_Reid, Ferguson, Stewart, and other Writers._
SECTION I.
_Reid._
DR. THOMAS REID attained distinction as an opponent of scepticism on the principles of common sense. He was born on the 26th of April, 1710, in the parish of Strachan, Kincardineshire, where his father was minister for the long period of fifty years. Dr. Reid was educated at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and having studied for the Church, was appointed pastor of the parish of New Machar in 1737. In this position he quietly performed his parochial duties for fifteen years, and gained the esteem of the inhabitants of the parish. In 1752, he was elected Professor of Philosophy in King’s College, Aberdeen, an office which he held for eleven years. He was chosen in 1763 to succeed Adam Smith in the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, and in this famed seat of learning continued to instruct a large class of students for a period of eighteen years.1 Thus, Reid performed the functions of a professor for a period of nearly thirty years.
1 Stewart’s _Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid_.
He was gifted by nature with a strong constitution. Although rather under the middle height, his frame was vigorous, and his muscular force unusually great. To these advantages he joined habits of exercise and temperance and an unclouded serenity of temper. “His countenance was strongly expressive of deep and collected thought; but when brightened up by the face of a friend, what chiefly caught the attention was a look of goodwill and kindness.”1
1 Stewart’s _Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid_. Stewart says:――“The merits of Dr. Reid as a public teacher were derived chiefly from that rich fund of original and instructive philosophy which is to be found in his writings, and from his unwearied assiduity in inculcating principles which he conceived to be of essential importance to human happiness. In his elocution and mode of instruction, there was nothing peculiarly attractive. He seldom, if ever, indulged himself in the warmth of extempore discourse; nor was his manner of reading calculated to increase the effect of what he had committed to writing. Such, however, was the simplicity and perspicuity of his style, such the gravity and authority of his character, and such the general interest of his young hearers in the doctrines which he taught, that, by the numerous audiences to which his instructions were addressed, he was heard uniformly with the most silent and respectful attention. On this subject, I can speak from personal knowledge; having had the good fortune, during a considerable part of the winter of 1772, to be one of his pupils.”――_Ibid._, section 1.
Dr. Reid’s writings consist of――(1) _An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense_, published in 1764; (2) _Essays on the Intellectual Powers of the Mind_, 1785, and _Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind_, 1788; (3) _An Account of Aristotle’s Logic_; (4) _An Account of the University of Glasgow_; (5) _An Essay on Quantity_.
The most polished of his works is the _Inquiry into the Human Mind_. It consists of seven chapters, each of which is divided into a number of sections. Excepting the first and the concluding chapters, the work is mainly occupied with the treatment of the five external senses: an analysis of sensation, in the following order:――Smelling, tasting, hearing, touching, and seeing. The work throughout has a somewhat polemical tone, with occasional touches of sarcasm; still it has rare merits. His treatment of the senses is often accurate, though not always. In the history of philosophical opinions he is frequently inaccurate, and sometimes quite wrong; imperfect knowledge of previous systems of thought was his weakest point.
Reid avows that it was Hume’s _Treatise of Human Nature_ which prompted him to undertake his own _Inquiry into the Mind_, and to reclaim against the principles which had issued in such sceptical conclusions. He desired to place the fundamental principles of knowledge upon firmer grounds, though, in the execution of his task, he often declaims rather than reasons on some of the questions at issue.
His treatment of the external senses, especially of sight and touch, is valuable. He makes true and ingenious remarks on natural language and signs. Such signs he conceived to be of two kinds――(1) those which have their meaning assigned by tacit agreement; and (2) those which, prior to all agreement, have a distinct meaning which man understands by the principles of his nature. Thus “language, so far as it consists of artificial signs, may be called artificial; so far as it consists of natural signs, I call it natural.” He argues that, if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one. He thinks that the signs which are naturally expressive of man’s thoughts may be reduced to three kinds――modulations of the voice, gestures, and features. His explanation of this subject is interesting and instructive.1
1 Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume I., pages 95‒96, 117‒118, _et seq._
Reid’s doctrine of signs is connected with his view of perception. He distinguished perception from sensation, and stated that the simplest operations of the mind do not admit of logical definition. He often states that the sensations are merely signs, and that the objects themselves are the things signified; but he does not maintain that the sign resembles the original. He observes that the same mode of expression is used to denote sensation and perception, but sensation has more of the element of feeling in it than perception: mere sensation consists in its being felt and in nothing else; when it is not felt, it is not. Thus a sensation of pain signifies no more than the feeling of pain: the agreeable odour of a rose considered by itself is a pure sensation, which affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without any thought of the rose. This doctrine, according to Reid, is applicable to every other mere sensation.1
1 _Ibid._, Volume I., page 182, _et seq._; and in _Essays on the Intellectual Powers_, page 310.
On the other hand, perception, as understood by Reid, has always an external object, or an object distinct from the act by which it is perceived――an object which may exist whether it be perceived or not. He maintained that we have an immediate perception, a direct intuition of the primary qualities of bodies. Our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of these qualities, as to what they are in themselves; but of the secondary qualities of bodies, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion.
An act of perception of an external object he thus describes:――(1) “We have some conception or notion of the object perceived; (2) a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; (3) that this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning.” He also distinguishes perceptions into two classes――those which are original, and those which are acquired by experience.1
1 _Ibid._, Volume I., pages 313‒314, 258.
Thus Reid’s doctrine of perception seems to be explicit. It has to be observed, however, that in his accounts of the views of other philosophers, and in his criticisms on them, he did not search out the various theories of representative or mediate perception. This lack of exhaustive discrimination unintentionally led him into some mistakes which partially vitiated his criticisms of the doctrines of other philosophers, and rendered even the cardinal point of his own doctrine doubtful; for some hold that he is an idealist, and others that he is a realist. A brief explanation of this seems to be requisite.
1. First, then, some philosophers admit an immediate knowledge of a not-ego, but not of an external not-ego; while they do not limit the immediate knowledge of the mind to its own states, yet conceiving it impossible that the external reality can be brought within the sphere of consciousness, they suppose that it is represented by an image, numerically different from the mind, but placed somewhere, either in the brain or mind, within the sphere of consciousness. 2. Others deny to the mind any consciousness of a not-ego at all, and hold that what the mind immediately perceives, and mistakes for an external object, is merely the ego itself peculiarly modified. Each of these chief theories of a representative perception, admits of several subordinate varieties.
