the _Synoches_,[430] for a distributive government of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus of the Gods, from all the above-mentioned ruling and royal causes, but proximately from Saturn the leader of the Titannic orders. Prior however to other fabricators (δημιουργοι) it unfolds Jupiter, who is allotted the unical strength of the whole demiurgic series, and who produces and gives subsistence to all unapparent and apparent natures. And he is indeed intellectual according to the order in which he ranks, but he produces the species and the genera of beings into the order of sensibles. He is likewise filled with the Gods above himself, but imparts from himself a progression into being to all mundane natures. Hence Orpheus represents him fabricating every celestial race, making the sun and moon and the other starry Gods, together with the sublunary elements, and diversifying the latter with forms which before had a disordered subsistence. He likewise represents him presiding over the Gods who are distributed about the whole world, and who are suspended from him; and in the character of a legislator assigning distributions of providence in the universe according to desert to all the mundane Gods.[431] Homer too, following Orpheus, celebrates him as the common father of Gods and men, as leader and king, and as the supreme of rulers. He also says that all the multitude of mundane Gods is collected about him, abides in and is perfected by him. For all the mundane Gods are converted to Jupiter through Themis,

Ζευς δε θεμιστα κελευσε θεους, αγορην δε καλεσσαι ----ηδ’ αρα παντη φοιτησασα κελευσε Διος προς δωμα νεεσθαι.

i.e. “But Jupiter orders Themis to call the Gods to council; and she directing her course every where commands them to go to the house of Jupiter.”[432] All of them therefore are excited according to the one will of Jupiter, and become διος ενδον,[433] _within Jupiter_, as the poet says. Jupiter too again separates them within himself, according to two co-ordinations, and excites them to providential energies about secondary natures; he at the same time as Timæus says, abiding after his accustomed manner;

ως εφατο κρονιδης πολεμον δ’ αλιαστον εγειρεν.[434]

i.e. “Thus spoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war.” Jupiter however is separate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence also the most total and leading of the other Gods, though they appear to have in a certain respect equal authority with Jupiter, through a progression from the same causes, yet call him father. For both Neptune and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno speaks to him as one who is of the same order,

και γαρ εγω θεος ειμι· γενος δε μοι ενθεν οθεν σοι, και με πρεσβυτατην τεκετο κρονος αγκυλομητις,[435]

i.e. “For I also am a divinity, and Saturn, of inflected counsel, endowed me with the greatest dignity, when he begot me:”

And though Neptune says

τρεις γαρ τ’εκ κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη, Ζευς και εγω, τριτατος δ’Αΐδης ενεροισιν ανασσων,[436]

i.e. “For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms:”

Yet Jupiter is called father by both these divinities; and this because he comprehends in himself the one and impartible cause of all fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad;[437] connectedly contains the three fathers; and comprehends on all sides the vivification of Juno. Hence, at the same time that this goddess gives animation to the universe, he also together with other Gods gives subsistence to souls. Very properly therefore do we say that the demiurgus in the Timæus is the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and souls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inserts in them one union, and an indissoluble friendship and bond. For Night also in Orpheus advises Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the fabrication of the universe.

αυταρ επην δεσμον κρατερον περι πασι τανυσσης.

i.e. But when your power around the whole has spread A strong coercive bond.--

The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which subsists through analogy; but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect and soul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through analogy, and the indissoluble union from life, a bond. For he says animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable bond than these subsists from the demiurgic will. “For my will, says Jupiter in the Timæus, is a greater and more principal bond, &c.”

Firmly adhering therefore to this conception respecting the mighty Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the universe, that he is an all-perfect imparticipable[438] intellect, and that he fills all things both with other goods, and with life, let us survey how from names Socrates unfolds the mystic truth concerning this divinity. Timæus then says that it is difficult to know the essence of the demiurgus, and Socrates now says that it is not easy to understand his name, which manifests his power and energy.

That our soul knows partibly the impartible nature of the energy of the Gods, and that which is characterised by unity in this energy, in a multiplied manner: and this especially takes place about the demiurgus who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible causes, and evolves them to the fabrication of the universe. For Parmenides characterises him by sameness and difference. According to Homer two tubs are placed near him; and the most mystic tradition, and the oracles of the Gods say that the duad is seated with him. For thus they speak: “He possesses both; containing intelligibles in intellect, but introducing sense to the worlds.” These oracles likewise call him _twice beyond_, and _twice there_ (δις επεκεινα και δις εκει). And in short they celebrate him through the duad. For the demiurgus comprehends in himself unitedly every thing _prolific_,[439] and which gives subsistence to mundane natures. Very properly therefore is his name two-fold, of which δια manifests _the cause through which_, and this is paternal goodness; but ζηνα signifies _vivification_, the first causes of which in the universe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The former too, is a symbol of the Saturnian and paternal series; but the latter of the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewise as Jupiter receives the whole of Saturn, he gives subsistence to a triple essence, the impartible, the partible, and that which subsists between these; but according to the Rhea which he contains in himself, he scatters as from a fountain, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal life. But by his demiurgic powers and energies, he gives a formal subsistence to these and separates them from forms of a prior order, and from each other. He is also the ruler and king of all things: and is exempt from the three demiurgi. For they, as Socrates says in the Gorgias, divide the kingdom of their father; but Jupiter the demiurgus at once, without division reigns over the three, and unically governs them.

He is therefore the cause of the paternal triad, and of all fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he is _a king_ indeed, as being co-ordinated with the fathers; but _a ruler_, as being proximately established above the demiurgic triad, and comprehending the uniform cause of it. Plato therefore by considering his name in two ways evinces that images receive partibly the unical causes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who establishes the intellectual duad in himself. For he gives subsistence to twofold orders, the celestial, and the supercelestial; whence also the theologist Orpheus says, that his sceptre consists of four and twenty measures; as ruling over a twofold twelve.[440]

That the soul of the world gives life to alter-motive natures; for to these it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in the Phædrus and Laws. But the demiurgus simply imparts to all things life divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about bodies. No one however should think that the Gods in their generations of secondary natures are diminished; or that they sustain a division of their proper essence in giving subsistence to things subordinate; or that they expose their progeny to the view, externally to themselves, in the same manner as the causes of mortal offspring. Nor in short, must we suppose that they generate with motion or mutation, but that abiding in themselves, they produce by their very essence posterior natures, comprehend on all sides their progeny, and supernally perfect the productions and energies of their offspring. Nor again when it is said that Gods are the sons of more total Gods, must it be supposed that they are disjoined from more ancient causes, and are cut off from a union with them; or that they receive the peculiarity of their hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteness converting itself to bound. For there is nothing irrational and without measure, in the natures superior to us. But we must conceive that their progressions are effected through similitude; and that there is one communion of essence, and an indivisible continuity of powers and energies, between the sons of Gods and their fathers; all those Gods that rank in the second order, being established in such as are more ancient; and the more ancient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious production to the subordinate. And after this manner we must understand that Jupiter is said to be the son of Saturn. For Jupiter being the demiurgic intellect proceeds from another intellect, superior and more uniform, which increases indeed its proper intellections, but converts the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers, but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible sameness. Jupiter therefore proximately establishing a communion with this divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good, is very properly said to be the son of Saturn, both in hymns and in invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a second more partial kingdom, instead of that which is more total, a demiurgic instead of a paternal dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where instead of that which stably abides in itself.

Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn to be υβριστικον _insolent_, and looking to what does he assert this? We reply that according to the poets _satiety_ (κορος) is the cause of _insolence_; for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; and they say that _Satiety_ brought forth _Insolence_. (υβριν φασιν τικτει κορος). He therefore who looks without attention to the name of Saturn, will consider it as signifying _insolence_. For to him who suddenly hears it, it manifests satiety and repletion. Why therefore, since a name of this kind is expressive of insolence, do we not pass it over in silence, as not being auspicious and adapted to the Gods? May we not say that the royal series[441] of the Gods, beginning from Phanes and ending in Bacchus, and producing the same sceptre supernally as far as to the last kingdom, Saturn being allotted the fourth royal order; appears according to the fabulous pretext, differently from the other kings, to have received the sceptre insolently from Heaven, and to have given it to Jupiter? For Night receives the sceptre from Phanes; Heaven derives from Night, the dominion over wholes; and Bacchus who is the last king of the Gods receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father (Jupiter) establishes him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the sceptre, and makes him the king of all the mundane Gods. “Hear me ye Gods, I place over you a king.”

κλυτε θεοι τον δ’υμμιν βασιλεα τιθημι,

says Jupiter to the junior Gods. But Saturn alone perfectly deprives Heaven of the kingdom, and concedes dominion to Jupiter, cutting and being cut off as the fable says. Plato therefore seeing this succession, which in Saturn is called by theologists _insolent_ (υβριστικη) thought it worth while to mention the appearance of insolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is adapted to the God, and that it bears an image of the insolence which is ascribed to him in fables. At the same time he teaches us to refer mythical devices to the truth concerning the Gods, and the apparent absurdity which they contain, to scientific conceptions.

That _the great_ when ascribed to the Gods, must not be considered as belonging to interval, but as subsisting intellectually, and according to the power of cause, but not according to partible transcendency. But why does Plato now call Saturn διανοια the dianoetic part of the soul? May we not say, that it is because he looks to the multitude of intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of intelligibles, and the evolution of forms which he contains; since also in the Timæus, he represents the demiurgic intellect as reasoning, and making the world, dianoetically energising: and this in consequence of looking to his partible and divided intellections, according to which he fabricates not only wholes but parts. When Saturn, however, is called intellect, Jupiter has the order of the dianoetic part: and when again, Saturn is called the dianoetic part, we must say that he is so called according to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect of a higher order. Whether therefore you are willing to speak of intelligible and occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light (εκφαντορικος νους) or of that which connectedly contains (συνεκτικος νους) or of that which imparts perfection,[442] (τελεσιουργος νους) Saturn will be as the dianoetic part to all these. For he produces united intellection into multitude, and fills himself wholly with excited intelligibles. Whence also, he is said to be the leader of the Titannic race, and the source of all-various separation and diversifying power. And perhaps Plato here primarily delivers twofold interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius afterwards adopted. For the one interprets this name from the Titans extending their powers to all things; but the other from _something insectile_ (παρα το τι ατομον) because the division and separation of wholes into parts receives its beginning from the Titans. Socrates therefore now indicates both these interpretations, by asserting of the king of the Titans that he is a _certain great dianoetic power_. For the term _great_ is as symbol of power pervading to all things; but the term _a certain_, of power proceeding to the most partial natures.

That the name Saturn is now triply analysed; of which the first asserting this God to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to be the satiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image of the satiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is ejected as insolent. The second also which exhibits the imperfect and the puerile, is in like manner rejected. But the third, which celebrates this God as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn is intellect, and the supplier of all intellectual life; but he is an intellect exempt from co-ordination with sensibles, immaterial and separate, and converted to himself. He likewise converts his progeny and after producing them into light again embosoms and firmly establishes them in himself. For the demiurgus of the universe, though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges sensibles, and provides for subordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is essentialized in separate intellections, and which transcend wholes. “For the fire which is beyond the first, says the Chaldean Oracle, does not incline its power downwards.” But the demiurgus is suspended and proceeds from Saturn, being himself an intellect subsisting about an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible, and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me, that as Saturn is the summit of those Gods, that are properly called intellectual, he is intellect, as with reference to the intelligible genus of Gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible genus of Gods, and are conjoined with them through intellections. “Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity,” says the hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the intellectual Gods. _Purity_ therefore indicates this impartible and imparticipable transcendency of Saturn. For the not coming into contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude, are signified by purity. Such indeed is the transcendency of this God with respect to all co-ordination with things subordinate, and such his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proserpine. For all these, through their progressions into secondary natures, require the immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly established in himself, and hastily withdrawing himself from all subordinate natures is established above the guardianship of the Curetes. He contains however, the cause of these uniformly in himself. For this purity, and the undefiled which he possesses, give subsistence to all the progressions of the Curetes. Hence in the Oracles, he is said to comprehend the first fountain of the Amilicti, and to ride on all the others. “The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they become refulgent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire.”

Νους πατρος αραιοις εποχουμενος ιθυντηρσιν Ακναμπτου αστραπτουσιν αμειλικτου πυρος ολκοις.

He is therefore _pure intellect_, as giving subsistence to the undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual series.

Αυτου γαρ εκθρωσκουσιν αμειλικτοι τε κεραυνοι, Και πρηστηροδοχοι κολποι παμφεγγεος αλκης. Πατρογενους Εκατης, και υπεζωκος πυρος ανθος, Ηδε κραταιον πνευμα πολων πυριων επεκεινα.

i.e. “From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the prester-capacious bosoms of the all-splendid strength of the father-begotten Hecate, together with the environed flower of fire, and the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles.”

For he convolves all the hebdomad of the fountains,[443] and gives subsistence to it, from his unical and intelligible summit. For he is, as the Oracles says, αμιστυλλευτος uncut into fragments, uniform, and undistributed, and connectedly contains all the fountains, converting and uniting all of them to himself, and being separate from all things with immaculate purity. Hence he is κορονους, as an immaterial and pure intellect, and as establishing himself in the paternal silence. He is also celebrated as the father of fathers. Saturn therefore is a father, and intelligible, as with reference to the intellectual Gods.

That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is both, and is then intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. The first of these is Phanes; the second which is alone moved is Saturn; and the third which is both moved and permanent is Heaven.

That Saturn from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent subsistence in the intellectual orders has been considered by some as the same with the one cause of all things. He is however only analogous to this cause, just as Orpheus calls the first cause _Time_ (χρονος) nearly homonymously with Saturn. (κρονος) But the Oracles of the Gods characterise this deity by the epithet of _the once_; (τῳ απαξ) calling him _once beyond_ (απαξ επεκεινα). For _the once_ is allied to _the one_.

