_David Hume and Adam Smith._
SECTION I.
_Hume._
THE two names at the head of this chapter have attained high distinction not only in Scottish philosophy, but also in the history of European thought, and especially in the literature of political economy. This is so fully recognised, that it would be superfluous to enlarge on it; but it may be said that Hume, by his bold and sceptical reasoning, aroused philosophers from their slumber, and greatly stimulated thought to further inquiries in various directions; while Smith advanced an attractive moral theory, and founded the science of political economy, which has proved beneficial in suggesting legislative reform and commercial enterprise.
Hume and Smith were mutual friends, and took a keen interest in each other’s speculation and researches. In several branches their inquiries were identical, but in others they were as wide as the poles asunder.
Hume1 published in 1739 two volumes of a work entitled _A Treatise of Human Nature_: “Being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.” In explaining his system, it is requisite to direct special attention to this work, as it is the most systematic, elaborate, and complete of all his productions.
1 Born in 1711, and died in Edinburgh in 1776. Shortly before his death he wrote a short but characteristic account of himself, entitled _My Own Life_. Besides this there are various biographical accounts of Hume, but I need only mention that the late Dr. H. Burton produced one, entitled _The Life and Correspondence of David Hume_, published in 1848; and more recently Professor Huxley published an account of Hume and his philosophy.
It consists of three books, which treat consecutively “Of the Understanding; Of the Passions; and Of Morals.” The first book is divided into four parts. The first part of it, which consists of seven sections, treats of ideas and impressions――their origin, composition, connection, abstraction, and other relations. The second part, extending to six sections, discusses at length the ideas of space and time. The third, contains sixteen sections, which deal with the subjects of knowledge and probability. The fourth, extending to seven sections, discusses the sceptical and other systems of philosophy, and completes his exposition of the Understanding. The second book is divided into three parts:――The first part consists of twelve sections, and under the general heading “Of pride and humility,” a pretty large division of the passions is treated; the second part, also consisting of twelve sections, treats of love and hatred; and the third part, containing ten sections, discusses the problem of the will, and the direct passions. The third book is, in like manner, divided into three parts:――The first part contains two sections, which treat of virtue and vice in general; the second part, extending to twelve sections, treats of justice and injustice, and various points connected with society and government; and the third part contains six sections, which treat of various virtues and vices.
Such is the plan of Hume’s great philosophical work. Although it is characterised by a marked simplicity of arrangement, it presents some of the most subtle thought and searching reasoning to be found in any literature. Still it did not at once produce a great impression; for, in his own words, “never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my _Treatise of Human Nature_. It fell dead-born from the press without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the Zealots.” This caused him to recast portions of it in a more popular form, under the titles of “Essays: Moral and Political;” “Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary;” “An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding;” “An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals;” and “Political Discourses.”1 But the principles which he enunciated in the _Treatise of Human Nature_ were not essentially changed in any of his subsequent writings. In an advertisement to the authoritative edition of his _Essays and Treatises_, published in 1777, the year after his death, he says that henceforth he desired that his later writings alone should be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles; and it is only fair to concede that the original _Treatise of Human Nature_, which he composed at an early period of his life, did not in all points truly represent his later sentiments; yet it is mainly in the improvement, the ease and polish of his style, and in the omission of two parts of the original treatise, containing some of his most acute speculations, that his later writings differ from his earliest――a difference of form and finish rather than of thought and matter. Moreover, it is in the original treatise that Hume can be historically studied to the best advantage.
1 Hume’s numerous short essays treat on a variety of subjects. Some of the more notable are those on eloquence, the standard of taste, and the highly polished ones on the Epicurean, the Stoic, the Platonist, and the Sceptic. In these and in others of his essays, he shows a fine critical faculty.
Regarding some of his other writings, it may be mentioned here that his _Natural History of Religion_ was first published in 1757; his two essays, the one on _Suicide_, and the other _Of the Immortality of the Soul_; his _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, and some other short pieces, were published after his death.
Several editions of his essays were published in his lifetime; and new ones were frequently added, as well as many alterations and corrections made on them. Since his death various editions of his works have appeared. An edition of his philosophical works, edited by Mr. T. H. Green and Mr. T. H. Grose, with valuable introductions and notes, was published in 1874‒5, in four large volumes.
Although Hume’s mind was original and vigorous, and his thinking and critical powers unusually great, yet he found the principles upon which he most effectively operated mainly in Locke and in Berkeley. There is little trace of the influence of Descartes in the _Treatise of Human Nature_; but his style bears internal evidence of the influence of French literature. No English philosophical writer of a prior date approached Hume in the qualities and the grace of his style.
On various points treated in the moral part of the treatise, the influence of Hobbes and of Hutcheson are easily traced; and Hume held the latter philosopher in very great esteem. Let us proceed to the exposition of his system, beginning with his own account of the state of his mind when he approached the subject:――
“At the time therefore that I am tired with amusement and company, and have indulged a reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally inclined to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation. I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations which actuate and govern me. I am uneasy to think I approve of one object and disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful and another deformed; decide concerning truth and falsehood, reason and folly, without knowing upon what principles I proceed. I am concerned for the condition of the learned world, which lies under such a deplorable ignorance in all these particulars. I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition, and should I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any other business or diversion, I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy.”1
1 Book I., Part IV., section 7.
He begins his exposition of the Understanding with a description of impressions and ideas, and resolves the perceptions of the mind into these two terms. The perceptions which enter the mind with most force he calls impressions, and this term includes all our sensations, passions, and emotions; by ideas he means the faint images of impressions excited in thinking and in reasoning. Having distinguished impressions and ideas into simple and complex classes, he then proceeds to discuss their qualities and relations. Impressions and ideas differ from each other only in the degrees of their vivacity――the one seems to be the reflection of the others; in the case, however, of complex ideas, he notices some exceptions to this doctrine; but seeing that all simple perceptions and ideas are copies of impressions, and that the complex ones are formed from them, therefore these two kinds of perceptions exactly correspond. He next starts the main subject――the existence of impressions and ideas――and proposes to inquire which of them are causes and which effects.