Thus, taking the first of the above hypotheses, it is subdivided according as the immediate object of perception is viewed――(1) as material, (2) as immaterial, (3) or as neither, (4) or as both, as something physical, as propagated from the external object, as generated in the medium or as fabricated in the mind itself; and the latter either in the intelligent mind or in the animal life, as infused by God or by angels, or as identical with the divine substance――as in the system of Spinoza, and in other pantheistic theories. In the second, the representative modification has been sometimes viewed as a mere product of the mind itself; or as innate, and so independent of any mental energy.1
1 Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume II., pages 816‒819; _Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic_, Volume II., pages 29‒30.
Now Reid never adequately distinguished these views of representative perception, either in their historical relation or as possible in theory, but directed his attacks against what he usually calls the “common theory of ideas,” which was merely one of the cruder forms of the representative theory of perception; and thus it happens that his onslaughts on Berkeley and Hume are often misdirected and ineffective, as he did not establish the fact of the two cognitions, the presentative and the representative, single out their contents or evolve their conditions; and, in particular, did not show which of these was the kind of cognition competent in our perception of the external world. He failed to observe that representation is possible under two forms――the egoistical and the non-egoistical; and each of which, if perception be reduced to a representative faculty, affords premises equally available to the absolute idealist and the sceptic. Hence he was led into various inconsistences of a historical character, especially in the exposition of his own doctrine of perception.1
1 Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume I., pages 106, 128, 130, 131, 210, 226, 256, 257, 269, 274, 277, 293, 299, 318, 427.
Yet, notwithstanding these defects of development and exposition, Reid performed good service to psychology by banishing the imaginary images interposed between perception and its objects.
Having indicated Reid’s view of perception, I proceed to give a brief account of his treatment of the other phenomena of the mind. He divides the mental phenomena into the intellectual powers and the active powers; and he classified the intellectual powers thus:――(1) The External Senses; (2) Memory; (3) Conception or Simple Apprehension; (4) Abstraction; (5) Judgment――First Truths; (6) Reasoning; (7) Taste. He distributed the active powers into three parts:――I. Mechanical principles of actions――(1) Instinct, (2) Habit; II. Animal principles ――(1) Appetites, (2) Desires, (3) Affections; III. Rational principles ――(1) Self-love, (2) Duty.1
1 This classification is not founded upon any essential principle of division of mental phenomena.
Following the order just indicated, the first essay is devoted to an explication of terms and principles taken for granted. The second essay treats of the external senses, which we have already considered; in it also he reviews at great length the opinions of various philosophers touching the perception of the external world. He then passes to memory, which he treats at length, and affirms that it is an original faculty. He states that by memory we have an immediate knowledge of things in the past,1 and that it is always accompanied with the belief of that which we remember. Under the head of memory he discusses duration and personal identity. Of the latter he says:――“The conviction which every man has of his identity, as far back as his memory reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it; and no philosophy can weaken it, without first producing some degree of insanity.... A person is something indivisible, and is what Leibnitz calls a monad.... The identity of a person is a perfect identity; wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees, and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a monad, and is not divisible into parts.”2
1 This is a mistake: we can only have a mediate knowledge of past things or events――that is, only a representative knowledge.
2 Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume I. pages 339‒345.
He describes conception, and says that conceiving, imagining, apprehending, and understanding are words used to express that operation of the mind called simple apprehension; the having an idea of a thing is, in common language, used in the same sense. He refers to the train of thought in the mind, but he adduces nothing specially original on the association of thoughts and ideas, and in fact he was behind some of his predecessors in this important branch of mental science.
In his essay on abstraction, he explains general words, general conceptions, and the process of classification. Then, under the general heading of judgment, he discusses common sense and first principles. Common sense he regards as a special faculty, and the following quotation will indicate what Reid meant by this phrase:――
“In common language, sense always implies judgment. A man of sense is a man of judgment. Nonsense is what is evidently contrary to right judgment. Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business.... Men rarely ask what common sense is; because every man believes himself possessed of it, and would take it for an imputation upon his understanding to be thought unacquainted with it.
“It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense. It is indeed the first-born of reason, and as they are commonly joined together in speech and in writing, they are inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense.”1
1 _Ibid._, Volume I., pages 421‒425.
Thus Reid considered it the province of common sense to judge of first principles; and he further avers that, to judge of first principles require no more than a sound mind free from prejudice and a clear conception of the question. The learned and the unlearned, the philosopher and the day-labourer, are upon a level, and will pass the same judgment, when they are not misled by some bias. He then proceeds to deliver his views of first principles.
Although first principles are self-evident, and cannot be proved by arguments, yet a certain kind of reasoning may be applied in their support:――1. To show that the principle rejected stands upon the same footing with others that are admitted. 2. As in mathematics, a reduction to absurdity may be employed. 3. The consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned, ought to have great authority with regard to first principles, where every man is a competent judge. 4. Opinions that appear so early in the mind, that they cannot be the effect of education, or of false reasoning, have a good claim to be considered as first principles.
He asks whether the conclusions of common sense can be enumerated and digested in such a form as all reasonable men will assent to it. He recognises the difficulties besetting this, and admits that his own enumeration is not perfectly satisfactory. His classification proceeds on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, and may be summarised thus:――
(A.) Principles of Contingent Truths:――1. Everything that I am conscious of exists.1 The irresistible conviction of the reality of what we are conscious of is not the effect of reasoning; it is immediate and intuitive, and therefore a first principle. 2. The thoughts that I am conscious of are the thoughts of a being that I call myself, my mind, my person. 3. Those things did really happen that I distinctly remember. 4. Our own personal identity and continued existence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly. 5. Those things do really exist that we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. 6. We have some degree of power over our actions and the determinations of our will. The origin of our idea of power is not easily assigned. Power is not an object of sense or consciousness. We see events as successive, but not the power whereby they are produced. We are conscious of the operations of our minds; but power is not an operation of the mind. It is evidently, however, implied in every act of volition, and in all deliberation and resolution. Likewise, when we approve or disapprove, we believe that men have power to do or not to do. 7. The natural faculties, whereby we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. 8. Our fellow-men with whom we converse are possessed of life and intelligence. 9. Certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind. The signification of those things we do not learn by experience, but by a kind of natural perception. Children, almost as soon as they are born, may be frightened by an angry or threatening tone of voice. 10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion. 11. There are many events depending on the will of man, possessing a self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances; as in men of sound mind we expect a certain degree of regularity in their conduct. 12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. Hume has shown that this principle is not grounded on reason, and has not the intuitive evidence of mathematical axioms.