That _Heaven_ the father of Saturn, is an intellect understanding himself indeed, but united to the first intelligibles; in which he is also firmly established; and connectedly contains all the intellectual orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This God too is _connective_, just as Saturn is of a _separating_ idiom; and on this account he is _father_. For connecting precede separating causes; and the intelligible and at the same time intellectual such as are intellectual only. Whence also _Heaven_ being the _Synocheys_ (συνοχευς) of wholes, according to one union gives subsistence to the Titannic series, and prior to this, to other orders of the Gods; some of which abide only in him, which he retains in himself, but others both abide and proceed, which he is said to have concealed, after they were unfolded into light. And after all these he gives subsistence to those divine orders, which proceed into the universe, and are separated from their father. For he produces twofold monads, and triads, and hebdomads equal in number to the monads. These things however will be investigated more fully elsewhere. But this deity is denominated according to the similitude of the apparent Heaven. For each of them compresses and connects all the multitude which it contains, and causes the sympathy and connection of the whole world to be one. For connection is second to unifying power, and proceeds from it. In the Phædrus therefore Plato delivers to us the production of all secondary natures by Heaven, and shows us how this divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to the intelligible. He likewise teaches us what its summit is, what the profundity of its whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of its progression. Here therefore investigating the truth of things from names, he declares its energy with respect to things more elevated and simple, and which are arranged nearer to _the one_. He also clearly appears here to consider the order of Heaven, as intelligible and at the same time intellectual. For if it sees things on high, it energizes intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of Gods, to which looking it is intellectual; just as it is intelligible to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are, the supercelestial place, an essence without colour, without figure, and without the touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending as Plato would say intelligible animals, the one cause of all eternal natures, and the occult principles of these; but as the followers of Orpheus would say, bounded by æther upwards, and by Phanes downwards. For all between these two gives completion to the intelligible order. But Plato now calls this both singularly and plurally; since all things are there united, and at the same time each is separated peculiarly; and this according to the highest union and separation.

With respect to the term μετεωρολογοι, i.e. _those who discourse on sublime affairs_, we must now consider it in a manner adapted to those who chuse an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who do not gravitate to earth, but sublimely tend to a theoretic life. For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives subsistence to such things as Heaven, which is co-ordinate to that Earth, produces paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called μετεωρολογος, or, _one who discourses about things on high_. Heaven therefore, being of a _connective_ nature, is expanded above the Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual series; and produces from himself all the Titannic race; and prior to this, the perfective and defensive orders: and in short is the leader of every good to the intellectual Gods. Plato therefore, having celebrated Saturn, for his intelligence which is without habitude to mundane natures, and for his life which is converted to his own exalted place of survey, now celebrates Heaven for another more perfect energy. For to be conjoined to more elevated natures is a greater good than to be converted to oneself. Let no one however think, that on this account the above-mentioned energies are distributed in the Gods; as for instance, that there is providence alone, in Jupiter, a conversion alone to himself, in Saturn, and an elevation alone to the intelligible, in Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwise provides for mundane natures than by looking to the intelligible; since as Plato says in the Timæus, intellect understanding ideas in animal itself, thought it requisite that as many and such as it there perceived should be contained in the universe; but as Orpheus[444] says with a divinely inspired mouth, “Jupiter swallows his progenitor Phanes, embosoms all his powers, and becomes all things intellectually which Phanes is intelligibly.” Saturn also imparts to Jupiter the principles of fabrication, and of providential attention to sensibles, and understanding himself, he becomes united to first intelligibles, and is filled with the goods which are thence derived. Hence also the theologist (Orpheus) says “that he was nursed by Night.”[445] If therefore the intelligible is nutriment, Saturn is replete not only with the intelligibles co-ordinated with him, but also with the highest and occult intellections. Heaven himself also fills all secondary natures with his proper goods, but guards all things by his own most vigorous powers; and the father supernally committed to him the connecting and guarding the causes of eternal animal. But he intellectually perceives himself, and is converted to the intelligibles which he contains; and this his intelligence, Plato in the Phædrus calls _circulation_. For as that which is moved in a circle is moved about its own centre, so Heaven energizes about its own intelligible, according to intellectual circulation. But all the Gods subsisting in all, and each possessing all energies, one transcends more in this, and another in a different energy, and each is particularly characterised according to that in which it transcends. Thus Jupiter is characterised by providence, and hence his name is now thus analysed; but Saturn by a conversion to himself, whence also he is _inflected counsel_ αγκυλομητις; and Heaven by habitude to things more excellent; from which also he receives his appellation. For his giving subsistence to a pure and the Saturnian intellect, represents his energy to the other part. But as there are many powers in Heaven, such as the connective, guardian, and convertive, you will find that this name is appropriately adapted to all these. For the connective is signified through bounding the intellectual Gods; since the connective bounds the multitude which he contains. The power which guards wholes subsists through the termination and security of an intellectual essence. And the convertive power subsists through converting seeing, and intellectually-energizing natures, to things on high. But all these are adapted to Heaven. For there is no fear that the Gods will be dissipated, and that on this account they require connective causes; or that they will sustain mutation, and that on this account they stand in need of the saving aid of guardian causes; but now Socrates at once manifests all the powers of Heaven, through convertive energy. For this is to behold things on high, to be converted to them, and through this to be connected and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven possesses this idiom according to analogy to the intelligible eternity and the intelligible wholeness. For Timæus particularly characterizes eternity by this, viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being established in the summit of intelligibles; and Socrates says that Heaven surveys things on high, viz. the supercelestial place, and such things as are comprehended in the god-nourished silence of the fathers. (και οσα τῃ θεοθρεμμονι σιγῃ περιειληπται των πατερων). As therefore Parmenides signifies each of these orders through _wholeness_, the one through intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeness; in like manner both Timæus and Socrates characterise them by a conversion to more excellent natures. But the conversion as well as the wholeness is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which account Timæus does not say that it looks to its intelligible, but only that it stably abides. But the conversion of Heaven is intellectual, and on this account Socrates says that it sees things on high, and through this converts, guards, and connects all things posterior to itself. Whence also in the Phædrus, it is said by the circulation of itself, to lead all things to the supercelestial place, and the summit of the first intelligibles.

That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government from his father, and to have transmitted it to Jupiter, by violence. Mythologists therefore celebrate the sections of Heaven and Saturn. But the cause of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the Titannic genus rejoices in separations and differences, progressions and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing God, separates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect he is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence also the demiurgic genus is again separated from him. Section therefore is on both sides of him. For so far as he is a Titan, he is cut off from the connective causes, but so far as he does not give himself to material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter.

That with respect to the supercelestial place to which Heaven extends his intellectual life, some characterise it by ineffable symbols; but others after giving it a name celebrate it as unknown, neither being able to speak of its form, or figure. And proceeding somewhat higher than this, they have been able to manifest the boundary[446] of the intelligible Gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this, they signify through analogy alone, these natures being ineffable and incomprehensible. Since that God who closes the paternal order, is said by the wise to be the only deity among the intelligible Gods, that is denominated: and theurgy ascends as far as to this order. Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted such a transcendency of uniform subsistence, that some of them are said to be effable, and at the same time ineffable, known, and at the same time unknown, through their alliance to _the one_, Socrates very properly restrains the discourse about them, in consequence of names not being able to represent their hyparxes; and in short, because it requires a certain wonderful employment, to separate the effable and ineffable, of their hyparxis or power. He accuses therefore his memory, not as disbelieving in the fables, which assert that there are certain more ancient causes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himself celebrates the supercelestial place. But he says this, because the first of beings cannot become known by the exercise of memory and through phantasy, or opinion, or the dianoetic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis of our essence; and through these we receive the sensation of their unknown nature. Socrates therefore says, that what in them is exempt, both from our gnostic and recollective life, is the cause of our inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be known through names. Theologists likewise would not remotely signify them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could be named, and apprehended by knowledge.

That Homer[447] does not ascend beyond the Saturnian order, but evincing that Saturn is the proximate cause of the demiurgus, he calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the son of Saturn. He also calls the divinities co-ordinate with him Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he denominates Jupiter, the father of men and Gods. But he does not introduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as truly αγκυλομητις in consequence of being converted to himself.

That Orpheus greatly availed himself of the licence of fables, and manifests every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to the first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends the intelligible unities, _Time_; whether because _Time_ pre-subsists as the cause of all generation, or because, as delivering the generation of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that he may indicate the order of true beings, and the transcendency of the more total to the more partial; that a subsistence according to Time may be the same with a subsistence according to cause; in the same manner as generation with an arranged progression. But Hesiod venerates many of the divine natures in silence, and does not in short name the first. For that what is posterior to the first proceeds from something else, is evident from the verse,

“Chaos of all things was the first produced.”

For it is perfectly impossible that it could be produced without a cause; but he does not say what that is which gave subsistence to Chaos. He is silent indeed with respect to both the fathers[448] of intelligibles, the exempt, and the co-ordinate; for they are perfectly ineffable. And with respect to the two co-ordinations, the natures which are co-ordinate with the one, he passes by in silence, but those alone which are co-ordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Hesiod deserves to be mentioned, for passing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being ineffable. For this also is indicated concerning them by the Oracles, which likewise add “they possess mystic silence,” σιγ’ εχε μυστα. And Socrates himself in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of them μυησις and εποπτεια, _in which nearly the whole business is ineffable and unknown_.

That Saturn in conjunction with Rhea produced Vesta and Juno who are co-ordinate to the demiurgic causes. For Vesta imparts from herself to the Gods an uninclining permanency, and seat in themselves, and an indissoluble essence. But Juno imparts progression, and a multiplication into things secondary. She is also the vivifying fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this account she is said to have proceeded together with Jupiter the demiurgus; and through this communion she generates maternally, such things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Vesta abides in herself, possessing an undefiled virginity, and being the cause of sameness to all things. Each of these divinities however together with her own proper perfection, possesses according to participation the power of the other. Hence some say that Vesta is denominated from essence (απο της εστιας) looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her vivific and motive power which she derives from Juno say that she is thus denominated ως ωσεως ουσαν αιτιαν _as being the cause of impulsion_. For all divine natures are in all, and particularly such as are co-ordinate with each other, participate of, and subsist in each other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates the form by which it is characterised, from Vesta. The orbs of the planets likewise possess the sameness of their revolutions from her; and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their rest.

That Vesta does not manifest essence, but the abiding and firm establishment of essence in itself; and hence this goddess proceeds into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to Saturn have not a subsistence in themselves and in another,[449] but this originates from Saturn. And a subsistence in _self_ is the peculiarity of Vesta, but in _another_ of Juno.

That the theology of Hesiod from the monad Rhea produces according to things which are more excellent in the co-ordination, Vesta, but according to those which are subordinate Juno; and according to those which subsist between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in a certain respect the same with the whole of vivification, and in a certain respect is not the same. For on high she is Rhea, but below in conjunction with Jupiter, she is Ceres: for here the things begotten are similar to the begetters, and are nearly the same.

That we ought to receive with caution what is now said concerning effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material flowing of Heraclitus; for this is false,[450] and unworthy the dianoetic conceptions of Plato. But since it is lawful to interpret things divine analogously, through appropriate images, Socrates very properly assimilates fontal and Saturnian deities to streams; in so doing jesting and at the same time acting seriously, because good is always derived as it were in streams from on high, to things below. Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the fontal deities, who eternally devolve streams of good, the deities who subsist as principles are celebrated. For after the _fountain_ of a river the place where it _begins_ to flow is surveyed.

That those divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called fontal. For “from him leap forth the implacable thunders,” says the oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea from which all life, divine, intellectual, psychical and mundane is generated, the Chaldean oracles thus speak.

Ρειη τοι νοερων μακαρων πηγη τε ροη τε. Παντων γαρ πρωτη δυναμεις κολποισιν αφραστοις Δεξαμενη, γενεην επι παν προχεει τροχαουσαν.

i.e. “Rhea[451] is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual Gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing.”

For this divinity gives subsistence to the infinite diffusion of all life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewise moves all things according to the measures of divine motions, and converts them to herself; establishing all things in herself, as being co-ordinate to Saturn. Rhea therefore is so called from causing a perpetual influx of good, and through being the cause of divine _facility_, since the life of the gods is attended with _ease_ (θεοι ρεια ζωντες).

That Ocean is the cause to all the Gods of acute and vigorous energy, and bounds the separations of the first, middle, and last orders; converting himself to himself, and to his proper principles, through swiftness of intellect, but moving all things from himself, to energies accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and causing them to have a never-failing subsistence. But Tethys imparts permanency to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and stability to the beings which are excited by him to the generation of secondary natures. She is also the source of purity of essence to those beings who perpetually desire to produce all things; as sustaining every thing in the divine essences which as it were _leaps forth and percolates_. For each of first causes, though it imparts to secondary natures a participation of good, yet at the same time retains with itself that which is undefiled, unmingled and pure from participation. Thus for instance, intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which also it fills soul; but establishing in itself that which in each of these is genuine and exempt, it also illuminates from itself to beings of a subordinate rank, inferior measures of these goods. And vigour of energy indeed, is present with more ancient natures, through Ocean; but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing which is imparted from superior to subordinate natures, whether it be essence, life, or intelligence, is _percolated_. And such of these as are primary, are established in themselves; but such as are more imperfect, are transferred to things of a subject order. Just as with respect to streams of water, such of them as are nearer their source are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys therefore, are fontal Gods, according to their first subsistence. Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of streams. But they also proceed into other orders of Gods, exhibiting the same powers among the Gods who rank as principles or rulers, among those of a liberated, and those of a celestial characteristic; and appropriately in each of these. Timæus, however, celebrates their sublunary orders, calling them fathers of Saturn and Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But their last processions are their divisible allotments about the earth; both those which are apparent on its surface, and those which under the earth, separate the kingdom of Hades, from the dominion of Neptune.

That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the former as father to prolific power, but to the latter, as father to intelligible[452] intellect.

That Ocean is said to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and the like, as establishing a communion with her, conformably to the generation of subordinate natures. For an according co-arrangement of the Gods, and a connascent co-operation in their productions, is called by theologists _marriage_.

That Tethys is denominated from leaping forth and _straining_ or _cleansing_, being as it were _Diatethys_, and by taking away the first two syllables _Tethys_.[453]

That Saturn is the monad of the Titannic order of the Gods, but Jupiter of the demiurgic. This last divinity however is twofold, the one exempt and co-ordinated with Saturn, being a fontal God, and in short ranking with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them; but the other being connumerated with the sons of Saturn, and allotted a Saturnian summit and dominion in this triad; concerning which also the Homeric Neptune says,

τρεις γαρ τ’ εκ Κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη.[454]

As brother Gods we three from Saturn came, And Rhea bore us.

And the first Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the king of things first, middle, and last, concerning whom Socrates also had just said, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life and salvation are imparted to all things through him.

But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is co-ordinate with the three sons of Saturn governs the third part of the whole of things, according to that of Homer,

τριχθα δε παντα δεδασται----[455]

A triple distribution all things own.