He concludes that simple impressions are prior to their corresponding ideas, and that impressions are of two kinds――those of sensation and those of reflection. The first kind arise originally in the mind from unknown causes; the second are derived mostly from our ideas. Thus:――“An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases, and this we call an idea.1 This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. These are again copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas, which, perhaps, in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas.” At this stage he expresses his opinion that the examination of the sensations belongs more to the anatomists and natural philosophers than to mental science, and therefore he does not enter upon them.2
1 This is nearly the same as Hobbes’ doctrine.
2 Book I., sections 1, 2.
Memory and imagination he treats together, but neither of them at much length. The first, he says, retains a strong and vivid impression, the second only a much fainter one. The chief distinction between memory and imagination consists in the fact that the memory retains the impressions in the order and form in which it receives them, while the imagination is not at all restricted in this way, as its function is to transpose and change its ideas.1 This power of the imagination he connects with his exposition of the association of ideas.
1 Further on he says――“Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of imagination.... Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compared to those angels whom the Scriptures represent as covering their eyes with their wings.”――Book IV., section 7. Again, in his later work, _An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, he remarks ――“Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed the original stock of ideas furnished by the external and internal senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision.”――Section 5, Part II.
Ideas are associated in three ways――namely, by semblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. These relations are briefly explained as principles of association, with the remark that, of the three, the associative relations of causation are the most widely ramified. Among the effects of the association of ideas, the most remarkable are those complex ideas which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasonings, and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex ideas he divides into relations, modes, and substances; and proceeds to examine these.1
1 Book I., Part I., sections 3, 4. What he states above, however, should be compared with his treatment of the principles of association in his later work, _An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, section 3.
He classifies relations under seven general heads――(1) resemblance, the most essential requisite of philosophical relation; (2) identity; (3) space and time; (4) quantity or number; (5) objects having the same quantity, but in different degrees; (6) contrariety; and (7) cause and effect. He affirms that we have no idea of substance, except as a mere collection of particular qualities, and closes the first part of his treatise with a discussion of abstract ideas. He alludes to Berkeley’s view, and argues that abstract or general ideas are formed from individual and particular ones, and brings in the convenient term Custom, of which he makes so much use in his speculations――“If ideas be particular in their nature, and at the same time finite in their number, it is only by custom they can become general in their representation, and contain an infinite number of other ideas under them.”1
1 Book I., Part I., sections 5, 6, 7.
The second part of the Understanding contains a long and exceedingly penetrating discussion of the ideas of space and time. He opens with a few sentences of polished banter about the dispositions of philosophers and their disciples. The first serious point taken up is the doctrine of infinite divisibility, which is handled with consummate skill. Founding upon the limited power of the human mind, he proceeds vigorously to demolish it; and in the fourth section he puts it in this form:――“Our system concerning space and time consists of two parts, which are intimately connected together. The capacity of the mind is not infinite, consequently no idea of extension or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a finite number, and these simple and indivisible: it is, therefore, possible for space and time to exist conformable to this idea; and if it be possible, it is certain they actually do exist conformable to it, since their infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory.
“The other part of our system is a consequence of this. The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when not filled with something real and existent. The ideas of space and time are, therefore, no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or order in which objects exist; or, in other words, it is impossible to conceive a vacuum and extension without matter, or a time when there was no succession or change in any real existence.”1
1 Book I., Part II., sections 1, 2, 3, 4.
The discussion is carried on through other three sections with great animation and ingenuity, and culminates in the annunciation of absolute Idealism, thus:――“Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe――we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can we conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced.”1
1 Book I., Part II., sections 4, 5, 6.
The third part of the Understanding, which treats of knowledge and probability, is the longest in the book; many topics of great interest are handled in it; but I shall chiefly direct attention to his views on causation.
Knowledge and science mainly turn and rest on the various kinds of philosophical relation. He re-states the relations which have been already noticed in a preceding page, and expiscates them at length in his own manner. In treating causation, he begins by proposing to search for the origin of the idea; and finds it to be some relation among objects. He then seeks to discover what the relation itself is; but all that he discovers is that the two relations of contiguity and priority in time are essential to causation. But seeing that any object may be contiguous and prior to another without being considered as its cause, there is a necessary connection to be taken into account, and it is upon this, the most essential relation of causation, that he made his grand attack. It would be tedious to follow him through his long discussion, and in fact it is unnecessary; therefore, I will only indicate the lines of his method of investigating the subject, and its results.
He inquires why a cause is always necessary, and affirms that the real state of the question is “whether every object which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause; and this he continues, I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain.” After a very long exposition of the manner in which we reason beyond our immediate impressions, and conclude that particular causes must have particular effects, he takes up the discussion of the idea of necessary connection, and asks――“What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together? Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have no idea that is not derived from an impression, we must find some impression that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea.... Finding that it is always ascribed to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects supposed to be placed in that relation, and examine them in all the situations of which they are susceptible. I immediately perceive that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any further, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation between these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several instances.... Upon further inquiry I find that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For, after a frequent repetition, I find that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determined by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon its relation to the first object. It is this impression, then, or determination which affords me the idea of necessity.”
After more discussion of a negative cast, he reaches the following result:――“The necessary connection between causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustomed union. These are therefore the same.
“The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be derived from some internal impression or impression of reflection. There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity which custom produces, to pass from an object to its usual attendant. This, therefore, is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality of bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union.”