1 Reid treats consciousness as a special faculty which cannot be defined.
(B.) Principles of Necessary Truths. Regarding those Reid deemed it enough to divide them into classes, and to mention some of each class.
I. Grammatical Principles:――1. Every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood. 2. Every complete sentence must have a verb.
II. Logical Principles:――1. Any contexture of words that does not make a proposition is neither true nor false. 2. Every proposition is either true or false. 3. No proposition can be both true and false at the same time. 4. Reasoning in a circle proves nothing. 5. Whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus may be truly affirmed of all its species, and of all the individualps belonging to that species.
III. The Mathematical Axioms.
IV. The Principles of Taste:――1. The fundamental rules of poetry, music, eloquence, and dramatic action; and 2. those of painting have always been the same, and will be so to the end of the world.
V. First Principles in Morals:――1. An unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one. 2. A generous action has more merit than a merely just one. 3. No man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder.
VI. Metaphysical Principles:――1. The qualities that we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we call body, and the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind. The distinction between sensible qualities and the substance to which they belong is not the invention of philosophers, but is found in the structure of all languages. 2. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause. 3. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks or signs of them in the effect.
Reid has sometimes been severely handled for his multiplication of first principles; and it must be admitted that his scheme is crude, lacking in discrimination, in logical consistency, and in precision of statement; that it includes various truths as first principles which have no real claim to such a character; still it embodies, in a plain form, a considerable quantity of important truths.
He concludes his exposition of the intellectual powers with an essay on Taste. He notices the force of custom, of fancy, and of casual associations, in modifying taste; and observes that men differ more in their standard of taste than their judgments in matters of truth and error.
His treatment of the active powers of the mind occupies five essays. In the first, he treats of active powers in general; in the second, of the will; in the third, of the principles of action, which he distinguishes as already stated; in the fourth, he discusses the liberty of moral agents; and the fifth and last essay deals with morals.
Touching the sense of duty, he recognises and insists that we have an original moral faculty, which we call conscience. We have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation; and by this faculty we perceive some things to be right in human conduct and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of the same faculty, and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates as upon the determinations of our senses, or our other natural faculties.
Reid contends earnestly for the freedom of the will, and discusses the counter doctrine of necessity at length, and with much vigour.1 In the concluding essay, he attacks the utilitarian theory of morals as propounded by Hume, and his objections to several points of it were well and effectively directed. He showed that this theory did not recognise or take account of moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends, and that it failed to distinguish between obligatory and non-obligatory useful acts.
1 In 1793, _An Essay on Philosophical Necessity_ appeared, by Alexander Crombie, A.M., and in which the views of Dr. Reid on the freedom of the will are adversely discussed and criticised, with much acuteness and ingenuity.
To sum up, though Reid’s writings are in many points imperfect, yet they have much psychological merit and interest. His intellect was active and vigorous, but not of the highest and widest order; his analytic and critical powers were limited; but he was painstaking and patient in investigation. In truth, the natural bent of his mind drew him more to the concrete and practical side of philosophy than to speculation in the higher region of thought; subjectively, he was not strong. Still his thinking power in certain directions, his native sagacity and force of character, his candour and fairness, and the favourable circumstances in which he was placed, enabled him to found a school, in which some of his disciples have outvied their master in analytic power and speculative thought.
SECTION II.
_Adam Ferguson._
Adam Ferguson is the author of a work on moral and political philosophy, and also of some historical books, which will be noticed elsewhere.1 He was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh in 1764, an office which he held, with some intervals of absence, till the year 1785. In 1766, he published an outline of his lectures for the use of his class, and from these heads and notes he explained his system orally to the students, always keeping his mind open for the reception of whatever new light might dawn upon it. After his retirement from the professorship, he rearranged his lectures into a systematic form, and published them in 1792, under the title of _Principles of Moral and Political Science_. In his preface he says:――“Many, no doubt, may be conscious, that in a continued pursuit of the same subject for so long a time, they themselves could have done better; but in this, it is to be regretted, that they have not done so: For in this field there is room for many labourers; and the subject, though never new, is always interesting. It is so in the specimen of every particular life; in the history of every particular age or nation, and even in the lucubrations of every faithful transcriber of what nature suggests.
1 He was a son of the minister of Logierait, and was born in 1723. Having passed through the arts classes at St. Andrews, he came to Edinburgh to study for the Church in 1742. Thus he became one of the literary coterie consisting of Robertson, Blair, Home, Carlyle, Hume, and others, who were then students in the University, or living in Edinburgh. In 1745, he was offered a chaplaincy to the 42nd Regiment――“The Black Watch,” and though only twenty-two years of age, and having only completed two sessions of the divinity course, he obtained ordination from the General Assembly on account of his high testimonials. He accompanied this regiment to the battle of Fontenoy, and was with difficulty prevented from rushing into action with a broadsword. He remained with his regiment till 1754, and obtained much influence over the Highland soldiers; he took a keen interest in military matters, and gained a knowledge of them which was afterwards of use to him as a historian. He gave up the idea of becoming a minister, as he felt that he had not the requisite qualities for a popular preacher.
Having returned to Edinburgh, he was appointed to succeed Hume as Librarian of the Advocates’ Library in 1757; but after a few years, he resigned this post, and became tutor to the sons of Lord Bute. In July, 1759, he was appointed to the chair of natural philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, and by the month of October he was ready to meet his class, which drew from Hume the remark, that “Ferguson had more genius than any of them, as he had made himself so much master of a difficult science――viz., natural philosophy――which he had never studied but when at college, in three months as to be able to teach it.” He occupied this chair for five years, and it is recorded that he gave universal satisfaction, by rendering his subject attractive and popular. He published a short summary of his course for the use of his class.――Sir A. Grant’s _Story of the University of Edinburgh_, Volume II., pages 349, 350.