He is also the summit of the three, has the same name with the fontal Jupiter, is united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the second is called dyadically, marine Jupiter, and Neptune. And the third is triadically denominated, terrestrial Jupiter, Pluto, and Hades. The first of these also preserves, fabricates, and vivifies summits, but the second, things of a second rank, and the third those of a third order. Hence this last is said to have ravished Proserpine, that together with her he might animate the extremities of the universe.

That the Titannic order dividing itself from the connecting order of Heaven, but having also something in itself abiding, and connascent with that order, Saturn is the leader of the separation, and on this account he both arms others against his father, and receives the scythe[456] from his mother, through which he divides his own kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is co-ordinated with those that abide[457] in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the two orders; so far as a Titan being connumerated with the Gods that subsist with Saturn; but so far as rejoicing in a co-ordination with Heaven conjoining himself with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who bounds the first and second orders, should be arranged in the middle of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted a power of this kind, and separates the genera of the Gods, the Titannic from the connecting (των συνοχικων) and the vivific from the demiurgic. Whence also ancient rumor calls Ocean the God who separates the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this account poets say, that the sun and the other stars rise from the ocean. What is now said therefore by Plato comprehends all the Titannic order through these two conjunctions; this order abiding and at the same time proceeding. And through the Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends every thing separated from the fathers; but through that of Ocean, every thing conjoined with the connecting Gods. Or if you had rather so speak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal cause, but through the other, every thing subservient to the paternal cause. For the female is the cause of progression and separation, but the male of union and stable permanency.

That of the demiurgic triad[458] which divides the whole world, and distributes the indivisible, one and whole fabrication of the first Jupiter, the summit, and which has the relation of father is Jupiter, who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect having the same appellation with it, is for this reason not mentioned here by Plato. But Neptune is allotted the middle and that which binds together both the extremes; being filled indeed from the essence of Jupiter, but filling Pluto. For of the whole of this triad, Jupiter indeed is the father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect. And all indeed are in all; but each receives a different character of subsistence. Thus Jupiter subsists according to _being_; but Neptune according to _power_, and Pluto according to _intellect_. And though all these divinities are the causes of the life of all things, yet one is so _essentially_, another _vitally_, and another _intellectually_. Whence also the theologist Orpheus says, that the extremes fabricate in conjunction with Proserpine things first and last; the middle being co-arranged with generative cause from his own allotment, without Proserpine. Hence _violence_ is said to have been offered to Proserpine by Jupiter; but she is said to have been _ravished_ by Pluto. (διο και φασι την κορην υπο μεν τον διος βιαζεσθαι, υπο δε του πλοντωνος αρπαζεσθαι.) But the middle is said to be the cause of motion to all things. Hence also, he is called _earth-shaker_, as being the origin of motion. And among those who are allotted the kingdom of Saturn, the middle allotment, and the agile sea (η ευκινηγος θαλaσσa) are assigned to him. According to every division therefore, the summits are Jovian, the middles belong to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And if you look to the centres, such as the east, that of mid-heaven and the west; if also you divide the whole world, as for instance into the inerratic, planetary and sublunary spheres;--or again, if you divide that which is generated into the fiery, terrestrial, and that which subsists between; or the earth into its summits, middle, and hollow, and subterranean parts, this triad every where distributes the first, middle and last differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries.

That the name Neptune is now triply analysed. For Neptune is the trident-bearer, and the Tritons, and Amphitrite are the familiars of this God. And the first analyzation of his name is from the allotment over which he presides, and from souls coming into generation, in whom the circle of sameness is fettered; since the sea is analogous to generation. But the second is from communion with the first.

αλλα Ζευς προτερος γεονει, και πλειονα ηδει.[459]

But Jove was born the first, and more he knew. For a Jupiter of this kind, is the proximate intelligible of Neptune. But the third analysis of his name is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of nature, and vivific of things last. He is also the guardian of the earth, and excites it to generations.

That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic God, who receives souls descending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic God, who frees souls from generation. For as our whole period receives a triple division, into a life prior to generation, which is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into a life posterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is characterised by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings, effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only in souls, but also in every fabrication of bodies, and in short, of all periods;--which circle also, he perpetually convolves. Thus for instance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the souls of the stars, and the convolutions of souls about generation, and the like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of souls prior to generation.

That some badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth, through fruits and metals; but Hades into the invisible, dark and dreadful. These Socrates now reprobates, bringing the two names to the same signification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect, to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect knowing all things. For this God is a sophist, who purifying souls after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as some improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades to some appears to be attended with perturbations (εμπαθως); but it is invisible and better than the apparent; such as is every thing intelligible. Intellect therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves itself to being, and the paternal cause, imitating in its energy the circle.

That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themselves the passions of the animated nature, and on this account consider death to be dreadful, as being the cause of corruption. The truth however is, that it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to nature, since a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature, and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is necessary to divest ourselves of the fleshly garments with which we are clothed, as Ulysses did of his ragged vestments, and no longer like a wretched mendicant together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as the Chaldean Oracle says, “Things divine cannot be obtained by those whose intellectual eye is directed to body; but those only can arrive at the possession of them, who stript of their garments hasten to the summit.”

That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is said to know _many_ things; but Hades compared with souls to whom he imparts knowledge is said to know _all_ things; though Neptune is more total than Hades.

That as it is necessary to analyse Pluto, not only into the obvious wealth from the earth, but also into the wealth of wisdom, so likewise Ceres must be analysed not only into corporeal nutriment; but beginning from the Gods themselves it is requisite to conceive her to be the supplier of aliment, first to the Gods themselves, afterwards to the natures posterior to the Gods; and in the last place, that the series of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For the characteristic of love shines forth first of all in the Gods: and this is the case with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and with those of every other divinity. But nutriment, when considered with reference to the Gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude from more exalted natures to those of an inferior rank. Gods therefore, are nourished, when they view with the eye of intellect Gods prior to themselves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties, such as justice itself, temperance itself, and the like, as it is said in the Phædrus.

That from sportive conceptions about the Gods, it is possible for those to energize entheastically, or according to a divinely inspired energy, who apply themselves to things in a more intellectual manner. Thus for instance, according to the material conceptions of the multitude, Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam corresponds to seed. Hence according to them the pleasure arising from this in coition is Venus. Who however, is so stupid, as not to survey primary and eternal natures, prior to such as are last and corruptible? I will therefore unfold the divine conception respecting Venus.

They say then that the first Venus was produced from twofold causes, the one as that _through which_,[460] co-operating with her progression, as calling forth the prolific power of the father, and imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker and cause unfolding the goddess into light, from his own generative abundance. For whence could that which congregates different genera, according to one desire of beauty, receive its subsistence except from the _synochical_ power of Heaven? From the foam therefore of his own prolific parts thrown into the sea, Heaven produced this goddess, as Orpheus says. But the second Venus, Jupiter produces from his own generative powers, in conjunction with Dione; and this goddess likewise proceeds from foam, after the same manner with the more ancient Venus, as Orpheus evinces. These goddesses therefore differ from each other, according to the causes of their production, their orders and their powers. For she that proceeds from the genitals of Heaven is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the supplier of an unpolluted life, and separates from generation. But the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the co-ordinations in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction. These divinities too, are united with each other through a similitude of subsistence: for they both proceed from generative powers; one from that of the connectedly-containing power of Heaven, and the other from Jupiter the demiurgus. But the sea signifies an expanded and circumscribed life; its profundity, the universally-extended progression of such a life; and its foam, the greatest purity of nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, and that which swims upon all life, and is as it were its highest flower.

That according to Orpheus Ceres is the same with Rhea. For he says that subsisting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, she is _Rhea_, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, she is _Ceres_. For thus he speaks,

Ρειην το πριν εουσαν, επει διος επλετο μητηρ Γεγονε δημητηρ.[461]

i.e. The goddess who was _Rhea_, when she bore Jove became Ceres.

But Hesiod says that Ceres is the daughter of Rhea. It is however evident, that these theologists harmonize: for whether this goddess proceeds from union with Saturn to a secondary order, or whether she is the first progeny of Rhea, she is still the same. Ceres therefore, thus subsisting, and receiving the most ancient and ruling order from the whole vivific Rhea, (της ολης Ζωογονου ρεας) and comprehending the middle centres of whole vivification, (της ολης Ζωογονιας) she fills all supermundane natures with the rivers of all-perfect life, pouring upon all things vitally, indivisibly, and uniformly.

Prior however to all this, she unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect, (Jupiter) and imparts to him the power of vivifying wholes. For as Saturn supplies her from on high with the cause of being; so Ceres from on high, and from her own prolific bosoms, pours forth vivification to the demiurgus. But possessing herself the middle of all vivific deity, she governs the whole fountains which she contains, and comprehends the one bond of the first and last powers of life. She stably convolves too, and contains all secondary fountains. But she leads forth the uniform causes of prior natures to the generation of others. This goddess too comprehends _Vesta_ and _Juno_: in her right hand parts Juno, who pours forth the whole order of souls; but in her left hand parts Vesta, who leads forth all the light of virtue. Hence, Ceres is with great propriety called by Plato,[462] _mother_, and, at the same time the _supplier of aliment_. For, so far as she comprehends in herself the cause of Juno, she is a mother; but as containing Vesta in her essence, she is the supplier of aliment. But the paradigm of this goddess is _Night: for immortal Night is called the nurse of the Gods_. Night however is the cause of aliment intelligibly:[463] for that which is intelligible is, according to the oracle,[464] the aliment of the intellectual orders of Gods. But Ceres first of all separates the two kinds of aliment in the Gods, as Orpheus says:

Μησατο γαρ προπολους, και αμφιπολους, και σπαδους· Μησατο δ’ αμβροσιην, και ερυθρου νεκταρος αρθρον· Μησατο δ’ αγλαα εργα μελισσαων εριβομβων.[465]

i.e. She cares for pow’rs ministrant, whether they Or Gods _precede_, or _follow_, or _surround_: _Ambrosia_, and _tenacious nectar red_ Are too the objects of her bounteous care. Last to the bee her providence extends, Who gathers honey with resounding hum.

Ceres therefore, our sovereign mistress (δεσποινα) not only generates life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from supernal natures to such as are last: _for virtue is the perfection of souls_. Hence mothers who are connected with the circulations of time, bring forth their offspring in imitation of this twofold and eternal generation of Ceres. For, at the same time that they send forth their young into the light, they extend to them milk naturally produced as their food.

That the conjunction of the demiurgic intellect with the vivific causes is triple: for it is conjoined with the fountains prior to itself; is present with its kindred co-ordinate natures; and co-energizes with the orders posterior to itself. For it is present with the mother prior to itself, _convertively_; (επιστρεπτικως) with Proserpine posterior to itself, _providentially_; (προνοητικως) and with Juno co-ordinate to itself with an _amatory energy_ (ερασμιως). Hence Jupiter is said to be enamoured of Juno,

ως σεο νυν εραμαι[466]

As now I love thee,----

And this love indeed is legal, but the other two appear to be illegal. This goddess therefore produces from herself in conjunction with the demiurgus and father all the genera of souls, the supermundane and mundane, the celestial and sublunary, the divine, angelic, dæmoniacal, and partial. After a certain manner too, she is divided from the demiurgus, but in a certain respect she is united to him: for Jupiter is said, in the Philebus, to contain a royal intellect and a royal soul. For he contains uniformly the paternal and maternal cause of the world; and the fountain of souls is said to be in Jupiter; just as again, the intelligence of Jupiter is said to be first participated by Juno. For no other divinity, says Jupiter in Homer, knows my mind prior to Juno. Through this ineffable union therefore of these divinities, the world participates of intellectual souls. They also give subsistence to intellects who are carried in souls, and who together with them give completion to the whole fabrication of things.

That the series of our sovereign mistress Juno, beginning from on high pervades to the last of things; and her allotment in the sublunary region is the air. For _air_ is a symbol of _soul_, according to which also, soul is called a _spirit_ (πνευμα); just as _fire_ is an image of _intellect_, but _water_ of _nature_, by which the world is nourished, (της κοσμοτρφου φυσεως) through which all nutriment and increase are produced. But _earth_ is the image of _body_, through its gross and material nature. Hence Homer obscurely signifying this, represents Juno suspended with two anvils under her feet: for the air is allotted two heavy elements beneath itself.

For

ηλιον δ’ ακαμαντα βοωπις ποτνια ηρη πεμψεν επ’ ωκεανοιο ροας

i.e. “Fair-eyed venerable Juno sent the sun to the streams of the ocean,”--is from the same conception.

For he calls the thick cloud produced by Juno, the setting of the sun. The assertion likewise that the end of this name will be conjoined with the beginning, if any one frequently repeats the name of the goddess, evinces the conversion of rational souls to her which proceed from her; and that voice is air that is struck. On this account also the voice of rational animals is especially dedicated to this goddess, who made the horse of Achilles to become vocal. But Socrates now delivers these three vivific monads in a consequent order, viz. Ceres, Juno, Proserpine; calling the first the mother, the second the sister, and the third the daughter of the demiurgus. All of them however are partakers of the whole of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner and intellectually, the second in a fontal manner and at the same time in a way adapted to a principle (αρχικως) and the third, in a manner adapted to a principle and leader (αρχικως και ηγεμονικως).

Of these goddesses the last possesses triple powers, and impartibly and uniformly comprehends three monads of Gods. But she is called Core (κορη) through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled transcendency in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle and last empire. And according to her summit indeed, she is called Diana by Orpheus; but according to her middle Proserpine; and according to the extremity of the order Minerva. Likewise, according to an hyparxis transcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of Hecate is established; but according to a middle power, and which is generative of wholes, that of Soul; and according to intellectual conversion that of virtue.[467] Core therefore, subsisting on high, and among the supermundane Gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities; and together with Jupiter generates Bacchus, who impartibly presides over partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, she is particularly beheld according to the middle peculiarity; for it is this which proceeding every where imparts vivification to the last of things. Hence she is called Proserpine, because she especially associates with Pluto, and together with him orderly distributes the extremities of the universe. And according to her extremities indeed, she is said to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but according to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in the subterranean regions. She therefore is also called Core, but after another manner than the supermundane and ruling Core. For the one is the connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the other is the middle of them, in herself possessing the peculiarities of the extremes. Hence in the Proserpine conjoined with Pluto, you will find the peculiarities of Hecate and Minerva; but these extremes subsist in her occultly, while the idiom of the middle shines forth, and that which is characteristic of ruling soul, which in the supermundane Core _was of a ruling_[468] nature, but here subsists according to a mundane peculiarity.