He further draws the following conclusions:――1. All causes are of the same kind, and there is no ground for the distinction, sometimes made, between efficient, formal, material, and final causes; for every cause is efficient, or, if it is not, there is no cause at all. 2. There is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause; and the distinction between moral and physical necessity has no foundation in nature. 3. The necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on intuitive or demonstrative evidence. 4. We can never have reason to believe that any object exists, if we cannot form an idea of it.1
1 Book I., Part III., sections 1‒6, _et seq._ On this subject of Causation, Hume never changed his views, for in his later work, the _Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, we find the following:――“When it is asked what is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact, the proper answer seems to be that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation, it may be replied in one word――Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience, this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication.... I shall content myself in this section with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the Understanding.” ――Section 4.
He repeats the statement that there is no connecting principle between cause and effect, which we can discover, and argues the point thus:――“These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may be justly inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connection between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert, that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.”――Section 4.
Again, “it appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connection among events arises from a number of similar instances, which occur, of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind――this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant――is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection. Nothing further is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea.... And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the Understanding, than the present? For surely, if there be any relation among objects, which it imports us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect.”――Section 7. Hume’s doctrine of causation, it will thus be seen, is the same in his latest works as in his earliest. I shall only adduce one other example of its application:――
“We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each other: their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible; but are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a Mind, even the Supreme Mind, operates either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection or our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. It is more difficult to conceive, that motion may arise from impulse, than that it may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases.”――Section 7.
In the fourth part of the book on the Understanding, Hume discusses Scepticism with regard to reason and the senses, touches briefly on ancient and modern philosophy, and treats at length of the immateriality of the soul and of personal identity. His treatment of the first of these subjects is of little real value, but his discussion on the senses is of more importance; while his handling of the immateriality of the soul and personal identity chiefly consists of a repetition and application of the negative principles, which he had before reached in the earlier parts of the book, and are therefore of less consequence. From the way in which he refers to the views of Spinoza, it is evident that he had never thoroughly studied the works of that great thinker. In the history of thought, indeed, Hume was not strong.
Touching reason, he says:――“When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my opinions than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed still further, to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.
“Should it here be asked me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in anything possessed of any measure of truth and falsehood; I should reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely or constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connection with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, of seeing the surrounding bodies when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine.”1
1 Book I., Part IV., section 1.
Now, touching the senses from a sceptical standpoint, Hume had already said, “that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression;” and, taking it for granted that body exists, he proposes to inquire into the causes which induce us to believe in its existence. He argues at length that by the senses we cannot know anything of continued or distinct existence. He then inquires how we attain the belief in the continued existence of the objects of the senses, and attributes it to the constancy and coherence of our impressions of them. He points out that when the mind starts in a particular train, it has a tendency to continue, even when objects fail it; and through this tendency we transform interrupted existence into continued existence. And, on his own theory of the mind, he accounts for our believing in this imagined continuity.
In the section on personal identity, he denies in the abstract the existence of self, and could find nothing to give us the impression of an unchangeable self. He observes “that the true idea of the human mind is, to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas, and these in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases another and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn.... As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, it is to be considered, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we should never have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitutes our self or person.”1
1 Book I., Part IV., sections 2, 6.
Before passing from Hume’s exposition of the Understanding, which is the most important part of his philosophy, let us recapitulate the leading points. It has to be observed that he develops a system of the human mind. 1. There are impressions, perceptions, and ideas, of which we are conscious; and, although we may imagine that we know external things as objects of perception, still, in reality we know nothing but our own impressions and perceptions. 2. Therefore, we know nothing of an actual external world save as a phenomenon, which may be, for ought we can ever know, a creation of our own minds――the world of imagination. 3. Since our notion of Causation is nothing but a generated habit of looking at our impressions, perceptions, and ideas as constantly conjoined in the relations of contiguity and succession――a mere result which custom has engrafted on human belief――beyond this we can have no idea of any power, force, energy, or necessary connection in causation. 4. Thus, as already indicated, Hume’s system of the mind is a form of absolute Idealism; in short, he embraced the idealistic principles of Berkeley, excepting that portion of them relating to a separate soul or spirit, which in the bishop’s own system played so important a part. Even granting the truth of Hume’s starting-point, and his fundamental principles, still a large part of his treatment of the Understanding may be fairly described as reasoning in a circle; for he proposes to examine, to clear up, and to solve difficulties, but he often returns to his original point of departure without disclosing anything at all, save the inevitable impressions and ideas in the universe of the imagination.
Passing to the Second Book of the Treatise, which is devoted to the treatment of the passions, under this general term he includes impressions of reflection, emotions, desires, and appetites; and divides them into two main classes,――the direct and indirect passions, which are all founded on pleasure and pain. He enumerates the direct as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security, together with the will; the indirect class embraces pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, and others associated with these. He also distinguishes the reflective emotions, as the calm and the violent:――“Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, etc. This division is far from exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion as to become, in a manner, imperceptible.”1 He gives a description and a kind of natural history of the several groups of passions, in which much insight and acute thinking are displayed.
1 Book II., Part I., section 1.
His usual method of explanation is to fix upon one or two generic passions, and then, by a vigorous process of argument and reasoning, mainly of a deductive form, to show their nature, their relation to other passions, and their modes of manifestation and influence. I can only afford space for a short specimen of his manner of exposition in this department, taken from the section on property and riches:――“For the same reason that riches cause pleasure and pride, and poverty excites uneasiness and humility, power must produce the former emotions, and slavery the latter. Power, or an authority over others, makes us capable of satisfying all our desires; as slavery, by subjecting us to the will of others, exposes us to a thousand wants and mortifications.