A contemporary and friend of Ferguson’s says of him:――“He was the son of a Highland clergyman, and had the pride and spirit of his countrymen.... He had the manners of a man of the world, and the demeanour of a high-bred gentleman, insomuch that his company was much sought after; for though he conversed with ease, it was with a dignified reserve.... He had another talent, unknown to any but his intimates, which was a boundless vein of humour, which he indulged when there was none others present, and which flowed from his pen in every familiar letter he wrote.”――_Autobiography of the Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle_, pages 281‒283. 1860.
“Although, therefore, an author may have been preceded by men of distinguished ability in former or in present times, it implies no degree of arrogance to follow even such reapers, in gleaning materials from this inexhaustible field of reflection, on which mankind have been employed from the beginning, and on which they will continue to be employed to the end of time.”
This work consists of two parts. The first treats of the most general phenomena in the nature and state of man, and extends to three chapters, which consecutively explain Man’s place in the scale of Being; Mind, or the characteristics of Intelligence; and Man’s Progressive Nature. Each of these chapters is divided into a number of sections, in which many important questions and interesting subjects are examined and discussed with rare candour and ability. The third chapter is especially attractive, as it explains the gradual progress and organisation of human society, the influence of habit, the progress of political and commercial arts, the pursuits and attainments of science, the fine arts, and the progress of moral apprehension.
The second part contains six chapters, which, under the following headings of a moral and political character, expound the Specific Good incident to Human Nature; the Fundamental Law of Morality, and its immediate Application and Sanctions; Jurisprudence, or Compulsory Law; Touching the Defences of Men; Moral Action, and the characteristics of a virtuous and happy Life; and, finally, Politics. Of these chapters, the first, the second, and the fourth are the most interesting, and present a body of well-digested information and reflection.
Ferguson was a well-informed man, and fairly equipped with a knowledge of the science of his time, as his method and conceptions clearly manifest. His moral ideas were distinct and comprehensive; his conception of human progress was accurate; and he approached nearer to the modern idea of a gradual development of human society and political institutions than any of his predecessors. Although, in some points, he was a follower of Hutcheson and Reid, in others he rose above them, especially in his admission of the idea of perfection in morality, and generally in his grasp of reality and of principles.
For instance, he says:――“Mind, we have reason to believe, predominates in nature; so that, in a comprehensive survey of all that exists, whatever is not mind, would be as nothing.... The essence of Almighty God we must conceive as most simple, being that which necessarily exists from eternity. Of His supreme intelligence, we have full evidence in the system of nature, and of His distinguishing the opposite conditions of moral good and evil, there is equally irresistible proof.”1
1 Volume I., pages 31, 129.
The following sentences will give an idea of his method:――“Most subjects in nature may be considered under two aspects――under that of their actual state, and under that of a specific excellence, or aspect, of which they are susceptible. Under the first, they are subjects of mere description, or statement of fact; under the second, they are objects of estimation or contempt, of praise or censure. In respect to what men have actually done or exhibited, human nature is a subject of history and physical science. Considered in respect to the different measures of good and evil, of which men are susceptible, the same nature is a subject of discipline and moral science. In treating of man, as a subject of history, we collect facts and endeavour to conceive his nature as it actually is, or has actually been, apart from any notion of ideal perfection or defect.
“In treating of him as a subject of moral science, we endeavour to understand what he ought to be; without being limited, in our conception, to the measure of attainment or failure, exhibited in the case of any particular person or society of men.
“To have an object or purpose, and to employ means for the attainment of it, is the distinctive condition of mind or intelligent being; the first implies will and choice; the second implies energy and power. For man, therefore, to know his province, and to be qualified for his station, requires equally that he should be acquainted with the foundation of both.”1
1 Volume I., Introduction, pages 1, 2.
Thus the method of investigation in the study of human nature, according to Ferguson, is in the first place to ascertain, on the most comprehensive and exhaustive scale, what man actually has been in the past and what he is now; and then, upon this knowledge, to frame a more reasonable conception of the improvable capacity of man, a juster idea of what he ought to be, and to devise more available and effective moral means for advancing the progress, the happiness, and the perfection of mankind. He insists much on this view, and often returns to it throughout his work.
In accordance with his progressive conception of man, Ferguson at once discarded Hobbes’ theory that the state of nature was a continual war. He argues that “a child may be considered apart from his parent, and the parent apart from his child; but the latter could not have existed without the former. And if we trace human society back to its simplest state, even there the society was real――resting upon the fundamental feelings of human nature; and if we trace human thought back to its simplest exertions, even there it was an exercise of understanding and some effort of invention or skill.” He also rejected the contract theory of the origin of government, and argued consistently for the historical view of the gradual growth and development of society.1
1 Volume I., pages 190‒197, _et seq._
Ferguson discussed the standard of morality at length, and also the supreme end. He admitted only a qualified and limited value to utility as a moral principle, and the same with regard to sympathy. Utility appeared to him to resolve the distinction of right and wrong into a mere difference of tendency or external effect in the actions of men. He avers that sympathy is also inadequate as the principle of moral approbation, and argues on some points conclusively against Smith’s theory; but he fully recognised that sympathy is an important factor in the social nature of man.1
1 Volume II., pages 57‒115, 117‒126.
His own view of the principle of moral approbation is announced thus: ――“It is the idea of perfection or excellence which the intelligent and associated being forms to himself, and to which he refers in every sentiment of esteem or contempt, and in every expression of commendation or censure.”