That Proserpine is denominated, either through judging of forms and separating them from each other, thus obscurely signifying the ablation of slaughter (δια το κρινειν τα ειδη και χωριζειν αλληλων, ως του φονου την αναιρεσιν αινιττομενον) or through separating souls perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things on high, which is the most fortunate slaughter and death, to such as are worthy of it. (η δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελεως εκ των σωματων δια της προς τα ανω επιστροφης, οπερ εστιν ευτυχεστατος φονος και θανατος τοις αξιουμενοις τουτου.) But the name φερεφαττα _Pherephatta_, according to a contact with generation is adapted to Proserpine; but according to wisdom and counsel to Minerva. At the same time however all the appellations by which she is distinguished are adapted to the perfection of soul. On this account also she is called Proserpine, and not by the names of the extremes; since that which was ravished by Pluto is the middle; the extremes at the same time being firmly established in themselves, according to which Core is said to remain a virgin.

With respect to our sovereign mistress Diana, Plato delivers three peculiarities of her, the undefiled, the mundane, and the anagogic. And through the first of these indeed, the goddess is said to be a lover of virginity; but through the second, according to which she is perfective of works (τελεσιουργος) she is said to be the inspective guardian of virtue; and through the third she is said to hate the impulses arising from generation. Of these three likewise, the first is especially adapted to the progression of the goddess, according to which she is allotted an hyparxis in the vivific triad of the supermundane Gods; whether we call this deity Hecatic, as Theurgists say, or Diana with Orpheus. For there being established, she is filled with undefiled powers from the Gods called _Amilicti_.[469] But she looks to the fountain of virtue, and embraces its virginity. For the virginity which is there does not proceed forth, as the Oracle says, but abiding gives subsistence to Diana, and to supermundane virtue, and is exempt from all communion, conjunction and progression, according to generation. Hence Core also, according to the Diana and Minerva which she contains, is said to remain a virgin; but according to the prolific power of Proserpine, she is said to proceed forth, and to be conjoined with the third demiurgus, and to bring forth as Orpheus says, “nine azure-eyed, flower-producing daughters;”

εννεα θυγατερας γλαυκωπιδας ανθεσιουργους.

since the Diana and the Minerva which she contains preserve their virginity always the same. For the former of these is characterised according to her stability, but the latter according to her convertive energy. But that which is generative is allotted in her a middle order. They say too, that she aspires after virginity, since the form of her is comprehended in the vivific fountain, and she understands fontal virtue, gives subsistence to supermundane and anagogic virtue, and despises all material sexual connexion, though she inspects the fruits arising from it.

She appears also to be averse to the generations and progressions of things, but to introduce perfections to them. And she gives perfection indeed to souls through a life according to virtue; but to mortal animals she imparts a restitution to form. But that there is a great union between Diana, the mundane Hecate, and Core, is evident to those that are in the least degree conversant with the writings of Orpheus; from which it appears that Latona is comprehended in Ceres, and together with Jupiter gives subsistence to Core, and the mundane Hecate. To which we may also add that Orpheus[470] calls Diana Hecate. So that it is nothing wonderful, if we should elsewhere call the Diana contained in Core Hecate.

“Again, theologists especially celebrate two powers of our sovereign mistress Minerva, the _defensive_, and the _perfective_; the former preserving the order of wholes undefiled, and unvanquished by matter, and the latter filling all things with intellectual light, and converting them to their cause. And on this account, Plato also in the Timæus, analogously celebrates Minerva as _philopolemic_ and _philosophic_. But three orders of this Goddess are delivered by theologists; the one fontal and intellectual, according to which she establishes herself in her father Jupiter, and subsists in unproceeding union with him; but the second ranks among the supermundane Gods, according to which she is present with Core, and bounds and converts all the progression of that Goddess to herself. And the third is _liberated_, according to which she perfects and guards the whole world, and circularly invests it with her powers, as with a veil; binding together all the mundane summits, and giving subsistence to all the allotments in the heavens, and to those which proceed into the sublunary region. Now therefore Socrates celebrates her _guardian_ power, through the name of _Pallas_; but her perfective power through that of _Minerva_. She is the cause therefore of orderly and measured motion, which she first imparts to the Curetic order, and afterwards to the other Gods. For Minerva according to this power is the leader of the Curetes, as Orpheus says, whence also, as well as those divinities she is adorned with empyrean arms, through which she represses all disorder, preserves the demiurgic series immoveable, and unfolds dancing through rhythmical motion. She also guards reason as it proceeds from intellect; through this power vanquishing matter. For the visible region, says Timæus, is mingled from intellect and necessity, the latter being obedient to the former, and all material causes being in subjection to the will of the father. It is this goddess therefore, who arranges necessity under the productions of intellect, raises the universe to the participation of Jupiter, excites and establishes it in the port of its father, and eternally guards and defends it. Hence, if the universe is said to be indissoluble, it is this goddess who supplies its permanency; and if it moves in measured motion, through the whole of time, according to one reason and order, she is the source of this supply. She watchfully surveys therefore all the fabrication of her father, and connects and converts it to him; and vanquishes all material indefiniteness. Hence she is called _Victory_ and _Health_; the former because she causes intellect to rule over necessity, and form over matter; and the latter, because she preserves the universe perpetually whole, perfect, exempt from age, and free from disease. It is the property therefore of this goddess to elevate and distribute, and through an intellectual dance as it were, to connect, establish, and defend inferior natures in such as are more divine.”[471]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] For γονων, it is necessary to read γενων.

[2] It appears to me that πρωτως is in this place omitted in the original.

[3] For αριστα, I read αριστην.

[4] For κατα τουτο, it is necessary to read κατα ταυτον.

[5] For διακρινον, it is necessary to read διατεινον.

[6] For αυτο, I read αυτῳ.

[7] Instead of εκ της διακοσμησεως, it is necessary to read εκ ταυτης διακοσμησεως.

[8] For οπως, it is necessary to read πως, and in consequence of this, the sentence should not be, as it is in the original, interrogatory.

[9] From the version of Portus, it appears necessary after the words τους μεν, αφ’εαυτου τε, to supply the words του νοερου πατρος, τους δε αφ’εαυτου τε κ. τ. λ.

[10] For της ολης, it is necessary to read τοις ολοις.

[11] For τοις ολοις, it is necessary to read τοις πολλοις.

[12] The word αστρον is omitted in the original.

[13] εν is omitted in the original.

[14] For παντος it is necessary to read πατρος.

[15] αφ’ου signifies an occult, but υφ’ου, a manifest progression.

[16] For εξῃρηται, it is necessary to read εξηρτηται.

[17] For επιστησωμεν, I read επισκεψωμεν.

[18] For γονιμου, it is necessary to read μονιμου.

[19] For νεαρας, it is necessary to read νοερας.

[20] The following observations were written in the margin of the manuscript copy of this work of Proclus, by some scholiast or commentator: “For end and that which is perfected, and the possession of beginning, middles and end, first subsist in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. And on this account figure, also, there presents itself to the view. This triad, therefore, in the whole assimilative series is analogous to intelligibles and intellectuals, as having from them[21] the beginning, middles, and end. For the demiurgus produced this triad according to the similitude of the perfective triad, and connected the straight and the circular with motion. For to bound in a direct path, and to proceed circularly, are definitive of motion, as was said by Proclus in the Chapter prior to this. And as this triad has these properties from intelligibles and intellectuals, thus also the whole series of assimilative Gods possess them from this triad. Hence this triad of partial demiurgi, is analogous to the intelligible and intellectual fathers, i.e. to the perfective power.”

[21] For απ’ αυτης, it is necessary to read απ’ αυτων.

[22] For δε ὄντως, it is necessary to read δεοντως.

[23] It appears to me that after και αι ζητησεις in the original, there are wanting the words των προνοουντων, ωσπερ.

[24] For τριας here, it is necessary to read τριαδος.

[25] The word μιας is omitted in the original.

[26] For των αγαθων, it is necessary to read τῳ αγαθῳ.

[27] For θειον νοητον, it is necessary to read θειον γεννητον; every perpetually circulating body being thus denominated by Plato.

[28] For νοητοις here, it is necessary to read γεννητοις.

[29] For περιοδοις, it is necessary to read προοδοις.

[30] For υπ’ αλληλων it is necessary to read υπ’ αλλων.

[31] For πασης, it is necessary to read πασι.

[32] For παρα τι, it is necessary to read περατι.

[33] It is necessary here to supply the word ομοιου.

[34] For εαυτῳ, it is necessary to read εαυτο.

[35] For υλικης, it is necessary to read ολικης.

[36] It is necessary here to substitute και for το.

[37] Instead of περι αυτων, it is necessary to read περι αυτην.

[38] i.e. Phanes, or in Platonic language animal itself, subsisting at the extremity of the intelligible order.

[39] i.e. Imitating Saturn and Phanes.

[40] The Greek scholiast observes on this part of the text of Proclus as follows: “By the _intellectual_, Proclus means the _ruling_ Gods; but by an immaterial and separate intellect the whole demiurgus. And by _essence_ he means a partial hypostasis, such as that of soul, of a dæmon, and of the intellect which is co-ordinate to partial souls.”

[41] For νοητου here, it is necessary to read νοερου.

[42] viz. The genera of being, essence, sameness, difference, motion and permanency.

[43] For εσχατον, it is necessary to read εχουσιν.

[44] For εν δε, if is necessary to read αι δε.

[45] By intelligible souls, we must understand partial, but undefiled souls.

[46] For χωρικον, it is necessary to read χωριστον.

[47] Instead of περι τον κοσμον, it is necessary to read υπερ τον κοσμον.

[48] For περιοδους, it is necessary to read προοδους.

[49] For δυαδος, it is necessary to read δυναμεως.

[50] For εξηςτηται, it is necessary to read εξηρηται.

[51] For ουτε, it is necessary to read ουκουν.

[52] For οχετον, I read οχλον.

[53] For την απογεννησιν, it is necessary to read της απογεννησεως.

[54] For γονιμον, it is necessary to read μονιμον.

[55] For αφαιρησωμεθα, it is necessary to read αφορισωμεθα.

[56] For αρρητον, it is necessary to read αρρηκτον.

[57] For αυτοτελες, it is necessary to read ατελες.

[58] For περιφορας, I read περιγραφας.

[59] For μερων, it is necessary to read Μοιρων.

[60] In the original το δε μελλον is omitted.

[61] For τα παραγοντα, it is necessary to read τα παροντα.

[62] In the original ουχ απτομενον is omitted.

[63] In the original χωριστον εστι, is wanting.

[64] For περιοδῳ, it is necessary to read προοδῳ.

[65] Vid. Sallust. de Diis et Mundo, Cap. 6.

[66] Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 45.

[67] Vid. Jamblich. de Mysteriis Sect. I. Cap. 8.

[68] Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 9.

[69] Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 17.

[70] Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 19.

[71] See the 5th Book of this work, in which this speech is admirably discussed by Proclus, though not so fully as in these extracts.

[72] For μεν ειναι το παμπαν αθανατους in the original, it is necessary to read μη ειναι κ. τ. λ.

[73] Instead of νοητον, it is requisite to read νοητῳ.

[74] This divinity is Vulcan.

[75] παρ’ ετερου is omitted in the original.

[76] The words και λυτον απλως παρ’ εαυτου και παρ’ ετερου, are omitted in the original.

[77] For ενδοσιν, it is necessary to read ενωσιν.

[78] Κεχαρασμενην is erroneously printed for κεχαλασμενην.

[79] After την παραδειγματικην it is necessary to supply the words δια του καλως, την δημιουργικην, which are wanting in the original.

[80] The words και λυτοι are omitted in the original.

[81] For αυτου φυσιν, it is necessary to read αυτων φυσιν.

[82] Instead of του μη θνητου, it is necessary to read του θνητου.

[83] The original has erroneously μονας instead of μονον.

[84] For μετα βουλης, I read μεταβολης. For the mundane Gods are in no part of the Timæus represented as consulting about the fabrication of things.

[85] i.e. Proserpine.

[86] For τελειοτατα, it is necessary to read τελειοτητα.

[87] For τα θειοτα, it is necessary to read τα θειοτατα.

[88] Iliad xx. v. 24.

[89] Instead of δια τινων εγκοσμιων, it is necessary to read δια τι των εγκοσμιων.

[90] αθανατως is omitted in the original.

[91] For εξ ου σωματος, it is necessary to read εξω σωματος.

[92] For λυπης, it is requisite to read λοιπης.

[93] i.e. Jupiter, who is so called in this place by Proclus, because he contains in himself by participation, the Phanes or Protogonus who is the paradigm of the universe.

[94] For πονηρια, it is necessary to read πενια.

[95] For ιδρυαν, it is necessary to read ιδρυσιν.

[96] σαφῃ is erroneously printed for αφῃ.

[97] For και βαθεων, it is necessary to read και βαθμων.

[98] For πατρος, it is necessary to read παντος.

[99] Here also for πατρι, it is necessary to read παντι.

[100] Vid. Proclum in Tim. p. 275.

[101] These ολοτητες, according to the Platonic philosophy, have so far as they are wholes, a perpetual subsistence, and are the spheres of the fixed stars, the spheres of the planets, the sphere of air, the globe on which we live, and the ocean. See more on this subject in my Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle.

[102] Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 257 and 279.

[103] Hence, we may perceive at one view, as I have elsewhere observed, why the sun in the Orphic hymns is called Jupiter, why Apollo is called Pan, and Bacchus the Sun; and why the moon seems to be the same with Rhea, Ceres, Proserpine, Juno, Venus, &c. For from this theory it follows, that every sphere contains a Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, and in short, every deity,--each sphere at the same time conferring on these Gods the peculiar characteristics of its nature; so that for instance, in the sun they possess a solar property; in the moon a lunar one; and so of the rest.

This theory too is one of the grand keys to the theology of the Greeks; as it shows why one God is so often celebrated by the appellations of another; an ignorance of the cause of which led Macrobius to think that all the Gods were nothing more than the different powers of the sun, and has been one great source of the idle conjectures of the moderns about the divinities of the ancients.

[104] Vid. Procl. in Tim. lib. 4. p. 263.

[105] For περιοδον, it is necessary to read προοδον.

[106] For γνωριζειν, it is necessary to read οριζει.

[107] According to the Chaldaic dogmas, as explained by Psellus, there are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this three etherial; and then three material worlds, viz. the inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. They also assert that there are two solar worlds; one which is subservient to the etherial profundity; the other zonaic, being one of the seven spheres.