“It is here worth observing that the vanity of power, or shame of slavery, are much augmented by the consideration of the persons over whom we exercise our authority, or who exercise it over us. For supposing it possible to frame statutes of such an admirable mechanism that they could move and act in obedience to the will, it is evident the possession of them would give pleasure and pride, but not to such a degree as the same authority, when exercised over sensible and rational creatures, whose condition, being compared to our own, makes it seem more agreeable and honourable. Comparison is in every case a sure method of augmenting our esteem of anything. A rich man feels the felicity of his condition better by opposing it to that of the beggar. But there is a peculiar advantage in power, by the contrast which is, in a manner, presented to us between ourselves and the person we command. The comparison is obvious and natural. The imagination finds in it the very subject. The passage of the thought to its conception is smooth and easy. And that this circumstance has a considerable effect in augmenting its influence, will appear afterwards in examining the nature of malice and envy.”1
1 Book II., Part I., section 10.
He treats on the will at length, and maintains that it is controlled by the strongest motive; and he emphatically asserts that reason alone can never afford a motive to any action of the will, nor oppose passion in the direction of the will. “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Reason operates without producing any sensible emotion, and, except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, scarcely ever gives any pleasure or uneasiness.
But it is evident that there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they are real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling. These desires are either (1) certain instincts originally implanted in our nature, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or (2) the general appetite to good and aversion to evil.1 Besides these calm passions there are other violent emotions which have a great influence on the will, such as impending evils which raise our fears and aversions, and produce a sensible emotion. The common error of philosophers has been to ascribe the direction of the will to one of these principles, and in supposing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly contrary to their interest; for this reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counteract a strong passion in the pursuit of their interests and designs. “It is not therefore the present uneasiness alone which determines them. In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and, where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposition of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; though we may easily observe there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire.”2
1 Touching this distinction of the calm passions and desires, and the function assigned to them, Hume so far seems to follow Hutcheson.
2 Book II., Part III., section 3. Locke had stated that the strongest immediate desire, or, as he sometimes phrased it, “the present uneasiness,” determines the will to action; in effect his theory was that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, but the theory is better stated by Hume.
Hume, however, did not thoroughly develop the relation between belief and will. He merely says, what I have already indicated in a preceding page, “that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting of all our passions, the calm as well as the violent.” But he gives no satisfactory exposition of belief in its relation to the will, although he touches on it in his later work――_An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, section 5.
In the Third Book, Hume explains his moral views as originally advanced in the _Treatise of Human Nature_; and in an advertisement to it he expresses a hope that it may be understood by ordinary readers, with as little attention as is usually accorded to books of reasoning. As we have already seen, he maintains that reason alone can never be a motive of action, or impulse of the will; accordingly, he insists that moral distinctions are not derived from reason, but from a moral sense. What constitutes this moral sense, however, he failed to render explicit: and there is a lack of precision on the moral faculty, in the original development of his system. He recognises sympathy as the chief source of moral distinctions, which, along with utility, seems to form the foundation of his ethical views. The following is the clearest expression of his moral doctrines which I have found in the _Treatise of Human Nature_:――
“Most people will readily allow that the useful qualities of the mind are virtuous, because of their utility. This way of thinking is so natural, and occurs on so many occasions, that few will make any scruple of admitting it. Now, this being once admitted, the force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowledged. Virtue is considered as means to an end. Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued. But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone. To that principle, therefore, we must ascribe the sentiment of approbation, which arises from the survey of all those virtues that are useful to society or to the person possessed of them. These form the most considerable part of morality.”1
1 Book III., Part III., section 6. It may be observed that the influence of the current moral theories are visible in the views of Hume.
In his attempts to account for the origin of society, and of property, he adopts the deductive method. He usually states certain propositions, and then proceeds to adduce arguments in support of the conclusions which he intends to establish; still his treatment of these subjects is always interesting and often ingenious, although quite unhistorical and imaginary. His conception of the problem of the origin of government resembles that advanced by Hobbes, only it is not so violent; as Hume had more polish than the sage of Malmesbury.
Having now completed my account of Hume’s system as it was originally conceived and advanced; but seeing that he himself averred that his matured ethical views were embodied in his later work, _An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_, I shall briefly summarise his moral principles from this famed production.
It consists of nine sections, which treat the following topics:――“The general principles of Morals; Benevolence; Justice; Political Society; Why Utility pleases; Qualities useful to ourselves; Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves; Qualities immediately agreeable to others; Conclusion.” In an appendix, the points of “moral sentiment, self-love, justice, and verbal disputes” are treated. If we were only to look at the conception, the execution, and the limits of this treatise, it might be pronounced an admirable production. The main difference between it and the corresponding part in the _Treatise of Human Nature_, lies in the greater importance ascribed to utility in the later work.
1. As in it utility or a reference to the happiness of mankind is the standard of right and wrong, and also the ground and motive of moral approbation. 2. While the moral faculty itself assumes the form of a compound of reason and generous sentiment. 3. He insists warmly on the existence and importance of the sentiment of benevolence, but hardly recognises it as leading to any uncompensated self-sacrifice. 4. Touching the varied and great constituents of human happiness, he is meagre and defective. 5. He accepts the prevailing moral code of the society of his day. 6. According to his view, the inducements to virtue are, on the one side, our humane sentiments, and on the other, our self-love; the two classes of motives concurring to promote both our own good and the good of mankind. 7. The connection of ethics with politics is not developed; he does not distinguish the legal sanction of morality from the popular sanction; he draws no line between duty and merit. 8. He recognises no connection between ethics and religion. Such then are the leading principles of this remarkable treatise, which for long served as a text-book to utilitarian moralists.
Touching Hume’s other writings, I must be brief. His essay on _Miracles_ is exceedingly well worked out. His argumentation is entirely founded on the principle that experience is our only guide in estimating and appreciating the force and the value of evidence; but he also strengthens this position by a free use of every available weapon, that is, every passion, sentiment, feeling, and weakness of the human mind, were called into requisition as elements of the problem, and all employed with great sagacity and ingenuity. A short quotation will confirm this, and indicate his method.