If it be said that mankind are not agreed on this point, his reply is:――“The idea of perfection no doubt may be associated with subjects divested of merit; but notwithstanding the effect of such association in warping the judgment, virtue is approved as the specific perfection or excellence of man’s nature; and as no one ever inquired why perfection should be esteemed, it is difficult to conceive why we should look for any other account of moral approbation than this.”1
1 Volume II., page 134.
In many parts of his work the ideal conception of a progress towards perfection is touched upon and illustrated. “Perfection is nowhere to be found short of the infinite mind; but progression is the gift of God to all His intelligent creatures, and is within the competence of the lowest of mankind.... Men of humble capacity may learn to think justly on these subjects; and as far as wisdom depends on a just conception of familiar objects, it is the nature of created mind in the course of experience and observation to improve its sagacity and to make a continual approach to the highest measure of intellectual ability of which it is susceptible.... But the virtue of goodness, whether operating in mere innocence or in beneficence, is surely improvable if not actually acquired by habit.”1
1 Volume II., page 403.
In reference to the fundamental laws of morality, Ferguson taught “that the first law of morality, relating to the mind and its affections, requires the love of mankind as the greatest good to which human nature is competent.” If it should appear, however, that mankind are not agreed as to the kinds of external actions that flow from this principle, nor in the choice of what to expect from the beneficent, it may be asked by what rule is the friend of mankind to conduct himself? His general reply to this question is to the effect that mankind in reality do not often mistake the pernicious for the useful, nor the destructive for that which tends to their own preservation; and so the beneficent man has little difficulty in determining what is in him, a natural effect of benevolence or of goodwill to his fellow-creatures.1
1 Ferguson died in 1816, having lived to the great age of ninety-three years.
SECTION III.
_Dugald Stewart._
Ferguson was succeeded in the chair of moral philosophy by Dugald Stewart,1 who discharged the duties of the chair for a period of twenty-five years with unmatched success. He was a son of Dr. Matthew Stewart, professor of mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, and was born in his father’s house in the old college buildings. When eight years of age, he was sent to the High School of Edinburgh, and at thirteen he entered the University and attended the arts classes. But with the object of completing his philosophical education, at the age of eighteen he went to Glasgow and studied a session under Dr. Reid, and greatly appreciated the spirit of the doctrines of his master.2
1 Born in 1753; died in 1828.
2 When speaking of Dr. Reid, Stewart says:――“Among the members of this University (Edinburgh), Mr. Ferguson was the first to applaud Reid’s success, warmly recommending to his pupils a steady prosecution of the same plan, as the only effective method of ascertaining the general principles of the human frame, and illustrated happily, by his own profound and eloquent disquisitions, the application of such studies to the conduct of the understanding and the great concerns of life. I recollect, too, when attending, about the year 1771, the lectures of the late Mr. Russell, to have heard high encomiums on the philosophy of Dr. Reid, in the course of those comprehensive discussions concerning the objects and the rules of experimental science, with which he so agreeably diversified the particular doctrines of physics. Nor must I omit this opportunity of paying a tribute to the memory of my old friend, Mr. Stevenson, then professor of logic, whose candid mind at the age of seventy gave a welcome reception to a system subversive of the theories which he had taught for forty years, and whose zeal for the advancement of knowledge prompted him, when his career was almost finished, to undertake the laborious task of new modelling that useful compilation of elementary instruction to which diffidence of his own powers limited his literary exertions.
“It is with no common feelings of respect and gratitude that I now recall the names of those to whom I owe my first attachment to those studies, and the happiness of a liberal occupation superior to the more aspiring aims of a servile ambition.”――Stewart’s _Account of the Life and Writings of Reid_.
In 1771, when only nineteen years of age, Stewart was entrusted by his father, whose health was failing, to teach the mathematical class in the University of Edinburgh; and, notwithstanding his youth, he maintained order and taught well. He was formally appointed to the chair of mathematics in 1775, and held it till 1785, when, as already mentioned, he obtained the chair of moral philosophy, a position more congenial to his taste and aspiration.
According to the best testimony, Stewart was a successful and eloquent professor, and was justly regarded as an ornament of this illustrious University. The lectures which he delivered to his class were declared by those who heard them to be surprisingly touching and elegant. He was a Liberal in politics, a follower and expounder of the economical doctrines of Adam Smith; and several scions of the Whig nobility were placed in Edinburgh under his care and instruction. His teaching, by means of his lectures and his writings, attained a wide influence and contributed to diffuse a taste for elegant literature and liberal opinions in politics throughout Scotland. Many of his pupils rose to eminence in law, politics, and literature.
Stewart’s teaching was influenced by the current of events and the circumstances of his time; and practical considerations greatly controlled all his opinions and speculations. He was deeply interested in the French Revolution, and intensely moved by the deplorable excesses which sprung out of it. A short quotation from the concluding sentences of his course of lectures on political economy will illustrate this and other features of his teaching:――
“It is not, however, to those who look forward to the pursuits of science that I have addressed myself in these lectures. The greater part of you are probably destined for the active walks of business; and under this impression, I have uniformly endeavoured, so far as I was able, to direct your attention to studies susceptible of a practical application to the great concerns of humanity, whether providence may allot to you the obscure but important duties of a private station, or may be pleased to call you to the great and arduous scenes of public affairs. In either event, I shall follow you with my affectionate wishes through the various fortunes which may await you. And, believe me, nothing will ever give me greater satisfaction than to hear that you have carried into the different departments of life for which you may be destined, these steady principles of religion, of integrity, and of beneficence which can alone render you happy in yourselves and bring blessings to mankind.”
This was delivered in 1804, and four years later he concluded the same course with these memorable words:――
“Now, gentlemen, when the connection is to be dissolved which has for some months past subsisted between us, may I not be permitted to express the hope which I am encouraged to entertain by the attention with which you have honoured me:――that long after the period of your academical education, you will recollect with satisfaction those studies of your youth; and that by fixing in some measure your principles concerning the nature, the duties, and the prospects of man, they may contribute, under the various vicissitudes of fortune that may yet await you, to fortify your virtuous resolutions, to elevate your views above the pursuits of a vulgar ambition, and cherish in your minds those habitual sentiments of religion, of humanity, of justice, and of fortitude, which can alone render these talents and accomplishments a source of permanent happiness and honour to yourselves, a blessing to your friends, and a pledge to your country for the perpetuity of that political fabric reared by the hand and cemented by the blood of your ancestors; now alas! standing alone amid the wreck of surrounding establishments, the last asylum and the only remaining bulwark of the liberties of Europe.”1
1 _Collected Works_, Volume IX., pages 452‒453, 464. The above passages are admirably calculated for effect; and to have heard them from the lips of Stewart, uttered with all the grace, the gravity, and the dignity which he possessed, must have produced a strong impression.