[108] Viz. The supermundane Gods.

[109] It must be carefully observed, however, that this is only true of the Gods characteristically called supermundane. For it does not apply to the Gods who are _primarily_ intellectual, since they are above the supermundane order, to which the sun and Apollo belong.

[110] That is, according to the Chaldæan oracles, the sun is the middle of the empyrean, etherial, and material worlds, the two last of which, as I have observed in a former note, receive a triple division.

[111] These verses are not in Gesner’s collection of the Orphic fragments.

[112] These lines are from Empedocles, and in the original are as follow:

Ενθα κοτος τε φονος τε και αλλων εθνεα κηρων, Αυχμηραι τε νοσοι, και σηψεις, εργα τε ρευστα.

[113] Vide Jamblich. de Myst. lib. i. cap. 18.

[114] In Tim, lib. i. p. 51.

[115] For χορευτων in this place, it is necessary to read χορων των.

[116] Iliad. viii.

[117] Iliad. viii.

[118] In Tim. p. 48.

[119] This triad consists of Minerva, Diana, and Proserpine.

[120] The former part of this inscription is to be found in Plutarch’s treatise of Isis and Osiris; but the latter part, viz. _the fruit which I brought forth was the sun_, is only to be found in the above Commentary of Proclus. The original is, ον εγω καρπον ετεκον ηλιος εγενετο.

[121] viz. In _ether_ or _bound_, the summit of the intelligible triad.

[122] Instead of σχηματος, it is necessary to read οχηματος.

[123] For according to Plato, plants also, as having life, are animals.

[124] For δαιμονικας here, it is necessary to read ηγεμονικας.

[125] παντικα is erroneously printed in the original for μαντικα.

[126] For αιωνιοι, it is evidently necessary to read in this place παιωνιοι.

[127] Apud Porphyr. de Abstin.

[128] It is necessary here to supply the word θειον.

[129] It is requisite to read κατ εκεινον, instead of κατ εκεινην.

[130] The word ουρανιων is omitted in the original.

[131] It is obviously necessary here for εαυτων to read εαυτου.

[132] εγγονοι is omitted in the original.

[133] This is doubtless the Sibyl, of whom Proclus also observes (in Tim. p. 325.) “that proceeding into light, she knew her own order, and manifested that she came from the Gods, saying I am the medium between Gods and men.” ειδε γαρ τοι Σιβυλλα εις φως, και την ταξιν εαυτης, και ως εκ θεων ηκει δεδηλwκεν, ειμι δ’ εγω μεση τε θεων εἰπουσα μεση τ’ ἀνθρωπων.

[134] For επιπορευοντων, it is necessary to read επιτροπευοντων.

[135] Some of the moderns, from being profoundly ignorant of this circumstance, have stupidly supposed that the Gods of the ancients were nothing more than dead men deified; taking for their guides on this important subject, mere historians, philologists, and rhetoricians, instead of philosophers.

[136] For επι της, it is necessary to read επι γης.

[137] For αποκαταστασεως, it is requisite to read αποστασεως.

[138] In the original αλογων is erroneously printed for αναλογων.

[139] This is a very ancient Egyptian doctrine. And hence Kircher in his Oedipus Egyptiacus says that he read the following words engraved in a stone near Memphis: _Coelum sursum, coelum deorsum, quod sursum id omne deorsum, hæc cape et beaberis_, _i.e._ _Heaven is above and heaven is Beneath. Every thing which is above is also beneath. Understand this, and you will be blessed._ Conformably to this also the celebrated Smaragdine Table, which is of such great authority with the Alchemists, and which whether originally written or not by Hermes Trismegistus, is doubtless of great antiquity, says that all that is beneath resembles all that is above. But the Table itself is as follows: “Verum sine mendacio, certum et verissimum: quod est inferius, est sicut id quod est superius, et quod est superius, est sicut id, quod est inferius ad perpetrandum miraculum unius rei. Et sicut res omnes fuerunt ab uno mediatione unius, sic omnes res natæ ab hac re adoptatione. Pater ejus est sol, mater ejus luna. Portavit illud ventus in ventre suo. Nutrix ejus terra, pater omnis telesmi totius mundi est hic. Virtus ejus integra est, si versa fuerit in terram. Separabis terram ab igne, subtile a spisso suaviter cum magno ingenio. Ascendit a terra in coelum, iterumque descendit in terram, et recipit vim superiorum et inferiorum. Sic habebis gloriam totius mundi, ideo fugiet à te omnis obscuritas. Hæc est totius fortitudinis fortitudo fortis, quia vincet omnem rem subtilem, omniaque solida penetrabit. Sic mundus creatus est. Hinc erunt adoptationes mirabiles, quarum modus hic est. Itaque vocatus sum Hermes Trismegistus habens tres partes philosophiæ totius mundi. Completum est quod dixi de opere solis.” i.e. “It is true without a lie, certain, and most true, that what is beneath is like that which is above, and what is above is like that which is beneath, for the purpose of accomplishing the miracle of one thing. And as all things were from one through the mediation of one, so all things were generated from this thing by adoption [i.e. by participation.] The sun is its father, and the moon its mother. The wind carried it in its belly. The earth is its nurse. This is the father of all the perfection of the whole world. Its power is entire when it is converted into earth. You must separate the earth from the fire, the subtil from the thick sweetly with great genius. It ascends from earth to heaven, and again descends to the earth, and receives the power of things superior and inferior. Thus you will have the glory of the whole world, and thus all obscurity will fly from you. This is the strong fortitude of all fortitude, because it vanquishes every subtile thing, and penetrates all solid substances. Thus the world was fabricated. Hence admirable adoptions will take place of which this is the mode. I am therefore called Hermes Trismegistus possessing three parts of the philosophy of the whole world. That which I have said concerning the work of the sun is complete.”

[140] Instead of και γαρ ουρανιαν και την σεληγην Ορφευς προσηγορευσεν, the sense requires we should read και γαρ ουρανιαν γην την σεληνην, κ. λ.

[141] For εκ τ’ αυτου, it is necessary to read εκ τ’ αγαθου.

[142] Instead of λεγω δη τοις του Ουρανου τουδε συνοχικης μεσοτηρος, it is requisite to read λεγω δια της του Ουρανου, κ. λ.

[143] For τριαδην, it is necessary to read τριαδαις.

[144] For νοερων, read νοητων.

[145] For αποριαν, read απειριαν.

[146] For ενιαυτον here, it is necessary to read ενιαιον.

[147] Plato, in the 10th book of the Laws, distinguishes the genus of motions into ten species, viz. circulation about an immoveable centre, local transition, condensation, rarefaction, increase, decrease, generation, corruption, mutation or alteration, produced in another by another, and a mutation produced from a thing itself, both in itself, and in another. This last is the motion of an essence separate from bodies, and is the motion of soul.

[148] For γονιμον here, it is necessary to read μονιμον.

[149] πατρος is erroneously printed instead of πατερες.

[150] As this is a remarkably curious Orphic fragment, and is not to be found in Gesner’s collection of the Orphic remains, I shall give the original for the sake of the learned reader. και τοι γε οτι ο κρονος υπερτερος εστι του ωκεανου, δεδηλωκεν ο θεολογος παλιν λεγων· τον μεν κρονον αυτον καταλαμβανειν τον ουρανιον ολυμπον, κᾳκει θρονισθεντα, βασιλευειν των τιτανων· τον δε ωκεανον την ληξιν απασαν την μεσην· ναιειν γαρ αυτον εν τοις θεσπεσιοις ρειθροις τοις μετα τον ολυμπον, και τον εκει περιεπειν ουρανον, αλλ’ου τον ακροτατον, ως δε φησιν ό μυθος, τον εμπεσοντα του ολυμπου, και εχει τεταγμενον. Procl. in Tim. p. 296.

[151] For μετ’αυτου, it is necessary to read μετ’αυτης.

[152] For Θαυμαντα, it is requisite to read Θαυμαντος; and for ποντον, ποντῳ.

[153] The original here is evidently erroneous; for it is, ου γαρ εστιν ο φορκυς ουρανιδης αλλα ο φορκυς, ως εστι δηλον εκ της θεογονιας. For αλλα ο φορκυς, therefore, I read αλλα ο Ωκεανος; Ocean, according to the Theogony of Hesiod, being the progeny of Heaven and Earth.

[154] Κρονος is erroneously printed for χρονος.

[155] For της υγρας υλης ουσιας, I read της υγρας ολης ουσιας.

[156] The words ημεις δε εκομενως are omitted in the original.

[157] For διανοηθεις, it is necessary to read διακινηθεις.

[158] For αφανη here it is necessary to read εμφανη.

[159] The meaning of Proclus in asserting that the ennead proceeds from the monad as far as to the extremities without retrogression is as follows: The ennead, according to the Pythagoreans, circulates all numbers within itself, and there can be no number beyond it. For the natural progression of numbers is as far as to 9, but after it their retrogression takes place. For 10 becomes as it were again the monad. Thus, if from each of the numbers 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, the number 9 is subtracted, the numbers that remain will be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. And vice versa, the progression will receive an increase by the addition of 9. For, if to each of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. 9 is added, the numbers produced will be 10, 11, 12, 13, &c. Likewise by subtracting from 20 twice 9, from 30 thrice 9, from 40 four times 9, from 50 five times 9 &c, the numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, &c will be produced. By taking likewise from 100 eleven times 9, we again return to the monad. And after the same manner we may proceed to infinity. Hence it is not possible there should be any elementary number beyond the ennead. Hence too the Pythagoreans, called it Ocean and the Horizon, because all numbers are comprehended by and revolve within it. On this account likewise, it was called by them Halios, (παρα το αλιζειν) and Concord and Perseïa because it congregates all numbers, and collects them into one, and does not permit the conspiration of the numbers beyond it to be dissipated. Vid. Anonym. in opere quod inscripsit τα θεολογουμενα της αριθμητικης.

[160] For εισι, it is requisite to read προεισι.

[161] προοδους is omitted in the original.

[162] In the original it is παραπετα instead of παραπετασματα.

[163] These thirty-six decadarchs are the divinities alluded to by the Emperor Julian in his Oration to the Sun, when he says, “that the Sun divides the zodiac into twelve powers of Gods, and each of these into three others, so that thirty-six are produced in the whole.”

[164] This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires about _great_ things.

[165] In Tim. p. 184.

[166] This is according to the psychical mode of interpreting fables. See my translation of Sallust On the Gods and the World.

[167] This is a life pertaining to her own will; for the soul in this case gives herself up to the will of divinity.

[168] For an account of divine fables, and specimens of the mode in which they ought to be explained, see the Introduction to the second Book of the Republic, in Vol. I. of my translation of Plato.

[169] Iliad. lib. viii.

[170] For the irrational soul is an _immaterial body_, or in other words, _vitalized extension_, such as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantasy; and the celestial bodies are of this kind.

[171] It is necessary here to supply the word θειων.

[172] For τρεφει here, it is necessary to read στρεφει.

[173] For δεσμων here read θεσμων.

[174] In Tim. p. 59.

[175] Lib. ii. p. 81.

[176] i.e. Angels, dæmons, and heroes.

[177] Lib. iv. p. 240, &c.

[178] Viz. the Sun considered as subsisting in the supermundane order of Gods.

[179] “But we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, as we have done, we, and our fathers, our kings, and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem: for _then had we plenty of victuals, and were well, and saw no evil_. But since we left off to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, _we have wanted all things_, and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine.” Jeremiah, Chap. xliv, v. 17, 18.

[180] In this dialogue, Plato assimilates the intimate form of the soul to a winged chariot and charioteer, drawn by two horses; and says, “that all the horses and chariots of the Gods are good, and composed of things that are good.” In which passage, by the chariots of the Gods are to be understood all the inward discursive powers of their souls, which pursue the intelligence of all things, and can at the same time equally contemplate and provide for inferior concerns. But the horses signify the efficacy and motive vigour of these powers. And the wings are elevating powers, which particularly belong to the charioteer, or intellect.

[181] I. e. In the summit of that order which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

[182] ποιμαινων πραπεδεσσιν ανομματον ωκυν ερωτα.

[183] The author of these verses comprehends the triple genera that are more excellent than man, viz. angels, dæmons and heroes, under the appellation of illustrious heroes.

[184] It must however, be carefully observed, that this divine cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy or tendency in illuminating deity.

[185] See a most masterly defence of the character of Achilles as a hero in my translation of Proclus’s noble apology for Homer, in the first Volume of my Plato.

[186] Vid. Iamblich. de vita Pythag. Cap. 2.

[187] And this essence, as is shown in the 4th book, subsists at the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order.

[188] This forms the middle of the above-mentioned order.

[189] This forms the extremity of that order.

[190] Viz. to Saturn, who subsists at the summit of the intellectual order.

[191] Instead of και δια το μη λεγειν, το διδον αει γινομενος, it is necessary to read δια το μη ληγειν το διδον, αει γινομενος.

[192] For ορωμενος here, it is necessary to read ορμωμενος.

[193] Wholes whether corporeal or incorporeal are thus denominated.

[194] For συνεκτεινατο, it is necessary to read συνετεκταινετο.

[195] i.e. a circular motion.

[196] Proclus elsewhere informs us in these Commentaries, that the soul of the world is called by Orpheus _Ippa_.

[197] i.e. Vesta.

[198] i.e. Juno.

[199] i.e. Having a good dæmon.

[200] Instead of εις δαιμων εγενετο μεγας αρχος απο παντων, it is requisite to read εις δαιμων γενετο μεγας αρχος απαντων.

[201] For αφανη here, it is necessary to read εμφανη.

[202] For συμβολικης των θεων παρουσιας, it is requisite to read συμβολικα της των, κ. λ.

[203] After του οντως here, it is requisite to supply οντος.

[204] The part within the brackets is wanting in the original, in which there is evidently a defect, as the stars at the end of the proposition indicate.

[205] Here also the part within the brackets is wanting in the original.

[206] For εαυτῳ here it is necessary to read εαυτο.

[207] It is here necessary to supply the words αφ’ εαυτου.

[208] This is asserted by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics.

[209] In Prop. 5.

[210] For τοις αιτιοις here, it is obviously necessary to read τοις αιτιατοις.

[211] For ων το μεν αυτην διδωσι, it is necessary to read ων το μετ’ αυτην διδωσι.

[212] From the 11th Proposition.

[213] From the 7th Proposition.

[214] ει is wanting in the original.

[215] This is asserted in the Phædrus of Plato.