“With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received――their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense, and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretension to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality. He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause. Or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any circumstances, and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence. What judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects. Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence, and his impudence overpowers their credulity.”
He observes that records of miracles are found to abound most among ignorant and barbarous communities, and that when they are found among civilised nations, they are merely transmitted from the former. He also notices that the earliest annals of all nations are full of prodigies, omens, oracles, and judgments, which almost hide the few natural facts that are mixed with them; but, as we advance nearer to the enlightened ages, these mysterious and irregular phenomena become less and less prominent, though never entirely extirpated from human nature.
His ultimate conclusion was this:――“That no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle and make it a just foundation for any system of religion. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the ordinary course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history.”1
1 _Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, section 10. Hume’s own opinion of his main argument was this:――“I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I suppose, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.”
The chief value of this essay was that it presented a very able examination of the various circumstances, influences, and conditions which are apt to colour, exaggerate, and otherwise affect the evidence of certain classes of facts and events. It is a kind of inquiry for which Hume possessed unmatched qualifications.
As already mentioned, his _Natural History of Religion_ appeared in 1757: it consists of a short introduction, and fifteen sections. Following his usual method, he began with a general statement to the effect that polytheism was the primary religion of mankind, and then proceeds by arguments and reasoning to prove this general proposition. Thus the work is argumentative rather than historical, although he uses historical examples to confirm his propositions and arguments. It may be observed that the origins and the causes of early religions have now been far more satisfactorily explained than was possible in Hume’s day.
His _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, published after his death, are highly polished in style, and handle in a speculative form various interesting topics. But they are somewhat monotonous, and in fact contain little which had not before appeared in his other publications.
Concerning the value of Hume’s philosophy as a whole, it must be characterised as incomplete, which is partly a consequence of its sceptical foundation. He raises many questions and difficulties which he does not solve; while he often comes to unsatisfactory conclusions, by taking up the principles of Locke and Berkeley, and driving them to their logical issues.1
1 Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume I., footnotes, pages 129, 444, 457, 489; _Discussions_, page 85, _et seq._; _Lectures_, Volume I., pages 294, 373. Hamilton says:――“The sceptic ... cannot himself lay down his premises, he can only accept them from the dogmatist; if false the sooner they are exposed in their real character the better. Accepting his principles from the dominant philosophies of Locke and Leibnitz, and deducing with irresistible evidence these principles to their legitimate results, Hume showed by the extreme absurdity of these results themselves, either that philosophy was a delusion, or that the individual systems which afforded the premises were erroneous or incomplete. He thus constrained philosophers to the alternative, either of surrendering philosophy as null, or of ascending to higher principles, in order to re-establish it against the sceptical reduction. The dilemma of Hume constitutes perhaps the most wonderful crisis in the history of philosophy; for out of it the whole subsequent philosophy of Europe has taken its rise.” ――_Lectures_, Volume I., pages 394‒395.
Mr. J. S. Mill thought that Hamilton was wrong in his opinion of the scope and end of Hume’s philosophy, and expresses his own conviction “that Hume sincerely accepted both the premises and the conclusions of his own system.” ――Mill’s _Examination of Hamilton_, page 554.
Owing to a concurrence of various circumstances, Hume’s speculations have had a direct and wide influence on subsequent philosophy, psychology, ethics, theology, and criticism. In psychology he has had eminent followers in Britain and in other countries; while the sceptical side of his system has had much influence in many directions. But his doctrine of causation appeared to some thinkers as the most pressing problem which he had raised; and it was chiefly this doctrine which suggested to Kant the necessity of a new and thorough examination and criticism of the faculties of the human mind. While Kant’s own chief works, thus suggested, have in turn been the main source whence modern speculation has since radiated. Under varied modifications, Hume’s influence on Scottish philosophy was direct and important in its results.
Another notable consequence of the critically sceptical side of Hume’s writings, sprang from his suggestions concerning the methods of testing evidence, which touched both scientific and historical researches. He showed that the current modes of estimating historical evidence were extremely defective, and also boldly exposed the weakness of some of the grounds of belief. To this we owe Campbell’s _Essay on Miracles_, not to mention, at the same time other works of less note. In short, Hume’s influence was widely felt in culture, science, and historic criticism.
According to the best contemporary testimony, personally, Hume was a most exemplary man. Adam Smith’s character of him is well known; but I will quote the verdict of another of his contemporaries, a man who was a good judge of character, and knew Hume well. “At this time (1753), David Hume was living in Edinburgh and composing his _History of Great Britain_. He was a man of great knowledge, and of a social and benevolent temper, and truly the best-natured man in the world. He was branded with the title of Atheist, on account of the many attacks on revealed religion that are to be found in his philosophical works, and in many places of his history――the last which are still more objectionable than the first, which a friendly critic might call only sceptical. _Apropos_ of this, when Mr. Robert Adam, the celebrated architect, and his brother lived in Edinburgh with their mother, an aunt of Dr. Robertson’s, and a very respectable woman, she said to her son, ‘I shall be glad to see any of your companions to dinner, but I hope you will never bring the Atheist here to disturb my peace.’ But Robert soon fell on a method to reconcile her to him, for he introduced him under another name, or concealed it carefully from her. When the company parted she said to her son, ‘I must confess that you bring very agreeable companions about you, but the large jolly man who sat next me is the most agreeable of them all.’ ‘This was the very Atheist,’ said he, ‘mother, that you were so much afraid of.’ ‘Well,’ says she, ‘you may bring him here as much as you please, for he’s the most innocent, agreeable, facetious man I ever met with.’ This was truly the case with him; for though he had much learning and a fine taste, and was professedly a sceptic, though by no means an Atheist, he had the greatest simplicity of mind and manners, with the utmost facility and benevolence of temper, of any man I ever knew. His conversation was truly irresistible, for while it was enlightened it was very naïve.”1
1 _Autobiography of the Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle_, pages 272‒273, 1860. This production contains a good deal of small gossiping, and some important and useful information.