Some people, however, thought Stewart’s political opinions too liberal, and that he had shown rather much favour towards some of his French contemporaries; and he seems to have had such parties in his mind when he composed the following note:――“I think it proper for me now to add, that at the period when this memoir was read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, it was not unusual, even among men of some talents and information, to confound studiously, the speculative doctrines of political economy, with the discussions concerning the first principles of government, which happened unfortunately at that time to agitate the public mind. The doctrine of free trade was itself represented as of a revolutionary tendency; and some, which had formerly prided themselves on their intimacy with Smith, and on their zeal for the propagation of his liberal system, began to question the expediency of subjecting to the disputations of philosophers the arena of state policy, and the unfathomable wisdom of the feudal ages.”――Stewart’s _Life of Adam Smith, in Collected Works_, Volume X., page 87.
Stewart’s works consist of――(1) _Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, extending to three volumes, which were published separately in the years 1792, 1814, and 1827; but in the interval between the publication of the first and third of these volumes, (2) his _Outlines of Moral Philosophy_ appeared in 1793; (3) his _Philosophical Essays_ in 1810; (4) his _Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy_ in 1814 and 1820; (5) his _Biographical Account of Adam Smith_ in 1793, _of Dr. Robertson_ in 1796, and _of Dr. Reid_ in 1802; (6) his work on the _Active and Moral Powers of Man_ appeared in 1828, the year of his death; (7) his _Lectures on Political Economy_ which were not prepared for publication by Stewart himself, but drawn up from imperfect manuscripts, and included in Hamilton’s collected editions of his works. This edition extends to ten volumes, and to it my references are uniformly made.
When Stewart entered on the duties of the chair of moral philosophy, his mind was well trained to scientific studies, which enabled him to take a comprehensive view of the subject. In the first volume of his _Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind_, he explained at length what he conceived to be the nature, the object, and the utility of mental study; but he did not in any of his writings develop his view of the precise relation of psychology to the philosophical sciences, nor specify the modes of their dependence on each other; although he stated, in general terms, the common relation which the different branches of knowledge bear to the human mind. He indicates his view thus:――“To the philosophy of the mind are to be referred all our inquiries concerning the divisions and the classification of the objects of human knowledge, and also all the various rules, both for the communication and the investigation of truth. These general rules of science, and these general rules of method, ought to form the subject of a rational and useful logic.... As a philosophical system of logic would assist us in our particular scientific investigations, by keeping steadily in our view the attainable objects of human curiosity; so, by exhibiting to us the relation in which they all stand to each other, and the relation which they all bear to what ought to be their common end――the advancement of human happiness, it would have a tendency to confine industry and genius to inquiries that are of real practical utility.... From such a system of logic, too, important assistance might be expected for reforming the established plan of academical education. It is melancholy to reflect on the manner in which this is carried on in most, perhaps I should say in all the countries of Europe; and that in an age of comparative light and liberty, the intellectual and moral characters of youth should continue to be formed on a plan devised by men, who were not only strangers to the business of the world, but who felt themselves interested in opposing the progress of useful knowledge.”1
1 _Works_, Volume II., pages 55‒59, 77‒80; also Volume I. (Dissertation, pages 477, 478.) Stewart’s remarks on education are still worth reading.
Although he explicitly recognised the contrast of mind and matter, and the branches of science to which the investigation of the opposite phenomena gives rise, still he purposely refrained from attempting their scientific organisation. The leading aim of his efforts was to contribute what he could to general psychology, to diffuse a taste for reflective studies, and to induce a noble and hopeful life in man; thus raising a liberal culture upon the firm basis of self-knowledge.1 After he had discussed and pointed out the shortcomings in the existing state of things, he enounced his own purpose in the following words:――“I have thus endeavoured to point out and illustrate a few of the important purposes to which the philosophy of the human mind is subservient. It will not, however, I flatter myself, be supposed by any of my readers that I mean to attempt a systematic work on all or any of the subjects I have now mentioned, the most limited of which would furnish matter for many volumes. What I have aimed at has been to give, in the first place, as distinct and complete an analysis as I could of the principles, both intellectual and active, of our nature; and, in the second place, to illustrate, as I proceed, the application of these general laws of the human constitution to the different classes of phenomena that result from them.... It will not, therefore, I hope, be objected to me, that I have been guilty of a blameable violation of unity in the plan of my work, till it be considered how far such a violation was useful for accomplishing the purposes for which I write.”2
1 “It is almost unnecessary for me to remark, how much individuals would be assisted in the proper and liberal culture of the mind, if they were previously led to take a comprehensive survey of human nature in all its parts, of its various faculties, and powers, and sources of enjoyment, and of the effects which are produced on these by particular situations. It is such knowledge alone of the capacities of the mind, that can enable a person to judge of his own acquisitions; and to employ the most effective means of supplying his defects, and removing his inconvenient habits.... But education can never be systematically directed to its proper objects, till we have obtained, not only an accurate analysis of the general principles of our nature, and an account of the most important laws which regulate their operation; but also an explanation of the various modifications and combinations of these principles, which produce that diversity of talents, genius, and character, we observe among men.”――Volume II., pages 61, 62.
2 Volume II., pages 89, 90.
In the discrimination of ultimate principles, Stewart manifested admirable sagacity. He called truths “The Fundamental Laws of Belief, or the Primary Elements of Human Reason,” meaning by this generally what Reid termed First Principles, or the Dictates of Common Sense. The chief point in the treatment of these principles, in which Stewart differs from Reid, is in relation to mathematical demonstration. He makes no pretension to an exhaustive enumeration of these primary truths, but so far as he goes, his mode of discriminating them is reasonable and satisfactory.1
1 Volume III., page 41, _et seq._
His classification of cognition――the faculties of knowledge――is as follows:――1. Consciousness; 2. External Perception; 3. Attention; 4. Conception; 5. Abstraction; 6. Association of Ideas; 7. Memory; 8. Imagination; 9. Reasoning, including Logic.