[216] That if an essence is inseparable from body, it is impossible that the energy proceeding from this essence should be separate from body, Aristotle also demonstrates in his treatise On the Soul.

[217] The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, though perfectly necessary to the demonstration of the Proposition. Hence, the words ολον κινει, μερος δε κινειται, η, must be supplied.

[218] For if the whole moves, the part which is moved will at the same time be motive.

[219] The truth of this may be exemplified in light. Thus for instance we see many species of light; one kind emanating from the sun, another from fire and the stars, another from the moon, and another from the eyes of many animals. But this light though various, is every where similar, and discovers in its operations a unity of nature. On account of its uniformity therefore, it requires one principle and not different principles. But the sun is the only principle of all mundane light. And though there are many participants of light posterior to the solar orb, yet they scatter their uniform light, through one solar nature, property and power. But if we again seek for the principle of light in the sun, we cannot say that the solar orb is this principle; for the various parts of it diffuse many illuminations. There will therefore, be many principles. But we now require one first principle of light. And if we say that the soul of the sun generates light, we must observe that this is not effected by her psychical multiplicity, or she would diffuse different lights. Hence we must assert that she generates visible by intellectual light. But again this production does not subsist through intellectual variety, but rather through the unity of intellect which is its flower and summit. This unity is a symbol of that simple unity which is the principle of the universe. And to this principle the solar intellect is united by its unity; and through this it becomes a God. This divine unity of the sun therefore, is the principle of the uniform light of the world, in the same manner as simple unity and goodness is the source of intelligible light to all intelligible natures.

[220] The imparticipable is that which is not consubsistent with a subordinate nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is the intellect which is not consubsistent with soul, but is exempt from it. And imparticipable soul is the soul which is not consubsistent with body. And so in other things.

[221] Instead of ει γαρ αγονον, it is necessary to read η γαρ αγονον.

[222] The original here is both defective and incorrect. Instead therefore of τινος γενομενον υφ’ ου μαχεται, I read παν δε τινος γενομενον υφ’ ου μετεχεται.

[223] Instead of και οτι αλλο in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read και οτι αλλως.

[224] Instead of μετ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read μετ’ αυτο.

[225] For παρον here, it is necessary to read παραγον.

[226] Instead of προς παν here, it is necessary to read προς αιτιον.

[227] Instead of πως το διακριθεν, it is necessary to read πως το μη διακριθεν.

[228] For το απ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read τῳ απ’ αυτου.

[229] For το επιστρεφον, it is requisite to read το μη επιστερφον.

[230] There is a defect here in the original, which may be supplied, if instead of εστι την απο της ουσιας προς εαυτο επιστρεπτικον we read ει ουν εστι κατα την απο της ουσιας ενεργειαν προς εαυτο επιστρεπτικον.

[231] ουπω is omitted in the original.

[232] For μεριστην εαυτου, it is requisite to read μεριστον εαυτον.

[233] The truth of this reasoning may be evinced by the following considerations. Every thing which is measured by time, and such is every corporeal nature, depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is composed of the past, present and future. And if we conceive that any one of these parts is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time therefore is so essentially and intimately united with the natures which it measures, that their being such as it is, depends on the existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident therefore, that the natures to which it is so essential, must subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing; since, unless they flowed in conjunction with time, they would be separated from it, and would consequently perish. Hence, as we cannot affirm with propriety of any part of time, that it _is_; since even before we can form the assertion, the present time is no more; so with respect to all corporeal natures, from their subsistence in time, before we can say they exist, they lose all identity of being.

Such then is the unreal condition of every thing existing in time, or of every thing corporeal, and entangled with matter. But this shadowy essence of body is finely unfolded by Plotinus, in the 6th book of his 3rd Ennead, as follows: “Being (says he) properly so called is neither body, nor is subject to corporeal affections; but body and its properties belong to the region of non-entity. But you will ask, how is it possible, that visible matter should possess no real being; that matter in which stones and mountains reside, the solid earth, and bodies which mutually resist; since bodies which impel each other, confess by their collision, the reality of their existence? You will likewise ask after what manner things which neither strike against, nor resist each other, which neither externally act, nor internally suffer, nor are in any respect the objects of sight, viz. soul and intellect, are to be reckoned true and real beings. We reply, that on the contrary, things more corpulent are more sluggish and inert, as is evident in bulky masses of earth. But whatever is less ponderous is more moveable, and the more elevated the more moveable. Hence fire, the most moveable of all the elements, flies as it were from a corporeal nature. Besides, as it appears to me, whatever is more sufficient to itself, disturbs others less and brings less inconvenience; but such things as are more ponderous and terrene, unable from their defect of being to raise themselves on high and becoming debile and languid, strike and oppress surrounding bodies, by their falling ruin and sluggish weight. Since it is evident that bodies destitute of life, fall with molestation on any proximate substance, and more vehemently impel and pain whatever is endued with sense. On the contrary, animated beings, as participating more of entity, by how much the more of being they possess, by so much the more harmless they impinge their neighbouring bodies. Hence motion, which is a kind of life, or soul, or an imitation of life in bodies, is more present with whatever is less corpulent; as if more of body was necessarily produced where a defect of being happens in a greater degree.

Again, it will more manifestly appear from passivity, that whatever is more corpulent is more passive; earth in a greater degree than the other elements; and the rest in a similar proportion. For some things when divided, suddenly return to their former union, when no obstacle prevents their conjunction. But from the section of a terrene body, the divided portions always remain separate, as if destitute of natural vigour, and without any inherent desire of union and consent. Hence, they are ready by every trifling impulse, to remain as they are impelled; to rush from the embraces of bound, and hasten into multitude and non-entity. So that whatever becomes corporeal in an eminent degree, as falling fast into non-entity, has but little power of recalling itself into one. And on this account ponderous and vehement concussions are attended with ruin, when by mutual rushing one thing impels another. But when debility runs against debility, the one is valid against the other, in the same manner as non-entity rushing on non-entity. And this we think a sufficient confutation of their opinion, who only place being in the genus of body, persuaded by the testimony of impulses and concussions, and the phantasms perceived through the senses, which testify that sense is the only standard of truth. Such as these are affected in a manner similar to those in a dream, who imagine that the perceptions of sleep are true. For sense is alone the employment of the dormant soul; since as much of the soul as is merged in body, so much of it sleeps. But a true elevation, and true vigilance are a resurrection from, and not with the dull mass of body. For indeed a resurrection with body, is only a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like a man passing in the dark from bed to bed. But that elevation is perfectly true, which entirely rises from the dead weight of bodies. For these possessing a nature repugnant to soul, possess something opposite to essence. And this is farther evident, from their generation, and their continual flowing and decay, which are properties entirely foreign from the nature of being substantial and real.”

[234] ποτε is omitted in the original.

[235] It is necessary here to supply the word αυθυποστατων.

[236] For εις το αιτιωτερον, it is necessary to read εις το αιτιατον.

[237] ολον is omitted in the original.

[238] i.e. Any thing which is not universal (το τι).

[239] του οντος seems to be wanting here in the original.

[240] αιτιου is omitted in the original.

[241] i.e. As the Greek Scholiast observes in the margin of this Proposition, from the efficacious cause of that which acts, and the aptitude of that which suffers.

[242] The words το ποιουν ενεργειᾳ ον ο αυτο δυναμει, are wanting in the original.

[243] The Proposition ends here in the Greek, though very erroneously; and its conclusion forms the beginning of the next Proposition, which should begin at the words εαν το οντως ον. But instead of εαν, we must read παν.

[244] i.e. With natures rising into existence, or becoming to be, as opposed to the things which are, or to beings _truly_ so called (τα οντως οντα).

[245] Instead of παντως το οντως ον, it is doubtless necessary to read παν το οντως ον.

[246] Instead of δει πρωτον εξ αμφοιν ειναι, it is necessary to read δει προ του εξ αμφοιν ειναι.

[247] τι is omitted in the original.

[248] After οτι, there is a chasm in the original, and the words that are wanting appear to be δε αϊδιοτης απειρια τις εστιν.

[249] There is evidently a very gross error here in the original which is as follows: και γαρ εν τοις μεριστοις αι δυναμεις συναγομεναι μεν, πολλαπλασιαζονται, μεριζομεναι δε, αμυδρουνται. For powers when congregated are not multiplied, but united. Hence it is necessary to read και γαρ εν τοις μεριστοις αι δυναμεις συναγομεναι μεν, ενιζονται, μεριζομεναι δε, πολλαπλασιαζονται, και αμυδρουνται.

[250] By a strange mistake the original has απειρον here, instead of πεπερασμενον, and in the next line πεπερασμενον instead of απειρον.

[251] For αιτιοις here it is necessary to read αιτιατοις.

[252] Hence, as all things proceed from _the ineffable_, that which is imparticipable proceeds also from it, yet not as from a cause, but as from that which is better than cause. The procession, therefore, of the imparticipable from the ineffable is αρρητος εκφανσις, _an ineffable evolution into light_.

[253] Instead of πολλα γαρ ζῃ μεν, ζῃ, και νοει, it is necessary to read πολλα γαρ οντα μεν ουδε ζῃ, ουδε νοει.

[254] For του θανατου here, it is necessary to read του αθανατου.

[255] Instead of ως δι’ ομοιων ανομοιον, it is necessary to read ως δι’ ομοιων εις ομοιον.

[256] Instead of πως here it is necessary to read πας, and consequently the proposition is not interrogatory as in the original.

[257] It is necessary here to supply the word μεθεξεις.

[258] It is here requisite to supply νου.

[259] For υποκειμενοις, it is necessary to read υπερκειμενοις.

[260] There are two chasms in this sentence in the original, which I have endeavoured to supply in the translation.

[261] That the principle of all things is something beyond intellect and being itself, was asserted by the most ancient Pythagoreans, as well as by Plato and his best disciples, as the following citations will abundantly evince.

And in the first place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a most ancient Pythagorean, On the Principles of Things, preserved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82. and in which the following extraordinary passage occurs: ωστ’ αναγκα τρεις ειμεν τας αρχας, ταν τε εστω των πραγματων, και ταν μορφω, και το εξ αυτου κινατικον και αορατον δυναμει· το δε τοιουτον ον ου μονον[262] ειμεν δει, αλλα και νοω τι κρεσσον· νοω δε κρεσσον εστι, οπερ ονομαζομεν θεον φανερον.--i.e. “So that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; _that which is [the subject] of things (or matter), form, and that which is of itself motive, and invisible in power_. With respect to the last of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a subsistence, _but that it should be something better than intellect_. But that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with that which we denominate god.” It must here however be observed, that by the word _god_ we are not only to understand the first cause, but every god: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every deity, considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior to intellectual essence. Agreeably to the above passage is that also of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who expressly asserts that the first cause νου παντος και ουσιας δυναμει και πρεσβειᾳ υπερεχει--“surpasses every intellect and essence both in power and dignity.” Again, according to the same Syrianus, p. 103, b. we are informed “that the Pythagoreans called god the one, as the cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things through illumination, essence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound.” Των θειων ανδρων εν μεν λεγοντων τον θεον ως ενωσεως τοις ολοις αιτιον, και παντος του οντος, και πασης ζωης, και νου του παντελους επεκεινα. μετρον δε των παντων ως πασι την ουσιαν, και το τελος επιλαμποντα, και ως παντα περιεχοντα, και οριζοντα ταις αφραστοις αυτου, και παντος υπερηπλωμεναις περατος υπεροχαις. And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place _præclari_ is erroneously substituted for _Clinii_. “That which is _the one_, and _the measure of all things_ (says he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves: since he is the venerable principle of beings, the measure of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (μονον), possessing absolute dominion (κυριωδες), and himself manifesting himself (αυτο το εαυτο δηλουν).” This fine passage I have translated agreeably to the manuscript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaus; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is superior to the two first elements of things, _bound_ and _infinite_. For (says he) “Philolaus asserts that the deity established _bound_ and _infinite_: by bound indeed exhibiting every co-ordination, which is more allied to _the one_; but by infinity a nature subjected to _bound_. And prior to these two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated from the universality of things, which Archainetus (Αρχαινετος) denominates a cause prior to cause; but which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all things.” To all these respectable authorities for the superessential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony of Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us “that the Pythagoreans placed _the one_ as transcending the genus of things which are essentially understood.” και δη των μεν καθ’ αυτα νοουμενων γενος υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικοι παιδες, ως επαναβεβηκος το εν. In which passage, by things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy.

But in consequence of this doctrine of the ancients concerning _the one_, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others: such as αλαμπια, σκοτωδια, αμιξία, βαραθρον υποχθονιον, Απολλων, &c. viz. _obscurity_, or _without illumination_, _darkness_, _without mixture_, _a subterranean profundity_, _Apollo_, &c. For, considered as ineffable, incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be very properly called _obscurity_, _darkness_, and _a subterranean profundity_; but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less propriety be denominated _without mixture_, and _Apollo_; since Apollo signifies a privation of multitude. “For (says Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the first God _Apollo_, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of many.” Ennead. 5, lib. 5. To which we may add, that the epithets _darkness_ and _obscurity_ wonderfully agree with the appellation of _a thrice unknown darkness_, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damascius,[263] in their most mystical invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most ancient philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.

This silence is indeed remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his Theogony he says:

ητοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ’,----

That is, “_Chaos was the first thing which was generated_”--and consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Hesiod, γενετο is translated _fuit_, as if the poet had said that _Chaos was the first of all things_; and he is even accused by Cudworth on this account, as leaning to the atheistical system. But the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, γενετο was considered as meaning _was generated_, and not _was_ simply. And in the first place, this is clearly asserted by Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cælo. “There are certain persons (says he) who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are _generated_.--And this is especially the case with the followers of Hesiod.”--εισι γαρ τινες οι φασιν ουθεν αγεννητον ειναι, αλλα παντα γιγνεσθαι.----μαλιστα μεν οι περι τον Ησιοδον. And again, by Sextus Empiricus in his treatise Adversus Mathemat. p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying himself to philosophy. “For (says he) when Epicurus was as yet but a young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Hesiod,

Chaos of all things was the first produc’d,

from what Chaos was _generated_, if it was the first thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his business to teach things of this kind, but was the province of those who are called philosophers.--To those then, says Epicurus, must I betake myself, since they know the truth of things.” κομιδη γαρ μειρακισκος ων, ῃρετο τον επαναγινωσκοντα αυτῳ Γραμματιστην (η τοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ’) εκ τινος το χαος εγενετο, ειπερ πρωτον εγενετο. τουτου δε ειποντος μη αυτου εργον ειναι τα τοιαυτα διδασκειν, αλλα των καλουμενων φιλοσοφων· τοινυν εφησεν ο Επικουρος, επ’ εκεινους μοι βαδιστεον εστιν, ειπερ αυτοι την των οντων αληθειαν ισασιν.