SECTION II.
_Adam Smith._
Adam Smith was one of Hume’s most beloved and intimate friends. Smith ultimately limited his researches to special departments of moral and economical science. In these he was the more exhaustive thinker of the two, even if his efforts were less striking than those of his illustrious contemporary.
He was born at Kirkcaldy in 1723, and he lived till 1790. He was educated at the University of Glasgow, and attended the lectures of Hutcheson, then professor of moral philosophy. From Glasgow he went to Oxford, where he seems to have greatly widened the range of his culture, and thus laid the foundation of the vast stores of information, which he ultimately turned to so good account. He returned to Scotland in 1746, with the hope of obtaining a professorship in one of the Universities. In 1748, under the patronage of Lord Kames, Smith delivered a course of lectures on rhetoric in Edinburgh. He was appointed professor of logic in the University of Glasgow, in 1751; but in the following year he was transferred to the chair of moral philosophy, a position more in accord with his taste and aspiration.
In this chair his teaching covered a wide field. He divided his course of lectures into four parts:――(1) natural theology; (2) ethics; (3) justice, or that part of morality which can be stated under precise rules; (4) political science, in which he delivered some of the thoughts, afterwards embodied in his _Wealth of Nations_. In 1763, he was persuaded to resign his chair, and undertake the education of the young Duke of Buccleuch.
He travelled with his pupil abroad for about three years, chiefly in France, where he became personally acquainted with some of the leading men of letters and philosophers of that nation. On his return to Scotland, he retired to Kirkcaldy; and there, in the society of his mother, intently applied himself for ten years to inquiry and study, the results of which appeared in 1776, in his famous work, _The Wealth of Nations_. During the last twenty years of his life he held the post of Commissioner of Customs in Scotland. A few days before his death, he caused all his unpublished manuscripts to be burned, except a few comparatively short essays.1
1 These were published in a volume after his death, and consist of six, on the following subjects:――“A History of Astronomy;” “A History of Ancient Physics;” “A History of Ancient Logic and Metaphysics;” “An Essay on the Imitative Arts;” “On certain English and Italian Verses;” “On the External Senses.” His earliest efforts were a review of Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary and _Observations on the State of Learning in Europe_, which appeared in 1755, in a periodical called the _Edinburgh Review_.
Personally, Adam Smith was a grave-looking man, of a stout middle height, with prominent features and grey eyes. He was simple, warm-hearted, and kindly in disposition. His intellectual operations were calm, regular, and patient. He mastered a subject slowly but thoroughly, and carried his principles with a steady tenacity and invincible persistence through immense masses of facts and details on to wonderfully successful results. He was gifted with a remarkably strong memory, and had acquired a wide knowledge of English, French, and Italian literature; indeed the learning which he brought to bear on the subject of his chief work was amazingly various and great. But I will first direct attention to his charming work on Morals.
His _Theory of Moral Sentiments_ was first published in 1757; and soon became popular, as one of the most interesting and attractive books in the circle of ethical literature. Its distinctive feature is that the operation of human sympathy is the prime factor of moral sentiments: that mankind are so constituted as to sympathise with each other’s feelings, and to feel pleasure in the consonance of these feelings, are the simple facts on which Smith’s moral theory is founded.
His treatise is divided into seven parts, in the following order:――(1) of the propriety of action; (2) of merit and demerit, or the objects of reward and punishment; (3) of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct; (4) of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation; (5) of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation; (6) of the character of virtue; (7) of systems of moral philosophy. Such is the arrangement of the main heads of his theory, as given in the sixth edition; I will show its general scope, without entering into details.
The influence of Hutcheson and of Hume can be traced in several parts of Smith’s work, although his conception and application of the fundamental idea of his system differs from theirs. He is really original in his applications and illustrations. Analytically, his treatise is not remarkable; its merits rather lie in the practical and hortatory discourse, in the eloquent criticisms of character, and the fine illustrations of virtuous conduct with which it abounds, and are presented in a naturally copious, easy, flowing, and fascinating style. The chief blemish of his style is an excess of language――a running into redundance.
In Smith’s time the chief questions agitated, touched the foundation of morality――the standard of right and wrong, and the nature of the moral faculty.
He begins by stating that sympathy is the origin and source of moral approbation. “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he desires nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.” Thus, sympathy being one of the original passions of human nature, we may see it in the immediate passing of an emotion from one person to another, even when one does not know the cause of another’s grief or joy. Sympathy originates in the imagination, which alone enables us to enter into the sentiments and feelings of others; as we can easily imagine ourselves in the position of another, by simply changing places with him in fancy, by reflecting on what our own sentiments would be in a similar difficulty. Thus we can feel in some degree what the suffering or joy of another really is; so the feeling of a spectator corresponds to what, by bringing the case of another home to himself, he imagines should be that other’s sentiments; since sympathy is based on an original tendency to reflect the emotional states of those around us. We therefore form our moral ideas from observation and reflection on the sentiments and emotions of our neighbours.1
1 The following remarks on the operations of sympathy are from Mr. Sully’s able, careful, and valuable work, _Outlines of Psychology_, published in 1884:――“Sympathy in its simplest form shows itself in an unconscious reproduction or imitation of another’s feeling. The mind of the person affected does not consciously represent or dwell on the feeling which affects him, but simply vibrates in unison with it.