This distribution of the intellectual faculties is redundant; and though consciousness is recognised as a separate attribute of the mind, it receives no satisfactory treatment. Attention, though an important function, is not a separate faculty, as it is acquired by a long series of efforts, and both its exercise and power depends upon the will.
In regard to perception Stewart followed the doctrines of Reid. Conception is explained as a power of the mind which enables us to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation formally felt; its function being to give us an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. He distinguishes his meaning of the term from imagination, and observes that he followed Reid in this application of the term.
A chapter is devoted to abstraction, which is treated at great length through eight sections, and in which there are many interesting observations. The last section dealt with the use and abuse of general principles in politics, and he endeavours to clear up some of the prevailing misconceptions of the economical system――an ideal theory of society. Stewart himself was always inclined to take a favourable view of the future progress of mankind and the improvement of political institutions; and in this section he directs his efforts to show that such a result was probable.1
1 Volume II., page 249.
Two chapters are given to the discussion of the association of ideas, which he considered from two points of view――(1) the influence of association in regulating the succession of our thoughts, and (2) its influence on the intellectual powers and on the moral character, by the more close and indissolvable combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and in early youth. His exposition of association extends to about a hundred pages, and it is interesting and well illustrated by appropriate instances and quotations. He enumerates, as obvious modes of associative connection, Resemblance, Contrariety, Vicinity in time and place; and as less obvious modes, Cause and Effect, Means and Ends, Premises, and Conclusions. In his concluding remarks he avers that “there is good reason for believing that many of the facts which consciousness would lead us to consider, upon a superficial view, as ultimate facts, are resolvable into other principles still more general.”1
1 Volume II., page 344.
In his treatment of memory, he endeavoured to show that it cannot be resolved into the principle of association, because association presupposes a conservative faculty in the mind itself; but, on the other hand, without the associative principle, our faculty of retention would be of little use. He discusses the varieties of memory manifested in different individuals, the improvement of memory, the connection between memory and philosophical genius; and on all these varied relations of memory Stewart says much that is interesting and instructive. There are three requisites to a good memory――“(1) to be susceptible, (2) to be retentive, (3) to be ready.”1
1 Volume II. page 365.
To imagination he assigns the function of making a selection of qualities and circumstances from a variety of different objects, and, by combining and arranging these, to form a new creation of its own. He gives it, however, the characteristics rather of a reproductive faculty than of a representative one. He treated imagination in its relation to some of the fine arts, and its relation to taste and genius. He also examined at length the influence of imagination on character and happiness.1
1 Volume II., pages 431‒435, 450, _et seq._
In the second volume of his _Elements of the Mind_, he treats of reasoning and deductive evidence; of the Aristotelian Logic; and of the method of inquiry according to the experimental or inductive logic. These mixed logical discussions contain much that is interesting, if not always profound. The third volume of his _Elements_ treats of language; of the principle or law of sympathetic imitation; of the varieties of intellectual character; comparisons between the faculties of man and those of the lower animals; and several other interesting subjects. His long chapter on the varieties of intellectual character is exceedingly interesting.
Stewart’s volume of philosophical essays contain some of his best compositions, and are partly historical, critical, and literary. More than one half of the volume is occupied with the discussion of topics relating to Taste――the beautiful, the sublime, and allied subjects. Explanations and criticisms of Locke, Berkeley, and the theories of ♦Hartley, Priestly, and Darwin, occupy the other parts of the volume.
♦ “Hartly” replaced with “Hartley”
He classified the active powers of the mind, the emotions, feelings, and desires thus:――
I. Instinctive { 1. Appetites. Principles { 2. Desires = Knowledge, Esteem, Power, etc. of Action. { 3. Affections = Benevolent and Malevolent.
{ 1. Prudence. II. Rational and { 2. Moral Faculty. Governing { 3. Decency, or regard to character. Principles { 4. Sympathy. of Action. { 5. The Ridiculous. { 6. Taste.
His treatment of these varied phenomena of the mind is always interesting, cautious, humane, and marked by sound judgment and sagacity; occasionally original, and, on the whole, the most valuable part of his writings.
He stated the aim of moral inquiry thus:――“The object of moral philosophy is to ascertain the general rules of a wise and virtuous conduct in life, in so far as these rules may be discovered by the unassisted light of nature, that is, by an examination of the human constitution, and of the circumstances in which man is placed.” With this end, our inquiries may be arranged under three heads, according as they refer to the intellectual powers of man; to his active and moral powers, or to consideration of man as a member of a political body.1
1 _Outlines of Moral Philosophy._
In short, to sum up his chief moral doctrines, he maintained――1. That the Moral Faculty is an original principle of the mind; he argued this point earnestly and at length. 2. He argued against the ethical systems founded on Utility. 3. But he objected strongly to the doctrine which makes morality depend on the will of God. 4. On the question of Freewill, he contends for liberty. 5. Concerning the relation of Morality to Religion, he assumes the benevolence of the Deity, and avers that “when we are convinced that God is infinitely good, and that He is the friend and protector of virtue, this belief affords the most powerful inducements to the practice of every branch of our duty.” 6. He elaborately discussed the subject of Happiness, and presented a classification of the most important pleasures under the following heads:――(1) The pleasures of activity and repose; (2) the pleasures of sense; (3) the pleasures of the imagination; (4) the pleasures of the understanding; (5) the pleasures of taste, or fine art.
In forming an opinion upon his merits as a writer, the aims which he had in view, and the circumstances in which his works originated, should be remembered. Stewart cannot be called a great original thinker; but he was an able teacher and a good expositor. Most of his writings could have been much improved by a process of pruning and condensation.
His style is graceful, ornate, and flowing, and enriched by a liberal culture. He had the power of rendering a difficult subject attractive and easily comprehended; yet he was not, in the higher sense, a master of method. Hence his _Dissertation on the History of Mental Philosophy_ is very defective in arrangement and in consecutive exposition. In short, the main defects of his style is diffuseness and repetition, and a lack of force and strength, with a singular and lamentable want of brief and orderly recapitulation, at the proper places. He hardly seems to have been aware of the value of a concise and luminous statement at the close or the beginning of a great subject as an aid to the understanding. But after all reasonable deductions, Stewart’s works remain a noble monument of his talents, industry, humane culture, and his kindly nature and goodness of heart.