Simplicius too, in commenting on the passage above cited from Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows: “Aristotle (says he) ranks Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings Chaos was first _generated_. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is by him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert that _all things are generated, except the first_. It is, however, evident that those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by _generation_ than the procession of things from their causes; on which account _all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten_. For Hesiod also, when he says that _Chaos was first generated_, insinuates that there was something prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all knowledge and every appellation.” (De Cœlo, p. 147.)

[262] Instead of ον ου μονον, which is evidently the true reading, ονομον μονον is erroneously printed in Stobæus.

[263] περι αρχων.

[264] Instead of μαλλον here, it is necessary to read ηττον.

[265] η πλειονων is omitted in the original.

[266] δυναμενον is omitted in the original.

[267] By the echo of soul, Proclus means that vital quality by which the soul is united to the body; and which is nothing more than the last image and shadow of the soul. The necessity of such a connecting quality will easily appear, from considering that a truly incorporeal nature, like that of soul, cannot be connected with body, without a vital medium. In consequence of this we may consider with Plotinus (Ennead. 4. lib. 4.) the animated body as resembling illuminated and heated air. And the pains and pleasures of the body will be conversant with this shadow of the soul.

[268] The original here is defective: for it is ενωσιν δε θειαν, απο της μετεχο **** εαυτου υπαρξεως μεταδιδωσι τοις εφεξης. From the version of Patricius, however, the defect may be supplied as follows: ενωσιν δε θειαν, απο της μετεχομενης εναδος. εκαστον γαρ τουτων εαυτου κ. τ. λ. This emendation is adopted in the above translation.

[269] For το υπερουσιον ον, it is necessary to read το υπερουσιον εν.

[270] Thus too Hippocrates, ξυρροια μια, συμπνοια μια, παντα συμπαθεα. i.e. “_there is one conflux, one conspiration, and all things sympathize with all_.” He who understands this will see that the _magic_ cultivated by the ancient philosophers, is founded in a theory no less sublime than rational and true. Such a one will survey the universe as one great animal, all whose parts are in union and consent with each other; so that nothing is foreign and detached; nothing, strictly speaking, void of sympathy and life. For though various parts of the world, when considered as separated from the whole, are destitute of _peculiar_ life; yet they possess some degree of animation, however inconsiderable, when viewed with relation to the universe. Life indeed may be compared to a perpetual and universal sound; and the soul of the world resembles a lyre, or some other musical instrument, from which we may suppose this sound to be emitted. But from the unbounded diffusion as it were of the mundane soul, every thing participates of this harmonical sound, in greater or less perfection, according to the dignity of its nature. So that while life every where resounds, the most abject of beings may be said to retain a faint echo of the melody produced by the mundane lyre. It was doubtless from profoundly considering this sympathy between the mundane soul, and the parts of the world, that the ancient philosophers were enabled to procure the presence of divinity, and perform effects beyond the comprehension of the vulgar. And that this was the opinion of Plotinus, the following passage evinces: “It appears to me that the ancient wise men, who wished to procure the presence of the Gods, by fabricating statues and performing sacred rites, directed their intellectual eye to the nature of the universe, and perceived that the nature of soul was every where easy to be attracted, when a proper subject was at hand, easily passive to its influence. But every thing adapted to imitation, is readily passive, and is like a mirror able to seize a certain form, and reflect it to the view.” Ennead 4. lib. 3.

[271] The word στερησεως is omitted in the original.

[272] For μετα δε παντα θεων, it is necessary to read μεστα δε παντα θεων.

[273] There is a chasm here in the original. And it appears from the version of Patricius, that the words και γαρ απειρος εστιν οντως εκαστος, are wanting.

[274] In Prop. 93.

[275] The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, which I have supplied from the version of Patricius. In the Greek therefore it is necessary to supply the words παν το τελειον εν τοις θεοις.

[276] For εξῃρημενων it is necessary to read εξῃρημενον.

[277] Here also we must read ενιδρυμενον for ενιδρυμενων.

[278] The words αιτια γεννητικη, αλλα πασα αιτια γεννητικη ουκ εστι ζωογονικη, are wanting in the original.

[279] The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, which I have supplied from the version of Patricius. Hence, in the printed Greek text it is necessary to supply the words, εν τοις θεοις αρα, η μεν καθαροτης εστι και πρωτως αγαθον, και η φρουρα, και παν τοιουτον.

[280] For τι εν, it appears requisite to read τι ον.

[281] From the version of Patricius, it is necessary to supply the words η προς εαυτον, η προς το κρειττον επιστρεφεται which are wanting in the original.

[282] For νῳ here it is necessary to read νοητον.

[283] For μεθεκτου here, it is necessary to read αμεθεκτου.

[284] For τον νουν, it is necessary to read το ον.

[285] The original in the beginning of this proposition is both defective and erroneous. For it is as follows: παν το πληθος των εναδων των μετεχομενων υπο τινος ***** γαρ εστι των του κοσμου μερων, και δια μεσου, και της ψυχης. From the version of Patricius, however, the defect and error may be removed by reading παν το πληθος των εναδων των μετεχομενων υπο τινος αισθητου σωματος εγκοσμιον εστι. επιλαμπει γαρ των του κοσμου μερων, και δια μεσου νου, και της ψυχης.

[286] Instead of νοητον εστι τουτο here, it is necessary to read νοητον εστι τουτῳ.

[287] For ει γαρ εαυτον νοει, πας νους, it is requisite to read ἢ γαρ εαυτον νοει πας νους.

[288] δηλον is omitted in the original.

[289] For ακινητος here, it is requisite to read αιωνιος.

[290] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the words καθεν. ει γαρ.

[291] The word παντα is omitted in the original.

[292] Here also it is requisite to supply the words ομοιως παντα νοησουσι.

[293] By an intellectual perception of all things _according to one_, Proclus means a perception of all things in one. For all intellectual forms are in each; so that a perception of one, is a perception of all forms, and therefore of all things.

[294] It is here necessary from the version of Patricius to supply the words και ακινητος, αμεριστος εστι. παν γαρ.

[295] From the version of Patricius, it is likewise necessary to supply in this place the words κατα την αυτου ουσιαν αρα οριζει.

[296] The words within the brackets are omitted in the original, but may be supplied from the version of Patricius by reading after το ειναι, as follows, αει εχει εν τῳ ποιειν. η νοησις αρα εν τῳ ποειν.

[297] αμεγεθει is omitted in the original.

[298] Instead of οι δε μετ’ εκεινους, δια πλειονων, ελασσω κατα την δυναμιν ουν ελλαμψιν εκεινοι, κ. λ. it is necessary to read οι δε μετ’ εκεινους, δια πλειονων ελασσω, κατα την δυναμεως ελλεεψιν. ει ουν εκεινοι, κ. λ.

[299] It is here requisite to supply from the version of Patricius, the words εκ των δευτερων διηρημενως.

[300] It is necessary here to read and supply from the version of Patricius, πορρωτερον του ενος, ο δε νοερος αριθμος εγγυτερω του ενος.

[301] For ει here it is necessary to read η.

[302] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the words δει τον νουν μη μετεχοντα.

[303] The words και νους θειος are omitted in the original.

[304] θειος is omitted in the original.

[305] θειαι is omitted in the original.

[306] For των νοερων, it is necessary to read το νοερον.

[307] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the words και χωριστος του σωματος.

[308] The words ψυχης ου λογιζομενης are wanting in the original; but from the version of Patricius ought to be added.

[309] Here too, the words οτι ζωης εξωθεν, are wanting in the original.

[310] The original here is defective, but may be restored to the true sense by reading αλλα και ουσιας, ειπερ ζωης δηλον. προ γαρ ψυχης κ.λ. instead of αλλα και ουσιας, ειπερ ζωης. δηλον γαρ ψυχης κ.λ.

[311] Instead of οτι δε και το πρωτως ζωτικον, ουκ εστι φανερον, it is necessary to read οτι δε και το πρωτως γνωστικον ουκ εστι, φανερον.

[312] It is here requisite to supply the words κατ’ ενεργειαν δε του χρονου μετεχουσα.

[313] The words ζωη και γνωσις are wanting in the original. And immediately after, for ου γνωσεται, it is requisite to read ου γαρ γνωσεται.

[314] For ανους here, it is necessary to read ανουσιος.

[315] ουχ is omitted in the original.

[316] For η διακινησις, it is necessary to read ιδια κινησις.

[317] For φυσικως here, it is necessary to read ψυχικως.

[318] There is a chasm here in the original after the word δεχομενων, which may be supplied by reading ει γαρ θεια ηγεμονικην κ. λ.; and γεννητικην must be substituted for γενικην.

[319] For εξῃρηται τοις χρωμενοις αυτῳ ψυχης, it is necessary to read εξηρτηται της χρωμενης αυτῳ ψυχης.

[320] Instead of ωστε και η μερικη ψυχη, και το αιτιον αρα του οχηματος αυτης, it appears to me to be necessary to read ωστε και το αιτιον της μερικης ψυχης, και αρα του οχηματος αυτης.

[321] There is a chasm here in the original, which as it is not supplied in the version of Patricius, I have filled up by conjecture. Hence, I have added the words καθαραν, ανατρεχει εις την αυτης αρχαιαν φυσιν. το γαρ οχημα.

[322] For τας ψυχας here, it is necessary to read των ψυχων.

[323] For εαυτων here, the sense as well as the version of Patricius, require that we should read εαυτης.

[324] That is, not through the medium of dæmoniacal and divine souls.

[325] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the words και του ποτε νοουντος.

[326] The barbarous version of Morbeka has _insinuare_ here, but the word employed by Proclus was, I have no doubt, παρεισαγειν _adducere_.

[327] “Differenter elucidata.” So Morbeka; _differenter_ being doubtless his version of διαφεροντως.

[328] “Summa enim totorum.” This I suppose was in the Greek ολως γαρ.

[329] “Separavit ejus epistasiam, id est superstationem.” So Morbeka.

[330] Propter meliorem vicinitatem ipsi animam, in Morbeka’s translation, should doubtless be, propter vicinitatem hujus animæ ad meliorem naturam.

[331] Accessibus in Morbeka, was I suppose in the original εφοδοις, expositions or discussions.

[332] “Quia est utrumque,” with Morbeka.

[333] “Qualificat,” with Morbeka.

[334] “Et sunt tria hæc differentia ab invicem, faciens, quod fit, actio.” So Morbeka. But _actio_ was doubtless in the original ποιησις.

[335] “Operatio,” with Morbeka; in the original ενεργεια.

[336] ψυχικην, with Morbeka _animalem_.

[337] ολως; _totaliter_ Morbeka.

[338] _aspirantur_ in Morbeka, should evidently be _inspirantur_.

[339] In Morbeka opportunitatem.

[340] “Sed et in hoc omni.” So Morbeka.

[341] “Ubi autem in corporeis penitus.” So Morbeka.

[342] “Intellectu participante necessitati corporum.” _Participante_ here is perhaps an error of the transcriber; for Morbeka I have no doubt wrote _principante_.

[343] “Velut lumen Sol,” should be _velut lumen sole_.

[344] Iram is omitted here in the version of Morbeka.

[345] “Dicens quod neque audimus, circum nihil, neque videmus.” So Morbeka.

[346] Virtutes in Morbeka, i.e. δυναμεις in the original.

[347] “Multam habere partem.” So Morbeka.

[348] In Morbeka, sobrietate meliorem.

[349] Divinæ partis. So Morbeka.

[350] In Morbeka, “obtinetur et ab aliorum regnante causa.”

[351] In Morbeka _captat_ instead of _copulat_.

[352] “Quicunque autem pacis opera intelligentes reverendi fient, sortis fatalem alam effugiunt.” So Morbeka; in which, for _pacis_ read _patris_, and for _alam_, _aleam_. This oracle in the original is as follows:

Νοησασαι τα εργα του πατρος Μοιρης ειμαρμενης το πτερον φευγουσιν αναιδες.

See my Collection of Chaldæan Oracles in the Monthly Magazine.

[353] In Morbeka, _concupiscentiæ_; but in the Greek it was doubtless επιθυμιας. This word as used by Plato and Aristotle, signifies an appetite of the soul directed to the possession and enjoyment of eternal good.

[354] “Et nondum purgatus illud,” in Morbeka, i.e. illum oculum.

[355] Morbeka’s version of this part is as follows: “Omnis igitur anima secundum quod virtute participat, et quod est liberam esse: secundum quod autem malitia et debilitate et eo quod est servire aliis,” &c. But it should be, conformably to the above version; Omnis igitur anima secundum quod virtute participat, et quod est, liberam esse; secundum quod autem malitia et debilitate, et eo quod non est, servire aliis.

[356] This is barbarously expressed in the version of Morbeka, as follows, “et servire quidem aut desuper principatum, aut desuptus.”

[357] In the version of Morbeka, “quæ sine causa solam cognoscentem ipsius quia veritatem.”

[358] In Morbeka, “agibilia;” but in the Greek, I have no doubt, τα πρακτα.

[359] In Morbeka rejungentem, but I read adaptantem.

[360] In Morbeka “_solvere_,” instead of _scire_.

[361] “Et totaliter agibilium politicam.” So Morbeka. This in the original was, I suppose, και ολως τοις πρακτοις τῃν πολιτικην.

[362] Instead of “quia et aliis animalibus necesse partibus entibus omnes et facere, sed et pati,” as in Morbeka, it is necessary to read, in order to make sense of the passage, quia et aliis animalibus necesse partibus entibus, non modo et facere, sed et pati.

[363] This in Morbeka is, “neque rursum sequestrare animam a dominis electionum.”

[364] Morbeka has _quia_ here instead of _nisi_.

[365] _Quando_ in Morbeka, instead of _aliquando_.

[366] Here too Morbeka has _quando_ instead of _aliquando_.

[367] “Inecferribile in universum.” Morbeka.

[368] Morbeka has _differentem_ here, instead of _indifferentem_.

[369] The words _ad seipsam convertitur_, are omitted by Morbeka.

[370] Morbeka has _directionem_, but the original was I have no doubt κατορθωσιν.

[371] του ουρανου υπεραστρονομουσα. So Plato.