“This tendency manifests itself very early. There is possibly some instinctive knowledge of the signs of feeling, and connected with this, a native disposition to answer smile with smile.... But some amount of individual experience is needed for fixing the connection between the several feelings and their external expression. When this is acquired the child tends automatically to take on the moods of hilarity, anxiety, depression, of those about him. This appears to be due to the working of an imitative impulse which leads to the more or less complete adoption of the external attitude, gesture, tone,” etc. In a note he says――“That the child has a vague intuitive knowledge of other’s feelings seems to be shown by the fact that he responds to the smile of his mother long before his own experience could have taught him to associate pleasurable feeling with this particular facial movement.”――Pages 508‒511.
I have for a long period specially observed the early development of conscious feeling, and intelligence in infants; and my observation as to the primitive nature of sympathy agrees with Mr. Sully’s view.
But concerning the record of the signs of intelligence which Mr. Darwin has given of several of his own infants, my observation of infants does not tally with his. Taking the ages by months, I have found more signs of intelligence in infants than he did. For instance, I have found unmistakable signs of memory in relation to external and inanimate objects, in infants of three and four months old. Again, with regard to vision, I have observed an infant of four months old, fixing its eyes, and looking steadily at the flag on the top of the mast of a ship, at a considerable distance off.
Accord of feeling produces pleasure, and consciousness of its absence pain. As the sympathy of others is more necessary for us in grief than in joy, we are more desirous to communicate to others our disagreeable feelings than our agreeable ones. “The agreeable passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure. The bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing consolation of sympathy.” But we are pleased ourselves if we can sympathise with another’s success or misfortune, and pained if we cannot.
The amount of pleasure or pain felt by one person in the conduct or feelings of another is the measure of his approbation or the contrary. Thus the sentiments of anyone are just and proper, or the reverse, according as they coincide or not with the sentiments of someone else, who observe them; while his approbation varies according to the degree in which he can sympathise with them. A full accord of sentiments means perfect approbation. Just as a man’s sympathetic indignation fails to correspond to mine, according as his compassion falls short of my grief, does he feel a stronger or weaker disapproval of my feelings. Moral and intellectual approbation admits of a similar explanation: for to approve or disapprove of the opinions of others is only to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own; so to approve or disapprove of their feelings and emotions is merely to mark a similar agreement or disagreement between our own and theirs. Thus it appears that the sentiments of each individual are the standard of the correctness of another’s, for we can hardly judge of matters of sentiment by any other canon than the correspondent affections in ourselves; and the only measure by which any man can judge of the faculty of another is by his own faculty of a similar kind. On our efforts to sympathise with the feeling and passion of others are founded the gentle virtues of condescension, toleration, and humanity; while the sterner virtues of self-denial and self-command are founded on our effort to attune our passions and feelings to such a pitch as others can approve. The harmonious operation of these two sides of virtue, feeling much for others, and little for ourselves, restraining our selfish, and cultivating our benevolent affections, constitutes the highest perfection of human nature.1
1 Smith’s work must be read itself to attain a full conception of the richness of its illustrations and its attractive character.
He does not directly face the problem of the supreme end of life, nor propose the question whether virtue and morality are only means to the attainment of happiness; but it is pretty evident that he admits the utilitarian view of happiness. He makes no great effort to analyse human happiness, but says that it consists in tranquility and enjoyment; for without tranquility there can be no enjoyment, and with it there is scarcely anything that may not prove a source of pleasure. “In ease of body and peace of mind all the different ranks of life are nearly on a level, and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the highway possesses that security which kings are fighting for.... What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is not in debt, and has a clear conscience? If you would live freely, fearlessly, and independently, never come within the circle of ambition.... Power and riches are enormous and operose machines, consisting of springs the most nice and delicate, and which, in spite of all our care, are ready every moment to burst into pieces, and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessors.”
One of the most interesting parts of his book is the account which he gives of the many fortuitous circumstances which affect the sentiments and moral judgments of men. The most important of these irregular influences spring from the different positions of prosperity and adversity, custom or fashion. As those in high social positions are not exactly judged with the same strictness as the poor and humble, in equal degrees of merit there is hardly anyone who does not show more respect for the rich and great than for the poor and humble; while an equal, or even a far greater, amount of vice and folly is regarded with less aversion and contempt in the former, than in the latter. He explains that this arises in our sympathetic emotions: as these enter more vividly into the joys than into the sorrows of others, we consequently feel far more pleasure in the condition of the rich than in that of the poor; for we are apt to imagine the one class happy, but the other wretchedly unhappy. So, it is agreeable to sympathise with joy, but painful to enter into grief; and where there is no envy in the case, our inclination to sympathise with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathise with sorrow; and hence our disposition to admire the rich and powerful, and to despise the poor and lowly.
The longest and concluding division of his treatise is devoted to a review of other systems of moral philosophy; and from his own standpoint he gives an able and interesting account of them.
To sum up according to Smith, conscience is a derived faculty:――1. We do not begin with a moral consciousness by which we learn to judge of others, but from our judgments about others we acquire a moral consciousness of ourselves. Thus conscience is formed from the central principle of sympathy. 2. The general rules of morality are ultimately founded on experience of what, in particular instances, our moral sentiments approve or condemn; they are not intuitions supplied by nature. Moral rules are formed from experience, by an inductive process, not deduced from a general principle. The sense of duty and the feeling of obligation are both acquired from experience. 3. He recognises the existence of a benevolent and all-wise Being, who will ultimately redress all injustice; but what the Supreme Being approves must be inferred from the principles of benevolence. Our regard for Him should be shown, not in frivolous observances and ceremonies, but by a course of just and beneficent action.
Although his theory of morals cannot be accepted as satisfactory, still it holds an important place in the history of ethical systems. Its defects have often been pointed out, and it is unnecessary to enter into any further criticism of it. Smith did great service in developing the varied operations and manifestations of the sympathetic principle.