SECTION IV.
_Gerard, Beattie, Campbell, Alison._
Dr. Alexander Gerard was appointed professor of divinity in Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1759, an office which he held for about twelve years. He is the author of an ingenious _Essay on Taste_ which appeared in 1758, and a second edition in 1764. The essay is divided into three parts, and he handled the subject in the following order:――In the first part, Taste is resolved into its simple principles, which consist of the sense or taste of novelty; of the sense of sublimity; of beauty; of imitation; of harmony; of oddity and ridicule; and of virtue. In the second part, the formation of taste by the union and improvement of its simple principles is explained. In the third part, the province and importance of taste is discussed.1
1 To the second edition of this essay were annexed three other essays on the same subject, by Voltaire, d’Alembert, and Montesquieu.
He began by remarking that “a fine taste is neither wholly the gift of nature, nor wholly the effect of art. It derives its origin from certain powers natural to the mind; but these powers cannot attain their full perfection, unless they be assisted by proper culture. Taste consists chiefly in the improvement of those principles which are commonly called the powers of imagination, and are considered by modern philosophers as internal or reflex senses,1 supplying us with finer and more delicate perceptions than any which can be properly referred to our external organs.” And he reduces these reflex senses in the way indicated in the preceding paragraph.
1 The reference to modern philosophers was to Hutcheson’s _Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue_ and his _Essay on the Passions_; and Dr. Gerard’s _Treatise on Taste_ is only one of the many proofs of the influence of Hutcheson’s writings in Scotland.
The subject is well worked out, and his style is exceedingly clear, simple, and easy. He observes that the internal senses are assisted by a delicacy of feeling or passion; and, applying this to the pathetic, he says――“Since, therefore, the pathetic is a quality of so great moment in works of taste, a man who is destitute of sensibility of heart must be a very imperfect judge of them. He is a stranger to those feelings which are of the greatest importance to direct his judgment. If a person possessed all the internal senses in perfection, without delicacy of passion, he could estimate the principal works of genius, only by their inferior qualities.... Delicacy of passion may interest a person so much, that he cannot for some time examine a performance with critical exactness; but it gives him exquisite delight in the meantime, and enables him to pass a just sentence at last.”1
1 Page 83.
Dr. James Beattie1 was elected professor of moral philosophy in Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1760. In 1770, his _Essay on the Immutability of Truth_ appeared, which was intended to be a refutation of Hume’s scepticism. It is rather a vehement than reasonable production, and strong in passionate assertion, but weak in argument; yet it was popular for a time, and passed through several editions.
1 Born in 1735; died in 1803.
He is the author of a work entitled _Elements of Moral Science_, which was published in 1790‒93, in two volumes; which are mainly a summary of the lectures on moral philosophy delivered to his class in Marischal College. The work consists of two main divisions:――1. Psychology, under which is included cognition; the active powers――will, feelings, sentiments and passions; natural theology――the existence and attributes of God; and the nature and immortality of the soul. 2. Ethics or moral philosophy, which is followed by economics――the family and domestic relations; then politics; and finally rhetoric and logic. Such is an indication of Beattie’s scheme of philosophy, and the method of his system of instruction.
But his treatment of logic is limited to remarks on evidence; rhetoric, however, is treated at length through one hundred and ninety-three pages, and perhaps this is one of the most interesting parts of his work. Beattie’s style is orderly, his sentences are generally simple, and his line of thought easily followed; but it has not much animation or ornament, and lacks the qualities of strength and incisiveness.
Dr. George Campbell,1 a minister of the Church of Scotland, became Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1759. His first work, _A Dissertation on Miracles_, was published in 1762. It consists of two parts, and presented an examination of the principles advanced by Hume in his _Essay on Miracles_. In the first part, Campbell argues that miracles can be proved by testimony, “and religious miracles are not less capable of this evidence than others;” in the second part, he maintains that “the miracles on which the belief of Christianity is founded are sufficiently attested.” These chief points are well and ably worked out. His mode of controversy is candid and generous; and his examination of Hume’s principle, for there was but one principle at the root of it――namely, experience――is carried on throughout with admirable fairness and sagacity.
1 Born in 1719; died in 1796.
Campbell insists that Hume’s chief argument from experience is founded on a false hypothesis; as it supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is not the case. “Testimony, it is acknowledged, is a weaker evidence than sense. But it has been already evinced that its evidence for particular facts is infinitely stronger than that which the general conclusions from experience can afford us. Testimony holds directly of memory and sense. Whatever is duly attested must be remembered by the witness; whatever is duly remembered must once have been perceived. But nothing similar takes place with regard to experience, nor can testimony, with any appearance of meaning, be said to hold of it.
“Thus I have shown, as I proposed, that the author’s reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis.――It supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false.――It supposes, by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknowledged principles of ♦human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evidently shows that they have not.――It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidence, which, in the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which it is impossible, by any explication, to render of real use.”1
1 Part I., section 1, pages 63, 64 (1797).
♦ “hnman” replaced with “human”
Thus far, it seems Campbell did sway the balance somewhat against Hume’s chief principle of estimating evidence. But his dissertation itself must be read, for a full appreciation of the accurate, masterly, and analytic power which it displays. Shortly after it appeared, it was translated into the French, Dutch, and German languages.
Campbell’s _Philosophy of Rhetoric_, which appeared in 1776, is a valuable and ingenious work. It was universally recognised as the greatest work on the subject which had appeared since the time of Aristotle. His style is clear and terse, and always manifests a comprehensive grasp of the subject.
The Rev. Archibald Alison1 was a son of an Edinburgh magistrate, and educated at Glasgow and Oxford, and finally settled down in Edinburgh as an Episcopal minister. He was the father of the well-known historian, Sir Archibald Alison, and also of William P. Alison, an eminent physician and professor in the University of Edinburgh. He himself is the author of _An Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste_, which appeared in 1790, and has passed through six or seven editions.
1 Born in 1757; died 1839.
It is a pretty elaborate production, and its leading characteristic is an attempt to explain the æsthetic emotions and feelings on the principles of association. It is a work of real merit and value, and has had a considerable influence on subsequent theories of taste and beauty.