[372] In decisione lineæ. So Morbeka.

[373] The Greek of this, agreeably to my translation, was I have no doubt τ’ αγαθον μονον εξηρημενον ειναι.

[374] “Mediam habens notitiam, et solummodo scientiam, et eorum qui non totaliter.” So Morbeka; but the sense requires the following emendation: Mediam habens notitiam, et solummodo scientiam, et eorum qui totaliter, et eorum qui non totaliter.

[375] Morbeka has αυτοπεριγραπτον; but it should obviously be αυτοαπεριγραπτον.

[376] Morbeka has _contra_ here, instead of _nihilominus_.

[377] _Superessentialiter_ is omitted here in the version of Morbeka.

[378] “Neque enim tua fictio,” should be, neque enim si tua factio, (i.e. ars mechanica).

[379] See Plutarch’s admirable treatise, concerning those who are slowly punished by divinity; from which Proclus has derived much in what follows.

[380] The Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, in his treatise On the Divine Names has evidently taken what follows from this passage of Proclus: ουκ αρα ουδε εν αγγελοις εστι το κακον, αλλα κολαζειν τους αμαρτανοντας εισι κακοι. τουτῳ γουν τῳ λογῳ και οι σωφρονισται των πλημμελουντων κακοι. και των ιερεων οι τον βεβηλον των θειων μυστηριων απειργοντες. καιτοι ουδε το κολαζεσθαι κακον, αλλα το αξιον γενεσθαι κολασεως. i.e. “Neither, therefore, is there evil in angels, unless it should be said they are evil because they punish offenders. For the same reason, however, the castigators of those that act wrong, are evil. And in a similar manner those priests are evil who prohibit the profane from divine mysteries. Though indeed it is not evil to be punished, but to deserve to be punished.” The reader who peruses the above-mentioned treatise of this Dionysius will find that he has extracted largely from the present work of Proclus.

[381] In his 2d. Epistle.

[382] διεξοδικως is omitted in the original.

[383] προοδον is omitted in the original.

[384] Viz. self-subsistent superessential natures; for to these the αυτο, or _itself_ primarily belongs. The next to these are intellects. Those in the third rank, are souls. Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies. And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies.

[385] Viz. _the one_, and matter.

[386] μη is wanting in the original.

[387] _The good itself_ is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from _the good_; for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from _the good_ is _evil itself_. Hence, _evil itself_ is posterior to non-entity.

[388] For πολυαρατον, it is necessary to read πολυορατον.

[389] For περι here, it is requisite to read παρα.

[390] μοχθηρας is omitted in the original.

[391] For the proper parts of a self-motive whole, are also self-motive.

[392] For απ’ αιτιας here, it is necessary to read απεναντιως.

[393] For το μεν δυναμενον in this place, it is necessary to read, το μη δυναμενον.

[394] For συμμετριᾳ here, it is necessary to read ασυμμετριᾳ.

[395] viz. angels, dæmons and heroes.

[396] Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldæan oracles.

[397] The first effable subsists in the god Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order.

[398] See this explained in the notes on my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

[399] The _Iynx, Synoches, and Teletarchæ_ of the Chaldæans, compose that divine order, which is called by Proclus _intelligible and at the same time intellectual_, and is unfolded by him in the fourth book.

[400] This is one of the Chaldæan oracles.

[401] See the Timæus.

[402] It must however be carefully observed that multitude when it subsists causally, subsists without that distinction and separation which it possesses when unfolded; and that in _the one_ it has no distinction whatever. For _the one_ is all things prior to all.

[403] See the 7th Epistle of Plato.

[404] As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worse than knowledge, so the silence in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates is preceded by an ignorance superior to all knowledge. Let it however, be carefully remembered, that such an ignorance is only to be obtained after the most scientific and intellectual energies.

[405] Vid. Excerpta ex Damascio, a Wolfio, p. 232.

[406] Let the reader be careful to remember that _the one_ of the gods is their superessential characteristic.

[407] Vid. Excerpta, p. 228.

[408] Αλλ’ αυται μεν ουκ εισι κατα αληθειαν, ουτε μιαν, ουτε τρεις, ουτε μια αμα και τρεις.

[409] Vid. Wolfii Anecdot. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252.

[410] ως νουν is omitted in the original.

[411] μηποτε is erroneously printed instead of ποτε.

[412] το τριτον is I conceive erroneously omitted in the original.

[413] Την is printed instead of Γην.

[414] As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the Gods which Hesiod celebrates by the epithets of _Earth_, _Heaven_, &c. cannot be the visible _Heaven_ and _Earth_: for Plato in the Cratylus, following the Orphic doctrine concerning the Gods, as we have evinced in our notes on that dialogue, plainly shews, in explaining the name of Jupiter, that this divinity is the artificer of the sensible universe; and consequently _Saturn_, _Heaven_, _Earth_, &c. are much superior to the mundane deities. Indeed if this be not admitted, the Theogony of Hesiod must be perfectly absurd and inexplicable. For why does he call Jupiter, agreeably to Homer (πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε), “_father of Gods and men_?” Shall we say that he means literally that Jupiter is the father of all the Gods? But this is impossible; for he delivers the generation of Gods who are the parents of Jupiter. He can therefore only mean that Jupiter is the parent of all the mundane Gods: and his Theogony, when considered according to this exposition, will be found to be beautifully consistent, accurate and sublime. I only add, that την is again erroneously printed in the Excerpta of Wolfius for γην.

[415] χθονον is printed for χρονον.

[416] That is, from _bound_ and _infinite_.

[417] χουσώρος should be read instead of χουσώρου.

[418] Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54.

[419] _i.e._ θεοι νοητοι, νοητοι και νοεροι, νοεροι, υπερκοσμιοι, απολυτοι sive υπερουρανιοι, et εγκοσμιοι.

[420] For ολης here, it is necessary to read υλης, because matter according to Plato proceeds from the father Phanes, or animal itself, and not from the demiurgus.

[421] For αυτους, it is necessary to read αιτιας.

[422] viz. From axioms and definitions.

[423] μερικωτερας is omitted in the original.

[424] For δη here, it is requisite to read δει.

[425] Proclus here alludes to the fabulous wanderings of Ulysses in the Odyssey. For Homer by these occultly indicates the life of a man who passes in a regular manner from a sensible to an intellectual life, and who being thoroughly purified by the exercise of the cathartic virtues, is at length able to energize according to the intuitive perception of intellect, and thus after becoming reunited to Penelope or Philosophy, meets with and embraces his father. This appears also to have been the opinion of the Pythagorean Numenius, as we are informed by Porphyry in his treatise De Antro Nympharum. “For he thought that the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man who passes in a regular manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation; and thus at length arrives at that region (i.e. the intellectual region) where tempests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation

Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.”

See more on this subject in my Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p. 294.

[426] For μηδε ευροντα δυνατα δυνατον ειναι λεγειν, it is necessary to read, μηδε ευροντα εις απαντας δυνατον, κ. λ.

[427] For απεστραμμενης, it is requisite to read επιστραμμεγης.

[428] Plato in the Politicus thus calls the realms of generation, i.e. the whole of a visible nature.

[429] That is, intelligible intellect, the extremity of the intelligible order.

[430] That is, the divinities who compose the middle of that order of Gods, which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

[431] As what is here said from Orpheus concerning Jupiter is very remarkable, and is no where else to be found, I give the original for the sake of the learned reader: διο και Ορφευς δημιουργουντα μεν αυτον την ουρανιαν πασαν γενεαν παραδιδωσι, και ηλιον ποιουντα και σεληνην, και τους αλλους αστρῳους θεους· δημιουργουντα δε τα υποσεληνην στοιχεια, και διακρινοντα τοις ειδεσιν ατακτως εχοντα προτερον· σειρας δ’ εφισταντα θεων περι ολον τον κοσμον εις αυτον ανηρτημενας, και διαθεσμοθετουντα πασι τοις εγκοσμιοις θεοις κατ’ αξιαν διανομας της εν τῳ παντι προνοιας.

[432] Iliad. XX. v. 4.

[433] See the 14th line.

[434] Ibid v. 32.

[435] Iliad. IV. v. 58.

[436] Iliad. XV. v. 187.

[437] For the Saturnian triad belongs to that order of Gods which is called supermundane, and which immediately subsists after the intellectual order; so that the Jupiter who ranks at the summit of this triad is different from and inferior to the demiurgus.

[438] That is, he is not an intellect consubsistent with soul.

[439] And the duad considered as a divine form or idea is the source of fecundity.

[440] i.e. The twelve Gods who first subsist in the _liberated_ or supercelestial order and who are divided into four triads, and the twelve mundane Gods, Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; Vesta, Minerva, Mars; Ceres, Juno, Diana; and Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The first of these triads is _fabricative_; the second _defensive_; the third _vivific_; and the fourth _anagogic_ or _elevating_, as is shown by Proclus in the 6th book of his Theology.

[441] This royal series consists of Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus. “Ancient theologists, says Syrianus (in his commentary on the 14th book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics) assert that Night and Heaven reigned, and prior to these the mighty father of Night and Heaven, who distributed the world to Gods and mortals, and who first possessed royal authority, the illustrious Ericapæus.

τοιον ελων διενειμε θεοις, θνητοισι δε κοσμον ου πρωτος βασιλευε περικλυτος ηρικεπαιος.

Night succeeded Ericapæus, in the hands of whom she has a sceptre:

σκεπτρον εχουσ’ εν χερσιν ηρικεπαιου·

To Night, Heaven succeeded, who first reigned over the Gods after mother Night.

ος πρωτος βασιλευε θεων μετα μητερα νυκτα.

Chaos transcends the habitude of sovereign dominion: and, with respect to Jupiter, the oracles given to him by Night, manifestly call him not the first, but the fifth immortal king of the Gods.

αθανατον βασιλεα θεων πεμπτον γενεσθαι.

According to these theologists therefore, that principle which is most eminently the first, is _the one_ or _the good_, after which according to Pythagoras, are those two principles Æther and Chaos, which are superior to the possession of sovereign dominion. In the next place succeed the first and occult genera of the Gods, in which first shines forth the father and king of all wholes, and whom on this account they call _Phanes_.“

[442] Of these intellects the first is Phanes, the second Heaven, the third Earth, and the fourth the Subcelestial Arch which is celebrated in the Phædrus, viz. νους νοητος ο Φανης, εκφαντορικος νους ο Ουρανος, συνεκτικος νους η γη, τελεσιουργος δε νους η υπ’ουρανιος αψις.

[443] That is of the whole intellectual order, which consists of Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, the three Curetes, and the separating monad Ocean.

[444] ως δ’ Ορφευς ενθεῳ στοματι λεγει, και καταπινει τον προγονον αυτου τον φανητα, και εγκολπιζιται πασας αυτου τας δυναμεις ο ζευς, και γινεται παντα νοερως, οσαπερ ην εκεινος νοητως.

[445] διο και τρεφεσθαι φησιν αυτον ο θεολογος υπο της νυκτος. “εκ παντων δε κρονον νυξ ετρεφεν ηδ’ ατιταλλεν.”

[446] That is Phanes, intelligible intellect, or in the language of Plato αυτοζωον _animal_ itself.

[447] Homer however appears to have ascended as far as to the goddess Night, or the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order.

[448] That is to say _the first cause and bound_, which is called by Orpheus _æther_.

[449] See this explained in the notes of my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

[450] That is to say, it is false to assert of intellectual and divine natures, that they are in a perpetual flux; for they are eternally stable themselves, and are the sources of stability to other things.

[451] Gesner misled by Patricius, has inserted these lines among the Orphic fragments, in his edition of the works of Orpheus.

[452] Proclus here means that there is the same analogy between Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, as in the intelligible triad, between father, power, and intellect.

[453] Οτι ωνομασται η Τηθυς παρα το διαττομενον και ηθουμενον, οιον Διατηθυ, και αφαιρεσει των πρωτων δυσσυλλαβων Τηθυς.

[454] Iliad XV. v. 187.

[455] Iliad, XV. v. 189.

[456] See the Theogony of Hesiod, v. 176, &c.

[457] Proclus here alludes to the following Orphic verses cited by him in his Commentary on the Timæus, lib. 5. p. 296.

ενθ’ ουν τ’ ωκεανος μεν, ενι μεγαροισιν εμιμνεν ορμαινων ποτερωσε νοον τpαποι, ηε πατερα ον γνωσῃ τε βιης, και ατασθαλα λωβησαιτο συν κρονῳ, ηδ’ αλλοις αδελφοις οι πεπιθοντο μητρι φιλῃ, η τους γε λιπων, μενει ενδον εκηλος· πολλα δε πορφυρων, μενει ημερος εν μεγαροισι σκυζομενος τῃ μητρι, κασιγνητοισι δε μαλλον.

i.e. “But Ocean remained within the ample house, considering how he should act, whether he should deprive his father of his strength, and basely injure him, together with Saturn and the rest of his brethren, who were obedient to their dear mother; or whether leaving these, he should stay quietly at home. After much deliberation, he remained quietly at home, being angry with his mother, but more so with his brothers.”

[458] That is, of the first triad of the supermundane, which subsists immediately after the intellectual order.

[459] Hom. Iliad.

[460] This cause is Saturn, who according to the fable cut off the genital parts of Heaven. See the Theogony of Hesiod.

[461] This Orphic fragment is not to be found in Gesner’s collection of the Orphic remains.

[462] See p. 521. Vol. V. of my Translation of Plato.

[463] Because Night subsists at the summit of _the intelligible and at the same time intellectual_ order, and is wholly absorbed in the intelligible.

[464] That is, according to one of the Chaldean Oracles.

[465] These verses likewise, are not in Gesner’s collection.

[466] Iliad XIV. v. 328.

[467] Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans. For according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is _Hecate_, the second _Soul_, and the third _Virtue_.

[468] That is, of a supermundane nature: for the _ruling_, are the _supermundane_, Gods.

[469] That is, the Corybantes.

[470]

Η δ’ αρα εκατη παιδος μελη αυθι λυπουσα Λητους ευπλοκαμοιο κορη προσεβησατ’ ολυμπον.

[471] These admirable Scholia on the Cratylus end here; being unfortunately, like most both of the published and unpublished writings of Proclus, incompleat. These very scholia too appear to be nothing more than extracts from a copious commentary of Proclus which is lost.

Transcriber’s Notes:

1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been corrected silently.

2. Where appropriate, the original spelling has been retained.

3. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have been retained as in the original.

4. Italics are shown as _xxx_.