Let us now turn to his other famous work, _The Wealth of Nations_. It consists of five Books, each of which are divided into a number of chapters, but many of the chapters are again divided into parts and articles; and although there is a principle of method in it, still it is defective in the arrangement of materials, and abounds with digressions. Some of the subjects embraced in it are not economical, except in the most general sense; and though this wide range of topics enhances the value of the work, the task of presenting a just account of it is rendered more difficult.
The first book deals with the causes of improvement in the productive powers of labour, and of the order in which its produce is naturally distributed among the people. The treatment of this subject extends to eleven chapters, with a long digression concerning the variations in the value of silver throughout the four preceding centuries; the variations in the proportion between the respective values of gold and silver; and the different effects of the progress of improvement upon three different kinds of rude produce. This digression occupies about a third of the book; but it contains a vast and varied mass of facts and economical information.
Smith begins his great exposition with the simple proposition that labour is the real source of wealth; that the amount of labour expended upon any article is the true measure of its value, and that when this is ascertained as between different commodities, their exchange value will, in the long run, be regulated by it; that all exchangeable commodities are wealth, and not gold and silver only. “What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body.... Labour is the first price, the original purchase money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.... But, though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is often difficult to ascertain the proportions between the two different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different kinds of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and the ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account,” and many other circumstances.1
1 Introduction, Book I., chapter 5, pages 31, 32. I uniformly refer to Rogers’ edition of _The Wealth of Nations_, in two volumes, published in 1869. Touching labour, Smith further says:――“Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the only accurate measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare the values of different commodities at all times and places.”――_Ibid._, page 38.
He explains the division of labour; the origin and use of money; the component parts of the price of commodities; the natural and market price of commodities; wages; the profits of stock; wages and profits in the different employments of labour and stock; inequalities arising from the nature of the employments themselves, and inequalities occasioned by the policy of Europe. Then comes a long chapter on the rent of land, concerning which he is explicit and exceedingly interesting. Among other things he says:――
“As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they have never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them, and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land.”
He states that the landlord exacts from the tenant for the use of a portion of land the highest rent which the latter can afford to pay in the circumstances, and that he even sometimes demands rent for what is utterly incapable of human improvement. He adduces telling evidence of this, in connection with the kelp trade and the fishing trade, in Scotland, thus:――“Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline salt, useful for making glass, soap, and several other purposes. It grows in several parts of Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon such rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice every day covered with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by human industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded by a kelp-shore of this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn-fields.
“The sea in the neighbourhood of the Islands of Shetland is more than commonly abundant in fish, which make a great part of the subsistence of their inhabitants. But in order to profit by the produce of the water, they must have a habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord is in proportion, not to what the farmer can make by the land, but to what he can make both by the land and by the water. It is partly paid in sea-fish; and one of the very few instances in which rent makes a part of the price of that commodity is to be found in that country.
“The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford to give.”1
1 Book I., chaps. 6, 7, Volume I., pages 52, 153, 171, 175, _et seq._ Smith treats the subject of land rent at great length, and with marked ability; although his exposition in some points is defective, still he comes much nearer the truth than Ricardo, who accounts for the origin of rent on merely abstract and imaginary grounds.
In the second book, he treats of the nature, the accumulation, and the employment of stock; and through five chapters expounds this division of political economy. He explicates the nature of stocks, the effects of its accumulation into capitals of different kinds; the effect of the different employments of these kinds of capital; the nature and operation of money, considered as a particular branch of the general stock of society; and the different effects which the different employments of capital immediately produce upon the quantity both of national industry and of the annual produce of land and labour.
His exposition of these matters is minute and exhaustive. Commencing with the man of the most limited means, or the individual who has no income but what he derives from his labour, he then proceeds to show how the man who possesses stock and capital, after reserving a sufficient quantity for his own immediate consumption, may employ his capital in manufacturing wares, producing goods, and selling them again for a profit. Or it may be employed in the improvement of land, and in many other ways.
Extending his view, he states that the general stock of any civilised country is the same with that of all its inhabitants, and naturally divides itself into three portions, each of which has a different function. The first portion is reserved for immediate consumption, and its characteristic is, that it affords no profit, as it consists of the stock of food, clothes, household furniture, and so on. The second portion of the general stock is the fixed capital, and its characteristic is that it affords a revenue without circulating or changing masters. It consists chiefly of the following things:――(1) All useful machines and instruments which facilitate or abridge labour; (2) all those profitable buildings which are the means of procuring a revenue, not only to their proprietor, who lets them for a rent, but to the person who occupies them, and pays that rent for them――such as shops, warehouses, workshops, halls, farmhouses, and so on; (3) improvements of land, by clearing, draining, enclosing, manuring, and reducing it to the fittest condition for tillage; (4) the acquired and useful abilities of all the members of the community, which represent a considerable amount of fixed capital, yielding income. The third and last portion of the general stock is the circulating capital, and its characteristic is that it affords profit only by circulating or changing masters. He explains the functions of money at great length, and shows that it is merely a circulating medium of convenience and exchange. “The great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the society to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in the course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man the revenue which properly belongs to him, make themselves no part of that revenue.”1
1 Book II., chapters 2, 5; Volume I., pages 287, 289, 290, 379. Mr. Rogers gives some very interesting notes on capital, of which the following is a part:――“Most writers on political economy, misled by the fact that the advances of the capitalist are the means by which labour is for a certain present period supported, have given excessive prominence to the doctrine of a ‘labour fund,’ and have exaggerated the importance of this fund to those who live by wages. The fact is, the capitalist employer is nothing but a representative of the division of labour, or of employments.... The capitalist is only a convenience to labourer and consumer. This distinction is very important. There is no fund, except temporarily, between the capitalist and the labourer. Both are paid wages, one for producing, the other distributing; and the consumer pays the wages of both.”――Note by Rogers,